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ABSTRACT
Plato is a philosophical theologian in whom philosophy and theology are
synonymous, and the way of philosophy a religious endeavour. However, contemporary
scholarship overlooks the importance of the religious dimension ofPlato's philosophy,
and in particular, neglects an examination of the theological ideas that are involved in this
understanding. In answer to this, the thesis argues that, in Plato, philosophy is a religious
human experience, that it is within such a perspective that Plato's philosophical theology
can be properly understood, and that such a perspective provides both theological and
philosophical insights. The thesis offers a unique contribution to scholarship in that it
examines the issues ofPlato's philosophical theology from the perspective of Plato's
philosophy as a religious experience. Secondly, it relates the question of the religious
nature of Plato's philosophy to the issue of humanity by seeing Plato's philosophy as a
means of human transformation and as a religious way of life and existence. And thirdly,
by interacting with recent scholarly interpretation and commentary, seeks ways in which
such a perspective provides insights for contemporary theological and philosophical
thought. To examine these issues, the thesis employs two overarching themes:
philosophy as a religious experience as involved directly with the question of the human
situation and life, and the human experience of the divine in Plato. Chapters One and
Two consider, respectively, Plato's philosophy as a way of salvation and transformation
in the individual and society, and the idea of the philosophical life. Chapters Three
through Five examine the religious experience of the Forms as divine reality and the
meaning to human existence, the idea of the personal relationship between the
philosopher and the divine, and the philosophical experience of divine inexpressibility.
Lastly, in the Conclusion, I seek to apply the idea of Plato's philosophy as a religious
experience to a contemporary context by raising several of the important issues that are
involved when Plato's philosophy is realised as a religious way of life today. The thesis
concludes that what is manifested in Plato is a deep interrelation between philosophical
and religious thought which gives rise to a vibrant and insightful philosophical theology
of Plato's philosophy as a religious human experience.
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Now, had Tashtego perished in that head, it had been a very precious perishing;
smothered in the very whitest and daintiest of fragrant spermaceti; coffined, hearsed, and
tombed in the secret inner chamber and sanctum sanctorum of the whale. Only one
sweeter end can readily be recalled - the delicious death of an Ohio honey-hunter, who
seeking honey in the crotch of a hollow tree, found such exceeding store of it, that
leaning too far over, it sucked him in, so that he died embalmed. How many, think ye,
have likewise fallen into Plato's honey head, and sweetly perished there?
— Herman Melville, Moby Dick
INTRODUCTION
In Plato, philosophical and religious thought interrelate. As Iris Murdoch
reflects,
Plato.. .would not have made any sharp distinction between philosophy and
religious reflection... .Plato's work is full of images and myths at which we
must work to see what they mean in terms of everyday morals. Plato is not a
remote or abstract or purely 'intellectualist' thinker. He is very close to our
own religious and moral tradition, being indeed one of its founders. The
mythology of religion does not necessarily vanish but finds a new and
different place as religion is newly understood.1
This interrelationship between religious reflection and philosophical thought is so
profound in Plato, that for the ancient writers, Plato is looked upon, in the words of
Gerard Watson, 'not as the philosopher but as the theologian par excellence.'2
Indeed, a well-known notion is that the word 'theology' (GeoXoyia), or 'speech
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about the gods', is the invention of Plato himself. But, further, it is the endeavour of
philosophy ((fnkoaocjila) itself, literally as the 'love ofwisdom' which, in Plato,
proves just as seminal as a religious idea. Such a meaning is reflected in Diogenes
Laertius who writes in his, Lives ofthe Eminent Philosophers, that Plato's definition
ofphilosophy is,
the science of those things which are objects of thought and really existent,
the science which, he [Plato] says, is concerned with God and the soul as
separate from the body. And especially by wisdom he means, philosophy,
which is a yearning for divine wisdom.4
In a more modern commentary, Andre-Jean Festugiere comments that it is the quest
1 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Penguin Books, 1992), 510. Murdoch suggests
that the blurred boundaries ofphilosophy and religion can be witnessed in modern times in Indian
thinkers.
2 Gerard Watson, Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion ofGod, 29.
3
Republic 379a, which is centred in a discussion about the restraining of poets from saying things that
are untrue about the gods. See J. O. Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary (Duckworth,
1990), 164.
4
Diogenes Laertius, Lives ofthe Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, The Loeb Classical Library (William
Heinemann: London, 1925), 333. R. J. Hawkins in TheOxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, 1995) notes Laertius as having, 'a taste for anecdote and paradox, but no talent for
philosophical exposition.' (202) Some have even termed him as 'gossipy'. Some have said that
Laertius' definition reflects that which is part of his time: Platonic thought of the second century. Yet,
his words reflect the nuance of Plato's Dialogues at face reading. Also, historically, it reflects the
thought of what those who are chronologically closer to Plato think, which would be foolish to simply
toss aside as irrelevant.
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for the 'Eternal' that is the 'profound current which moves the Platonic doctrine'5 as,
only the eternal exists because it alone is unchanging. All else that the sense
perceive, is fleeting and corruptible. They pass, the Eternal remains.6
What philosophy is, in Plato, is that which is directly involved with a religious
dimension, even a religious quest in which the love ofwisdom is, to borrow James
Mackey's phrase of Greek philosophy in general, 'basically coterminous' with
religion.7
For Plato, philosophy is not only the contemplation of the divine, but is a way
of life and existence in light of that contemplation. As Pierre Hadot establishes
throughout his work, Philosophy as a Way ofLife: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates
to Foucault, the ancient conception of philosophy is a way of life for the
philosopher and not simply an exercise of the mind. In the case of Plato, Plato's
philosophy is given so that humanity may have a better existence, so that it may be
transformed by the philosophising. As Werner Jaeger notes, the word 'conversion'
itself arises in Plato, as the adopting of a philosophy meant a change in a person's
life.9 A similar point is made by Ilham Dilman who points out in his, Philosophy
and the Philosophic Life that, to Plato, 'philosophy was like a person's morality or
religion, something that could inform and change the whole of his life.'1
This 'religious' dimension of Plato's philosophy may be defined by the
interrelation of two ideas: one, that Plato centres his philosophy upon the encounter
with, and experience of the divine and eternal, and secondly, that philosophy is a way
of existence and life that is lived in light of this divine encounter. Although no full
or exhaustive definition of the term 'religious' exists, these two aspects are central to
the use of the term in connection with Plato. Bernard McGinn is helpful in
establishing this understanding of'religious' when he defines the term 'mysticism' in
5 Andre-Jean Festugiere, Personal Religion Among the Greeks (University of California Press:
Berkeley, 1954), 42.
6Ibid.
7 James Mackey, The Christian Experience ofGod as Trinity (SCM Press Ltd: London, 1983), 282 n.
34.
8 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way ofLife: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, Arnold
Davidson, editor, translated by Michael Chase (Blackwell, 1996).
9 Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Belknap Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 10.
Jaeger notes that A.D. Nock and his work, Conversion (Oxford, 1933), compares the conversion of
new followers with the psychological attitudes of the quasi-religious philosophical sects of Hellenistic
times.
10 Ilham Dilman, Philosophy and the Philosophic Life: A Study in Plato's Phaedo (Macmillan, 1992),
14.
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a similar understanding as an 'attempt to express a direct consciousness of the
presence of God', and in conjunction to this, being 'a process or way of life'.11 The
two ideas of that which is religious, and that which is mystical, employing McGinn's
definition, convey how that Plato's philosophy can be seen as a religious experience.
Further, and relatedly, Plato's philosophy seeks to transform humanity. Here, Keith
Yandell provides a further helpful commentary that the definition of'religion'
implicates, 'a diagnosis (an account ofwhat it takes the basic problem facing human
beings to be) and a cure (a way of permanently and desirably solving that
problem)....'12 It is in Plato that we find all of these meanings involved, in that
Plato's philosophy is characterised by an encounter with the divine that involves a
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way of life, and one in which philosophy leads to humanity's transformation.
However, the religious dimension that Plato's philosophy displays by its very
nature is greatly overlooked or, in some cases disregarded, in theological and
philosophical consideration today. On one hand, it is cast aside through a rejection
of the religious meaning of Plato's philosophy itself, and on the other, even though
accepting Plato as a religious thinker, Plato is rejected as being a part of the past, and
the religious thought, even the theology, he provides, and the philosophically
religious way of life he espouses, is considered as unliveable for today. For many,
philosophy is not defined by the religiously nuanced and ancient meaning of the
dove ofwisdom' which involves a way of life, but is defined as a rational activity
divorced from its religious and theological meaning altogether. As John Kekes
reminds us in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 'although wisdom is what
philosophy is meant to be a love of, little attention has been paid to this essential
component of good lives in post-classical Western philosophy.'14 For some, we have
rightly moved away from this understanding to even regard philosophy as simply the
study of the use of words and language. Such an opinion is exemplified in one such
as A. J. Ayer, who writes in his Language, Truth, and Logic that the true form or
definition of philosophy is not a search for an idea ofwisdom, but is the analysis of
" Bernard McGinn, Foundations ofChristian Mysticism (SCM Press: London: 1992), xv-xvi.
12 Keith Yandell, Philosophy as Religion: A contemporary introduction (Routledge: London, 1999),
17.
13 Catherine Zuckert writes in her work, Postmodern Platos (The University of Chicago Press:
London, 1996) reflecting on Nietzsche that: '[Plato] hoped to change the world entirely.' (11)
14
TheOxford Companion to Philosophy, Honderich, Ted, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1995), 912.
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terms, which is a way to which even Plato himself belongs.15 Recently, in another
example, the work of Jacques Derrida, so influential in postmodern thought, declares
an end to philosophy as we have known it,16 seeing the individual, as Iris Murdoch
comments, 'as submerged in language.'17 In such understandings, philosophy is far
removed from its meaning in Plato who sees it as intertwined with theology as a
contemplation and experience of the divine and the eternal, and as a religious way of
life and existence. In reference to these considerations, no one, of course, can deny
that a basis for the Platonic dialogue is one of defining and terminology, as Ayer's
words establish, but such an act of definition is not in Plato an end in itself, but a
means to wisdom as a description of that which is divine reality. For Plato, the
words of the dialogue itself lead the reader to love to that search for wisdom which
lies beyond the words, that eternal reality to which his words point. By not
understanding this religious dimension of the meaning of philosophy in Plato,
theological and philosophical thought has become impoverished of the theological
and philosophical insights that the understanding of philosophy as a religious
experience provides.
Further, what is also faced in contemporary scholarship is an idea that even
though Plato may be regarded as a religious thinker, Plato's religious, and even
theological thought is no longer tenable, offering nothing of insight to theological or
philosophical thought today. Exemplified by those such as Don Cupitt, such an
opinion sees Plato as a religious thinker, one who even urged others toward a certain
way of life, but is one who no longer holds any insight for today, and never really
IR •
should have had at any time. For Cupitt, philosophy 'is in turmoil', and, for him,
we have rightly moved beyond Plato in our thought. Cupitt summarises that,
So far all the varied movements of the day have a common theme, it is
anti-platonism. Plato impressed upon the entire history ofWestern thought
what now looks like a wholly unjustified and superstitious supematuralism of
thought, a supernaturalism of our intellectual standards, a supernaturalism of
meanings (essentialism) and of knowledge, and finally a supernaturalism of
philosophy itself - all of which has suddenly come to seem utterly absurd
and unendurable.19
15 Alfred Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (Victor Goilancz Ltd: London, 1936), 59.
16 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 185.
17 Ibid.
18
Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church (SCM Press: London, 1989), 41.
19 Ibid
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Even the doctrine of Forms, Cupitt comments, are linked to a past anthropological
era: 'The Paleolithic hunter called this thing that guided him a spirit, Plato calls it a
90
Form... and I call it just a word.' As Cupitt goes on to say, all of philosophy for
Plato was, and still is a 'flight' away from existence as a whole: 'Philosophy,
capital-P Philosophy, had from the beginning been in headlong flight from time and
from everything changeable; in Eight from the earth, in flight from the body and the
• 21
passions, in flight from biology and history.' What he and 'everyone else' loves,
says Cupitt, is that which Plato does not: the 'changing, watery, once-only, volatile,
ephemeral, shadowy, trembling, emotional, and briefly glimpsed.'22 For Cupitt,
Plato is one who is part of the past, one who misses the true and helpful
understanding of life and existence by desiring some eternal realm out of touch with
life in general.
However, the argument put forward by those such as Cupitt is founded upon
a failure to see that what is termed as Plato's weakness is actually the strength of his
philosophy; Plato's philosophy is not a means of escape from life, but is a way of
dealing with human existence, and Plato's philosophical theology is a means in
which a philosophically religious way of life is established. Cupitt's point, that Plato
engages in 'superstitious supernatural ism' loses its lustre when this true
understanding of Plato's philosophy is obtained - as Iris Murdoch writes, to accuse
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Plato of such is simply to misunderstand Plato's philosophy altogether.
Interestingly, it is this very aspect and appreciation of philosophy being a way of
wisdom and way of life that has led some philosophers to seek help in Plato himself.
As Catherine Zuckert writes in Postmodern Platos, philosophers as varied as
Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Leo Strauss, and even
Jacques Derrida, though all strong critics of Plato, have 'been primarily concerned
with philosophy,' and in so doing, 'have all gone back to Plato to discover what
philosophy originally was.'24 As Zuckert notes reflecting on the thought of
Nietzsche particularly, philosophy, for Plato,
20 Don Cupitt, After God: The Future ofReligion (Weidenfield and Nicolson: London, 1997), 38.
21
Cupitt, Radicals and the Future ofthe Church, 41.
22 Don Cupitt, The Revelation ofBeing (SCM Press: London, 1998), 18.
23
Murdoch, Metaphysics, 455.
24 Catherine Zuckert, Postmodern Platos, 7.
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did not consist simply in the formulation of arguments and doctrines. On the
contrary, philosophy was way of life; indeed, philosophy constituted the only
form of human life that was truly satisfying and, as such, could be affirmed to
be worthwhile in and of itself.25
Conveying an overall dissatisfaction, Zuckert notes that, 'these thinkers are not
interested so much in what Plato meant to his contemporaries as they are in what his
work has meant and still can mean for later generations.'26 To add to
Zuckert's comment, the most creative thought of recent scholarship in Plato has been
not only to address the question of philosophy as a way of life, but to address this
understanding in its religious terms in Plato.
For some thinkers the idea that Plato is a religious thinker for the modern day
is one that is deeply considered. Iris Murdoch has set forth in her work, particularly
through the idea of the Good, a treatment of Plato as a religious thinker which raises
the issue once again of Plato not only as a theologian, but one whose philosophy
offers a philosophical-religious perspective for the modern age. Exemplified in her
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, and The Fire and the Sun, Plato is seen as one in
whom philosophy and religious thought, metaphysics and morality meet. As Fergus
Kerr has written, Murdoch is one who, 'insists that Plato is a deeply religious
77
thinker...' ; but not a thinker simply of the past but one who speaks even to the
present age, as Murdoch herself has said, 'Plato is not only the father of our
philosophy, he is our best philosopher.'2 Not only in Murdoch, but also in others is
the quest seen to understand more fully the religious dimension of Plato's
philosophy. Scholars such as Gerard Watson, Karl Jaspers, Simone Weil, Eric
Vogelin, and others, have seen the study of Plato to be that which offers religious
insight.
With this in mind, this thesis addresses the lack of understanding of the
religious dimension of Plato's philosophy that is found in recent theological and
philosophical scholarship by examining Plato's philosophy as a religious human
experience and a way of life, and engaging with the theological-philosophical ideas




Fergus Kerr, Immortal Longings: Visions of Transcending Humanity (SPCK: London, 1997), 86.
28 Iris Murdoch in a conversation with Bryan Magee; Iris Murdoch, Existentialists andMystics
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1997), 6.
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Plato, 1 take the perspective that Plato provides an interrelation of philosophical and
religious thought which establishes Plato as a religious thinker and his philosophy as
a religious experience. Further, such a perspective in turn provides a basis for not
only understanding Plato's philosophical theology, but sees this experience and his
philosophical theology as establishing both theological and philosophical insights for
contemporary thought.
To examine Plato in this way, I concern myselfwith three underlying issues:
the theological ideas that are involved in considering philosophy as a religious
experience in Plato, the ways that these involve humanity and human existence, and
thirdly, the possible insights these provide based upon an interaction with
contemporary interpreters and commentators. One of the primary considerations of
the thesis is examining the issues of Plato's philosophical theology from the
perspective of Plato's philosophy as a religious experience. In adopting such a
perspective, 1 have not sought simply to rehash long considered theological ideas, but
to raise these theological issues as they apply to human existence and within a
contemporary context. Even the use of Plato's texts is one which seeks these
religious ideas by interacting with what is being stated in the text, but adopting a
thematic approach and not a treatment of one specific dialogue. By employing this
thematic approach, I am able to examine various issues of Plato's philosophical
theology in depth by employing different texts instead of being limited to the depth
of one particular dialogue, examining Plato's philosophical theology as a whole. The
issues involved within the idea of Plato's philosophy as a religious experience blend
and correlate philosophical and religious ideas together to the point that the
theological becomes the philosophical and vice versa.
The thesis also contributes to a perspective of Plato's philosophy as a whole
as one that is a religious experience which involves itself within the human situation.
The question of philosophy as a religious experience as one of an encounter with the
divine is centred upon and involved directly with humanity in Plato, providing
meaning and as a way of life and existence. The religious nature of Plato's
philosophy is one that is for Plato fulfilled in not simply being an idle speculation
about the divine, but one which addresses and applies itself directly to human
existence. In his work, The Religion ofSocrates, Mark McPherran argues that the
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religious nature found in Socratic-Platonic philosophy is one which comes from the
human response to life in general:
without meaning to define it, religion is in its essence simply part of the
common human response to the uncharted territories of life (trying to
comprehend their mysteries and terrors, trying to express gratitude for their
joys), and in that broad sense we are all of us religious and surrounded by
coreligionists.29
Plato's concern for the human question is a central theme in the Dialogues as a
whole, and the experience of the divine to which his philosophy strives is one that
applies directly to, and is directly involved within, the human experience.30
Finally, the thesis also attempts to raise the ways in which the theological
ideas within the perspective of Plato's philosophy as religious experience give
insight to theological thought today. Employing contemporary scholarly
commentary and interpretation, the thesis attempts to bring Platonic philosophical
theology to give insight upon current theological endeavour. To do this I interact
with those such as Iris Murdoch throughout the thesis who represent an interpretation
of Plato that is aware of him as a religious thinker, but one that also seeks to bring
such an interpretation to bear upon contemporary thought.
The structure of the thesis is built upon two over-arching themes: one is the
question of the religious nature of philosophy and the philosophical life and
secondly, the question of the human experience of the divine in Plato's philosophy.
In the first two chapters I explore the question of humanity in Plato and the issue of
Plato's philosophy as a way of salvation and transformation. In this, I discuss Plato's
views of humanity, addressing what Plato perceives to be the human situation of
facing evil and how that philosophy leads to a transformation of the soul. I show
through Plato's texts, as well as commentary and interpretation, that Plato perceives
his philosophy to be as a salvation for humanity which makes a way of ascent to the
29 Mark McPherran, The Religion ofSocrates (Penn State University Press, 1996), 11. Because of his
emphasis on this human aspect, some have even regarded Socrates as an early representative of the
existential approach to philosophy. See Emmanuel Mounier, Existentialist Philosophies'. An
Introduction (Rockcliff: London, 1948), 134-135: 'Socrates became the founder of a doctrine of
absolute morality... not ofman as an Athenian or a Greek, but ofman as man,' he is regarded as a
predecessor to existential enquiry.' Also see, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'Existentialism' (4978), vol.
7, page 78, where Socrates is mentioned.
30
Bryan Magee's words echo to Plato's quest in that Magee describing his attraction to
'humanist-existentialism', that it was based partly on that he, 'had always believed that the most
important questions in philosophy concern not knowledge but existence.' Bryan Magee, Confessions
ofa Philosopher (Phoenix: London, 1997), 331.
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divine necessary. Yet, I argue, such an ascent is not an escape from the world, but an
ascent which is to be followed by a turning toward the world to address the human
situation. The chapter raises the issue that, for Plato, philosophy applies to human
existence and is the way in which humanity finds meaning and value in existence. In
the second chapter I examine the importance of the idea of philosophy in Plato as a
religious way of life. In this, I take up the five themes of philosophy as learning to
die, knowing oneself, the idea of the dialogue, the idea of embodiment, and the
notion of becoming like God, homoiosis theo, as being respectively the symbol,
dictum, practice, embodiment, and goal of the philosophical life. As I show in the
chapter, the philosophical way of life for Plato is one of human existence, a way of
living that is necessary, to Plato, for humanity to live in order to find truth and
meaning in life. To Plato, such a life is a necessary carrying out into existence of all
that philosophy is and represents so that it is not simply metaphysical speculation,
but a carrying out of the philosophical ideal into human existence.
In the third chapter, I argue that a proper understanding of the doctrine of the
Forms must see it as conveying a religious encounter with the divine. Beginning
with the religious experience of the reality of the Forms, I discuss as well the aspects
of participation (methexis), the immanence and transcendence of the Forms, the
striving of union with the divine, culminating in the relationship of the human soul to
the Forms in the idea of anamnesis as a notion which betrays the soul as returning to
the divine. 1 argue, as well, that, based upon contemporary commentary, there is an
existential meaning of the Forms as Plato sees them as applicable to life. In this I
explore the topics of the nearness and distance of the Forms both metaphysically and
existentially, as they involve and attach themselves in relation to the soul. Following
on from this aspect of relationship, I explore the personal devotion of the
philosopher, and the experience of relationship between the philosopher and the
divine in Plato. In light of this, 1 examine the philosopher's relationship to the
Forms, to a personal God, and the relationship of God to the Forms focusing upon
the scholarly interpretation of the Forms as pictures of God. Following from the
work of Karl Jaspers, I establish that Plato speaks of a God ofmany names, but,
taking on the ideas of Iris Murdoch as well, that it is an idea of a divine which goes
beyond a personal God altogether.
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Lastly, in chapter five, I argue that one of the ultimate expressions of the
divine in Plato is the doctrine of the divine as inexpressible and that this is the
culminating experience of the philosophical life and the culminating understanding
of the divine in his philosophical theology. In this chapter I argue that Plato speaks
of the divine as one that is beyond expression, a divine which words cannot fully
make known. Yet, I view this theological notion to be one governed by the idea of
experience in that what Plato expresses in the Forms and most poignantly in the
Seventh Letter, is the inexpressibility of the divine as a philosophical experience of
the soul. This experience, based upon the Seventh Letter, represents the culmination
of Platonic philosophical theology as it joins together a profound expression of the
divine to the depth of philosophical experience.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I examine Plato's philosophical theology in a
contemporary theological context by raising several of the important theological
issues that arise when Plato's philosophy is realised as a religious way of life today.
I argue that Plato's is a theological perspective that centres upon a theology of the
human experience of philosophy as a religious endeavour and from this there arises
not only a theological perspective regarding the human experience of the religious
endeavour of philosophy itself, but it is such an experience that leads to a conception
of the divine that goes beyond traditional understanding. Plato's philosophical
theology is insightful for today, it is argued, in that it expresses a theological
understanding of the human experience of philosophy in general that, though going
beyond traditional theological constructs, forms an insightful religious way of life
today.
What is shown in this thesis is that in Plato, philosophy is a religious
experience. And it is within such a perspective that a means is provided of
understanding Plato's philosophical theology as a whole. What is seen through this
perspective is that in Plato is a profound interrelationship of philosophical and
religious ideas that manifests a vibrant and insightful philosophical theology.
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CHAPTER ONE:
PHILOSOPHY AND THE WAY OF HUMAN TRANSFORMATION
Plato's philosophy is a religious experience in that it is a transformation of
the soul through an encounter with the divine, involving itself directly in the question
of humanity as a quest for salvation. Characterised by the ascent of the soul to
envision the divine and eternal, Plato's philosophy is not a turning away from the
world and existence, but one which sees philosophy as that through which humanity
finds meaning, and as that which directly transforms human life and existence. In
this chapter we examine the idea of Plato's philosophy as a way of transformation
through the way that it approaches the human situation, and the way that the meaning
of human existence is given through the endeavour of philosophy and the ascent to
the divine.
The Human Situation and the Search for Salvation
To begin to see Plato's philosophy as a religious experience is to understand
Plato's philosophical and theological view of the human situation. For Plato,
humanity constantly faces the flux and evil of the world in which it lives. Human
society is plagued by the love of materialism, power, and prestige that causes the
injustice and evil in the world, which pulls the soul to its destruction. Yet, for Plato,
it is through philosophy that such a situation is addressed, and within philosophy
does humanity find its true existence, a means to live in the light of the eternal,
which in turn, provides the only meaningful existence.
The dramatic nature of the human situation for Plato is seen in the way that
Plato's philosophy confronts humanity with the choice between the philosophical
way of life and the way of the world and its system. In the Apology, the reader is
implicitly given a choice in Socrates' words to either join with him or to side with his
accusers. Socrates describes the importance, and even the religious undertaking of
the philosophical life:
This, I do assure you, is what my God commands, and it is my belief that no
greater good has ever befallen you in this city than my service to my God.
For I spend all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to
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make your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your
possessions, but for the highest welfare of you souls.... (30a-b)'
For Socrates, the pursuit of philosophy is a divine command (Koad xov 0e6v; 23b),
even a fulfilment of the cause ofGod (23c) calling individuals to lead the
philosophical life, to 'let no day pass without discussing goodness', to examine one's
own soul through philosophy, and that it is only such a life that is worth living.
(.Apology 38a) Similarly, in the Republic, Socrates, recounting the tale ofEr and the
judgement of one's soul after death, establishes the true meaning of what philosophy
accomplishes:
But ifwe are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and
capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever
to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever,
that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here
and when we receive our reward.... (621c-d)
What is clearly seen is that philosophy, in Plato, is a means of transformation for
humanity, a way of life that is centred in the divine, one that is not simply an option
or a mental exercise, but one that involves the depth of the human soul. For Plato, it
is only though philosophy that one encounters the divine and gains wisdom, which is
ultimately necessary for humanity to have.
The idea of the transformation through philosophy characterises Plato's work
as a whole. Reflecting upon the meaning of such passages and the understanding of
Plato's philosophy as a whole, a number of commentators observe that Plato's
philosophy takes on a deeper religious aspect in that it is a search for salvation.
Gerard Watson writes that such an understanding of philosophy had been learned by
Plato from Pythagoras who understood that, 'Salvation would come through
philosophy.'3 This salvific nature is seen in that it answers the dilemma that
humanity suffers in the Heraclitean flux, as James Mackey notes: 'it was the evils
associated with flux and change that sent Plato... on the quest for wisdom - and
salvation.'4 Iris Murdoch comments that such a quest characterises Plato's work as a
1 Unless otherwise stated, texts are taken from The Complete Dialogues ofPlato, Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns, eds. (Princeton University Press, 1961).
2 Paul Shorey notes that ctco^eiv 'is here used in its higher sense, approaching the idea of salvation....'
Republic II, (Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, Ltd: Cambridge, Mass., 1935), 519.
3
Watson, Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion ofGod (The Columba Press: Dublin, 1994) 13.
4 James Mackey, The Christian Experience ofGod as Trinity (SCM Press, Limited: London, 1983),
107.
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whole in that it is largely concerned with how one may know 'salvation'5 as seen in
Plato's Republic with 'the persistent questioning of Socrates by the young men' as to
what is the 'salvation of the individual', seen in the questions of, 'What is justice?' or
'How are we to become virtuous?'6 The philosopher in Plato is literally the
individual who loves wisdom, the one who travels, as Eric Voegelin puts it, 'the road
toward salvation.'7 The philosopher is a representative of 'man in the anxiety of his
fall from being; and philosophy is the ascent toward salvation for Everyman'.8 This
salvific aspect is not seen by simply examining how often Plato uses the word
'salvation' (aooxijpta), but arises from an understanding and interpretation of what
philosophy is, and means for humanity in Plato, as one involves oneself within the
Dialogues as a whole. Ifwe concentrate upon what philosophy means to Plato,
taking into account various interpretations which raise this issue, we see that Plato
sees his philosophy as answering the problems of human existence.
As it is a reflection upon salvation for humanity, Plato's philosophy is a deep
pondering of human existence. Through his philosophy Plato attempts to confront
the evil that is within the world and to establish a stability and meaning for life
through a quest for wisdom that is ultimately found in the divine. According to
Aristotle, Socrates perceived a lack in previous thinkers in addressing the human
situation, and it is this that sent him, says Aristotle, to look away from the study of
the physical universe to the question ofmorality,9 or in other words, back to the soul.
In fact, the question of humanity is one that appears even before Socrates in many
Presocratic philosophers especially those such as Xenophanes, Pythagoras,
Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, whose impetus is to help humanity through
their philosophy. Reflecting on this idea, Eric Voegelin in his essay, 'Reason: The
Classic Experience' writes that the ancient philosophers as a whole, 'engaged in an
5 Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics (London: Chatto and Windus, 1997), 414.
6 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Penguin Books, 1992), 24. As Michael Morgan
notes, through the Orphic-Bachic rites, the transformation of the soul was achieved through emotional
excitement which Plato changes to be a transformation that is achieved through rational inquiry, or
philosophy, so that 'a life aimed at salvation takes the form of... a philosophical life.' Michael
Morgan, 'Plato and Greek Religion', Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut
(Cambridge University Press, 1992), 232.
7 Eric Voegelin, Plato andAristotle (Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 70.
8 Ibid.
9
Aristotle, Metaphysics I. 987b, Loeb Classical Library, William Tredennick, transl. (London:
William Heinemann, 1933).
13
act of resistance against the personal and social disorder of their age.'10 Yet, it is
Plato who represents an acute emphasis upon humanity through his attention given to
the soul and how that humanity may be transformed through philosophy. As
Voegelin continues, reflecting on Plato, 'Philosophy is not a doctrine of right order,
but the light ofwisdom that falls on the struggle; and help is not a piece of
information about truth, but the arduous effort to locate the forces of evil and identify
their nature.'
At the basis ofPlato's thinking about human existence is an assumption that
there is something wrong within the world, namely that humanity suffers from the
actuality of evil that pervades society, and that there erupts from this a
meaninglessness of existence which only the contemplation of the divine can
remedy. As an ancient Greek, Murdoch writes that Plato takes, 'a fairly grim view of
the human situation',12 but it is the human situation without philosophy. Through the
love ofwisdom, Plato desires to move the individual beyond the human dilemma
toward the divine wherein is found the remedy for humanity, and the point at which
all things find meaning and full existence. However, such a desire does not mean an
escape from reality, as Nietzsche wrongly determined when he wrote, 'Plato is a
coward in face of reality' as he 'flees into the ideal.'13 What Plato sees, contrary to
Nietzsche, is that philosophy addresses human existence providing for it a guide to
truth and justice. Indeed, Plato involved himself within human existence even in his
own time, as Murdoch reminds us, as he lived an active life during some of the most
violent times in history:
Plato lived, and lived dangerously, as an active participant through one of the
beastliest and most violent periods of recorded human history. His
philosophical imagination, though much concerned with politics, does not
focus on these historical details, the rare references to which (for instance at
Symposium 220-21 and Theaetetus 142) are in effect aesthetic.14
His involvement in human existence is seen even on a more personal level, as Plato
was profoundly affected by the sense of injustice that surrounded the death of
10 Eric Voegelin, 'Reason: The Classic Experience', Anamnesis (University ofNotre Dame Press:
Notre Dame and London, 1978), 89.
11
Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 62-3.
12 The Pythagoreans regarded the body as a prison; Murdoch, Existentialists, 397.





Socrates who was, in Plato's mind, put to death by the will of those who loved their
possessions and fame rather than philosophy and the truth it conveyed.15 Thus,
Plato's philosophy is a reaction to the injustice and evil of society and
meaninglessness that this brings, through the contemplation of the eternal and divine
which attempts to establish goodness and meaning within the human dilemma. In
this regard, philosophy for Plato is never divorced from its societal impact. As
Goethe writes,
Difficult though it might be to detect it, a certain polemical thread runs
through any philosophical writing... Thus Plato's discussions are often not
only directed to something but also directed against it.'16
Plato's philosophy is not only an acknowledgement of the meaninglessness that life
without philosophy presents, but is a polemical response to that meaninglessness as
well. As Nicolas Berdyaev writes,
Philosophy not only wants to perceive meaning, it desires that meaning shall
be triumphant. Philosophy will not come to terms with a meaningless world
datum, it seeks either to break through to another world, a world which has
meaning, or to discover the wisdom which brings light into the world, and
changes human existence in it for the better.17
To Plato, philosophy 'breaks through' the lack ofmeaning in the world to envision
the divine which is the only ideal that can transform existence, and through this
envisioning of the divine, alone, does humanity find meaning. Because of its
reflection upon the divine, Plato's philosophy is a theological statement addressing
societal and even existential concerns.
In her essay, 'God in Plato', Simone Weil reflects upon the role of philosophy
in society in Plato's Republic by examining how that philosophy in Plato is a source
of salvation standing against the evil perpetuated by society. For Weil, the pull of
society is the greatest obstacle against wisdom, even more than the flesh, and the
image that Plato portrays of society is as a 'terrible' force.18 In fact, such a theme is
'of first importance', writes Weil, one that runs throughout Plato's works, though an
idea not always specifically expressed and one that is never given enough
15 The Apology is Plato's great record of this injustice.
16 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Dialogue and Dialectic. Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato.
Christopher P. Smith, transl. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 39.
17 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End (Geoffrey Bles: London, 1952), 4.
18 Simone Weil, Initmations ofChristianity, Elisabeth Chase Geissbuhler, ed. & transl. (Routledge:
London and New York, 1957 - reissue 1998), 84.
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importance.19 In the Republic Socrates asks, '...do you see any salvation
(acoxriplav) for someone who is by nature a philosopher, to insure that he'll practice
philosophy correctly to the end?'(494a) For Socrates, the philosopher's 'salvation'
depends upon divine protection, as Socrates says, 'if anything is saved and turns out
well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the
providence of God (Geov (aoipav) preserves it you will not be speaking ill.' (493a)
The theological meaning of these words is noticed by Weil as she writes, 'it is
impossible to affirm more categorically that grace is the unique source of salvation,
• 21*that salvation comes from God and not from man.' On this account, Weil sees
Plato's philosophy as not a philosophy at all, nor even 'a search for God by means of
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reason, but 'an orientation of the soul toward grace.' For Weil, wherever it can,
'public opinion imposes itself under one form or another in every society without
exception,'23 but it is the philosopher who is called away from the popular opinion to
seek salvation in divine truth.
Though we can say Weil's comments are deeply penetrating, we cannot
however gather from this that Plato attempts to throw society to the side using his
philosophy as a means to flee from society, but that Plato seeks to transform the
individual and society through his philosophy. In Plato, it is philosophy as the
contemplation of the divine that provides the contrastual element to the evil that
pervades society, and the philosophical life as the model that counteracts a life given
simply to pleasing societal norms. In this, the philosophical life provides a radical
way of existence that sees the knowledge of one's own soul as the true mark of
existence (Alcibiades I). Without such qualifications, Weil's argument is too strong
against society as a lost cause, for to Plato society is transformed through philosophy
and not cast away. The objective, for Plato, is to change society not overlook it. As
Socrates says in the Republic:
19 Ibid.
20 Paul Shorey in his translation of the Republic (Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, Ltd:
Cambridge, Mass., 1935) translates Oeov potpavas God's providence and gives various references of
the providence of God mentioned in other dialogues: Apology 33c; Phaedo 58e; Protagoras 328e;
Meno 99e; Phaedrus 244c; Laws 642c, 875c; Ion 534c. (Vol. II, 38) Liddell and Scott note that
moira indicates a 'parL portion, division' of something as opposed to the whole (A Lexicon: Abridged
from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford, 1926), 450).




No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are,
Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be fdled with
envy and hatred by competing with people. Instead, as he looks at and
studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do
injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates
them and tries to become as like them as he can. Or do you think that
someone can consort with things he admires without imitating them?
(500b)24
The philosopher is a model to society, one who affects the society by being a part of
it as an example of life, but one who stands outside of the society's influence by
envisioning and imitating the divine injustice and order in life. The philosopher thus
becomes an embodiment of the divine within the society offering a contrast to the
regular life that simply follows society blindly. Plato is not nihilistic, but realistically
challenges the society with a call to wisdom that is founded upon the divine, which,
for him, offers a transformation of existence. The salvific nature of Plato's
philosophy is that it offers meaning to human existence in that through philosophy
humanity finds the true way of life. Plato's 'philosophical imagination', Iris
Murdoch writes, is fostered by a desire to bring meaning and help to the individual
9S
and society. Reflecting upon ancient philosophy as a whole, Eric Voegelin writes
that, 'the reality experienced by the philosophers is specifically human' in that it is
'man's existence in a state of unrest.'26 This experience is seen in Plato in the
Republic, as Voegelin writes, that it is 'the anxiety of the fall from being' that forms
97
the underlying theme of the dialogue.
This question of the meaningfulness of philosophy for humanity in Plato's
mind is, at least in part, a reaction to the philosophies of his predecessors Heraclitus
and Parmenides. Acutely aware of the lack of existential meaning that Heraclitus'
notion of flux presents, Plato perceives the dilemma of all things being in the throes
of change, seeing no rest for the soul except in a notion of changeless Forms and an
unchanging God. (Republic 379ff.) On the other hand, Parmenides' philosophy,
24 G. Grube translation, revised by C.D.C. Reeve, Plato: Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed.
(Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, 1997).
25 Another example of such a persuasion is Boethius who, feeling tragedy on a personal level after
being cast away into prison by Theodoric, penned the Consolation ofPhilosophy to not only bring
help to himself, but to offer a philosophical light to his society as well. His work takes on a vivid
personal tone of passion as he finds salvation through the vision of the lady Philosophy.6
Voegelin, Anamnesis, 92.
27
Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 62.
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though satisfying a search for unity, is for Plato in need of a principle of life so that
it is applicable to human existence. (Sophist 249//) Karl Popper, though one of the
strongest critics of Plato in modern times, reflects upon this perception, and calling to
mind the influence of both Heraclitus and Parmenides on Plato's thought, writes that,
Much as he (Plato) disliked and despised this empirical world of flux, he was,
at bottom, most deeply interested in it. He wanted to unveil the secret of its
decay, of its violent changes, and of its unhappiness. He hoped to discover
the means of its salvation. He was deeply impressed by Parmenides' doctrine
of an unchanging, real, solid, and perfect world behind this ghostly world in
which he suffered....29
Popper admits that though Plato attempted to look constantly away from the world to
find wisdom in the divine, there is also the deep search for meaning within the world
which involves him within an equally deep interaction and pondering of existence. It
is a deeply felt realisation of human existence that governs Plato's philosophy as the
attempt to rectify the acute sense of change and evil by the philosophical
contemplation of the divine.
The answer for giving meaning to human existence for Plato is found in the
contemplation of the divine. In the Apology, as well as in the Republic, and even the
Laws, human existence is depicted as having no intrinsic meaning on its own, but a
worth that is found in reference to the divine. In the Apology, considering the worth
of human wisdom, Socrates declares that,
Real wisdom is the property of God, and this oracle is his way of telling us
that human wisdom has little or no value... The wisest of you... is he who
has realized, like Socrates, that in respect ofwisdom he is really worthless.
(23a)
The reciprocal effect is that through knowing one's own worthlessness in regard to
wisdom one begins to know wisdom itself, and only in the loss of the sense of one's
self-importance is wisdom found. Stated in the Republic, human life in and of itself
is not something important at all: 'Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts
of grandeur and contemplation of all time and all existence can deem this life of a
28
Murdoch writes that the idea of a self-contained unity of limited whole is a fundamental instinctive
concept. The urge to prove that where we intuit unity there really is unity is a deep emotional motive
to philosophy, to art, to thinking itself. Intellect is naturally one-making. (Metaphysics, 1) We
naturally cannot tolerate chaos, or the chaotic derivatives of violence, or the tearing apart of all
knowledge, as Murdoch writes, for there is an implicit fear in us of chaos, which is the fear of
'plurality, diffusion, senseless accident....' (Metaphysics, 1)
2 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd, 1952), 28-29.
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man a thing of great concern [peya xt; of any great importance]?' (486a)30 Further,
in the Laws, the way of wisdom, says the Athenian, is to:
keep our seriousness for serious things, and not waste it on trifles, and that,
while God is the real goal of all beneficent serious endeavor, man, as we said
before, has been constructed as a toy (ttaiyvtov) for God, and this is, in fact,
the finest thing about him. (803c)
Human life, says the Athenian, is about 'play' (xoov 7taiScov) (803d), making proper
sacrifices but not to be too serious about the entire matter. We are to encourage the
children to, 'live out their lives as what they really are - puppets in the main, though
with some touch of reality about them, too.' ( 804b) When accused of having a low
view of humanity, the Athenian replies that his mind has been upon God and not
with humanity at all:
Marvel not, Megillus, but forgive me. For when I spoke thus, I had my mind
set on God, and was feeling the emotion to which I gave utterance (ttpoQ
yap xov 08ov dTiiSoov Kat ttaBcov einov bttep eiprpca vfa). Let us grant,
however, if you wish, that the human race is not a mean thing, but worthy of
serious attention. (804c)
Although there is an apparent dearth of meaning to human existence conveyed in
Plato, human affairs, though not serious, are, as Iris Murdoch writes, to be taken
seriously.31 Defending Plato's stance, Murdoch writes that by the time he wrote the
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Laws, Plato 'had plenty of reasons for thinking poorly of mankind.' However, she
writes, Plato's tone 'suggests a religious attitude rather than a resentful one,' one that
33
sees God as the 'measure of all things and not man.' (Laws 716b)
For Plato, humanity must have its attention drawn toward the eternal and
divine before life is truly lived and existence is to have any significance. As the
wisdom that is needed is found in the divine, humanity, for Plato, must ascend
beyond the physical to glimpse the intangible in order for existence to be worth
living. Philosophy is a means of salvation and transformation as it is the soul's ascent
toward the divine in which it finds its true existence. It is to this subject we now
turn.
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The Way of Ascent as Transformation
For Plato, the remedy of the human situation is the soul's ascent to the divine
and it is philosophy that provides the medium through which this ascent takes place.
Such an ascent is not, for Plato, an option but a necessity, a need within humanity to
find wisdom within a world given to flux and meaninglessness.34 As Flans Urs von
Balthasar writes, 'for Plato, no philosophy can exist without it [ascent].'35 Because
wisdom is only found in the knowledge of the divine, the experience of ascent is one
in which the philosopher goes beyond the physical and sensual and encounters the
divine, an encounter that directly affects existence. In this idea, Plato addresses what
he perceives as a need of human existence to ascend from a world of flux and change
and be transformed, but from this transformation to live in the world. In the images
conveyed in Plato's Myth of the Cave, the notion ofwonder, and in the seminal
doctrine ofEros, we find the human aspect of transformation and salvation through
ascent deeply conveyed.
The Cave: Periagoge and the Journey ofthe Soul
In the parabolic myth of the Cave (Republic 514-517), Plato gives a picture of
humanity and the situation of the world. Situated with the exposition of the Good
(.Republic 501ff) and the image of the dividing line (.Republic 509d\fj), the myth of the
Cave presents a picture of the human situation and its salvation in turning from the
'shadows' of the world to the Tight' of the divine. Socrates pictures human beings
living in a cave, with the entrance 'a long way up, open to the light and wide as the
cave itself, chained and fettered to the wall of the cave, unable to turn. The only
light in the darkness is a fire far above and behind them, and in front of the fire is a
low wall on which people, some talking and others in silence, carry statues of all
sorts of things. All that the prisoners see are the shadows of the objects cast by the
dim light of the fire, and all they hear are the voices of those who in the background
33 Ibid.
34 Erik Davis in his Techgnosis: myth, magic, andmysticism in the age of information (Harmony
Books: New York, 1998) links the longing felt in the soul for transcendence above the world as
articulated in philosophical terms in Plato. Davis argues that there are religious impulses within the
history of technology and even in the information technology of the modern era.
35 Hans Urs von Baltahasar, The Glory ofthe Lord: A Theological Aesthetics (T. & T. Clark:
Edinburgh, 1989), 181.
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carry the objects. However, one of the prisoners becomes free, and stretching, turns
around, but the light of the fire pains his eyes and he wishes to return to the wall and
shadows. All that he is starting to behold seems to be a dream. But the freed
prisoner is forced to ascend out of the cave into the sunlight where gradually he
begins to see all things in their true reality, finally beholding the sun itself which
gives light to all things. Yet, even with this vision, the freed prisoner wishes the
others to know and see what he does, so he descends back into darkness of the Cave.
However, says Socrates, those in the cave react against him because of his 'upward
tz:
journey' (dvafidatt;) saying that his eyes are ruined. If he tried, says Socrates, to
free any of them, they would kill him in the end.
The myth of the Cave portrays the philosophical life in its transforming
power. The various elements of the myth demonstrate this: the cave is the world, the
prisoners are representative of humanity, the freed one is the philosopher, the fire is
the light of this world, and the sun is the divine, the Good. Socrates himself explains
the myth by saying that the
visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire
inside it to the power of the sun. And if you interpret the upward journey and
the study of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible
realm, you'll grasp what I hope to convey.... (517b)
Once this upward journey is taken, says Socrates, it isn't surprising that one wishes
to remain there, to spend time above and not return to the world of shadows. It is
when we return back to the shadows of the world that we become lost for it is
difficult to go from the 'divine study' to the evils of human life. (517d)
One cannot read the myth of the Cave as a simple image of a world of
illusion over against a world of reality, but must see the more universal elements
within the myth as they apply to humanity as a whole. The myth portrays both a
picture of humanity in its choice of existence, and also the philosophical soul in its
unrest, knowing the divine world but living among the shadows. The prisoners in the
Cave, as Socrates says, are Tike us (bftoiotx; f|piv).' (Republic 515a) Julia Annas
writes that Plato does not show 'just the degraded state of a bad society' but shows
36 The act of going up, dva(3aiua), has the connotation of 'mounting', literally to ascend a mountain
(abridged Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1926), 47). The
way up and out of the Cave is illumined by such an image in that it is a steep path that one must
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i • • 37'the human condition' as a whole. Reflecting on the meaning of the myth for
human existence as a whole, Iris Murdoch writes that the Cave is a parable of human
life. Murdoch writes, we all have our place in the myth, like those in the Cave, we
all face the wall seeing at first the shadows, but some turn around and see the objects
as imitations of real things. Murdoch writes,
They (we) may perhaps go no further, taking the fire to be the only source of
light. Some of us may venture on, glimpsing another light beyond, and
emerge into the sunlight, where we are dazzled and can only look down at
shadows and reflections, then raising our heads, see the real things
TQ
themselves and then (if finally enlightened) the sun.
Yet further, as the myth of the Cave concerns human existence, it is more
than a picture of the epistemological distinction between appearance and reality but
involves deeply religious analogies. Annas in her commentary, though admitting the
myth concerns the 'human condition', fails to follow through the religious
implications of her statement. To understand the full gist of the Cave is to recognise
the religious implication and imagery of the ascent of the soul from a world of
shadow to light. As Eric Voegelin writes, 'Plato's philosophy... is not a philosophy
but the symbolic form in which a Dionysiac soul expresses its ascent to God.40
Plato's philosophy occupies a place beyond simply defining it as a philosophy but a
philosophical-religious expression that applies to human existence as a whole. Even
Anders Nygren writes that, as exemplified in the myth of the Cave, Plato unifies
philosophy and religion together:
we see, too, that it is quite impossible to decide whether Plato's teaching is
primarily philosophical or religious; the truth is, that both sides work in
together and form an inseparable unity. This fact is plainly shown in the
famous parable of the Cave... The substance of this parable is the doctrine of
the Forms; but its colouring is that of a doctrine of salvation.41
The ascent out of the Cave cannot be simply a matter of the rationale, but is
one which includes states of existence and of the soul. The distinction of appearance
and reality, which is the theme of Plato's myth, has in itself, as Catherine Wilson
ascend out of the Cave. To take the symbol farther, the path is not easy but difficult, it is a scaling of
a height, and literally to walk and ascend as up a mountain.
37 Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1982), 252.
38 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 10.
39 Ibid.
40
Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 70.
41 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, Part I, transl. by A. G. Herbert (London: Society For Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1941), 128.
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writes, 'moral/theological overtones.'42 Iris Murdoch writes it well when she insists
the myth signifies the restoration of our knowledge of the real world.43 'The details
ofwhat happens in the cave are to be studied seriously', writes Murdoch, 'the Tower
half of the story is not just an explanatory image of the 'higher half, but is
significant in itself.'44 Murdoch writes that, 'We see in our lower things the shadow
of higher things, and thereby our continual (daily, hourly, minutely) sense of the
connection between the good and the real can lead us to believe in the supreme
reality of what is perfect: the unique place ofGod, or Good, in human life.'45
Murdoch writes that the myth of the Cave,
portrays a spiritual pilgrimage from appearance to reality. We turn around,
we climb up, we raise our heads. At each stage we see at first the shadows of
what is more real and true.46
The prisoners who face the wall of the cave, those who see only the shadows, are in a
state of eikasia, a state of vague image-ridden illusion.47 It is a picture of the world
and those who do not see beyond the veil of shadows, change, and opinion to the
philosophical world of reality. In her own dialogue, Art and Eros, Murdoch provides
a more individualised and personal interpretation of such a problem. The soul, she
has Plato say, is one in which the vast region is dark. There are different levels of
the soul, says Murdoch's Plato, 'dark low levels where we are hardly individual
people at all.'
Eros is there. This darkness is sex, power, desire, inspiration, energy for
good or evil. Many people live their whole lives in that sort of darkness,
seeing nothing but flickering shadows and illusions, like images thrown on a
screen - and the only energy they ever have comes from egoism and dreams.
They don't know what the real world is like at all. Not only could they not
understand any difficult thought, they cannot even see ordinary things - like
that wine cup or the face of Socrates - because anxiety and selfishness are
48
making them blind, they live behind a dark veil.
Murdoch writes that the 'pilgrim' is seen as 'passing through different states of
awareness whereby the higher reality is studied first in the form of shadows or
42 Catherine Wilson, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1995), 42.
43 Murdoch, from The Fire and the Sun in Existentialists and Mystics, 389.
44 Ibid.
45 Murdoch, Methaphysics, 397-398.
46 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 10.




images.'49 Some raise up and go toward the light; some are simply satisfied to stay
within the cave, but all of us are there in one place or another.
A crucial image given in the myth of the Cave is the transformation that is
given in the turning, the periagoge, away from the world of shadows to encountering
the world of light and knowing wisdom. Socrates asks,
Consider then, what would be the manner of the release and healing from
these bonds and this folly (ocbxoov Aaictiv te Kai laatv tcov Seapcov
Kai TrjQ dt(j)poaiL)vr|(;) if... When one was freed from his fetters and
compelled to stand up suddenly and turn (TtepidcYeiv) his head around and
walk and to lift up his eyes to the light...? (.Republic 515c)
As Karl Jaspers notes, the insight to divine reality that is found in the Cave is one
which 'requires a turning around (metastrophe, periagoge).'50 It is this image of
periagoge and the idea of the turning around of the soul that raises the religious
connotations of what Plato is describing.51 As Socrates later indicates, the very
aspect of turning is one that elicits an image of the soul's conversion to philosophy.
To turn the soul, as Socrates later speaks, is the art of philosophical discourse which
is:
of the speediest and most effective shifting of conversion (xfjq TteptocYCoyfjq)
of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it
possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it
should, an art ofbringing this about (towo biappxavfiaacftai). (518d)52
53
In her essay, 'The Republic', Simone Weil illumines the link between the symbol
of the soul's turning toward the divine and its salvation. Weil writes that Plato in the
Republic 518c-d describes the 'metaphorical description of conversion.'54 Yet, what
must theologically be said in this aspect is that the transformation offered in the
periagoge of the soul is not based on that which comes from the outside inward but a
turning of the soul toward that which is already known.
The power to learn is present in everyone's soul... the instrument which each
learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light
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111, n. 25. Jaeger notes that Plato conveys a religious conversion in the turning toward the Light of
true Being.
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Shorey, Republic I, 134-5.
53 Simone Weil, Intimations, 132-150.
54 Ibid., 132-133.
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able to study that which is the brightest thing that is namely, the one we call
the good.' {Republic 518d)
For Plato there is no import of revelation, but a turning of the soul toward the truth
that is already found within it. Weil raises the issue through her translation of
Socrates' words:
The instruction [of the soul] is not what some declare it to be. For they affirm
that knowledge, not being in the soul, they will put it there, as if one might
put sight into blind eyes. Whereas the theory which I will expound teaches
that the faculty of understanding, and the organ of this faculty, is innate in the
soul of each one. But it is as if one were unable to turn one's eye towards the
light, away from darkness, without turning the whole body. Likewise it is
with the whole soul that one must turn oneself from what is becoming (the
temporal) until the soul becomes strong enough to endure the contemplation
of reality, and all that is most luminous in that reality; which we have already
declared to be the good.75
The soul possesses within itself the ability to turn, and the process of salvation for
the soul in theperiagoge is one that is based upon the soul's turning upon itself.
Within the periagoge of the soul within itself is the aspect of its journey
(Tf|v jiopfetav) - a journey known literally in the illustration of the one who ascends
from from the Cave, but also in the experience of the soul within itself. Recalling the
parable of the Cave, Socrates describes the philosophical discourse itself as a
'journey' by asking, 'What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic
(oh 8taA,e8xtKfiv xamriv xijv Ttopetav KaA,etq)? {Republic 532b) Considering this
image, philosophy in Plato is characterised by a progression, a search, a journey and
process of coming out of the Cave. The turning commences the journey, or in
Murdoch's more religiously laden term, a 'pilgrimage' through philosophy from
illusion to that which is truly real.56 The philosopher, exemplified in the Republic,
and reminiscent also of the Phaedo, is one who partakes in this pilgrimage, the
'upward journey' {Republic 517b), in order to know wisdom and, dramatically
speaking, to seek relief from the world's evil. Such an understanding prompts even
Anders Nygren to observe that, 'In the Republic as in the Phaedo philosophy and
57
religion meet together and become one.'
55 Ibid.
56 See quote above from Murdoch's, Metaphysics, 10. Italics mine.
57 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, Part I, 129.
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The words that Murdoch employs of 'pilgrimage' and a movement from
'appearance to reality' are significant in that they convey the religious nature within
Plato's philosophy not only in the metaphorical coming out of the Cave, but also as
an image of human life. Firstly, as we have discussed above, the movement is one of
ascent to the divine, a journey of the soul from the world of shadows and darkness to
the world and light of the divine. But there is a second meaning within the idea of
journey which speaks of philosophy and the philosopher's life as one that never
really arrives at the full comprehension of the wisdom or divine that is sought, or at
least until one dies, as Socrates indicates in the Phaedo (68 a-b).58 On this issue, the
philosophical journey never really ends for Plato, for it is implicit in the soul's
constant movement in philosophy to the world beyond the shadows, and in the
soul's constant desire to encounter the divine. This idea of journey is taken up by
some modern thinkers as a symbol of the philosophical experience itself. Karl
Jaspers says it well when he writes that philosophy itself, 'means to be on the way.'59
Even at the end of life, the philosopher is one who is still searching, as Jaspers
writes:
As an individual, each of us reaches the end of his life without really knowing
what is. He achieves nothing definitive, but remains on a road which merely
breaks off and ends in no absolute goal.60
Similarly, Sam Keen in his biography of Gabriel Marcel writes ofMarcel's view of
philosophy, which is telling ofPlato's description ofjourney, that,
Its [philosophy's] starting-point is a metaphysical dis-ease, like that of a man
in a fever who shifts around searching for a comfortable position, and it seeks
a unification of experience which will allow a more integrated and full life.
Philosophy, however, never achieves its end. It remains a quest, an activity
undertaken by homo viator, by man who is always in the process of
becoming.61
Laden within the myth of the Cave and implicit in this idea ofjourney is the
aspect of the pathos of humanity. For Plato, humanity suffers in the world of
shadows and must struggle to get out of the Cave. The pilgrimage and journey itself
is a difficult one, not only because the initial turning is difficult {Republic 515c), but
58 Death itself is called a 'journey' at Phaedo 68b as Socrates asks, will not the philosopher 'be glad to
make that journey (death)', since he is going to know the wisdom that he or she has longed for. (See
Hugh Treddenick's translation in Hamilton and Cairns, The Collected Dialogues ofPlato.)
59
Jaspers, Way To Wisdom (Victor Gollancz Ltd: 1951), 12.
60
Jaspers, The Perennial Scope ofPhilosophy (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.: London, 1950), 150.
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the way of ascent out of the Cave is rough and steep, and the prisoner is one who is
dragged up the steep path (Republic 515e). Plato indicates that to achieve the divine
vision is not easy, no matter how inclined we are to it within the soul. Yet, once the
individual has come into the light of the divine outside of the Cave there is a longing
to remain there (516d), but through compassion the philosopher returns to those who
are still in the shadows. Even though benevolent, the philosopher suffers the
humiliation of being mocked and even killed for speaking to those still chained of the
journey to the divine (517a). Such pathos is seen throughout the Dialogues most
specifically in the story of Socrates, a picture of the philosopher challenging those he
meets, and suffering for that which he practices.
The pathos of the philosophical journey is not an escape from the world, but
an ascent to wisdom in order that life is transformed. The one who ascends out of
the Cave remembers those still enslaved (516c). As Socrates says to Glaucon,
each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the
others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. When you are used to it,
you'll see vastly better than the people there. And because you've seen the
truth about fine, just, and good things, you'll know each image for what it is
f\9
and also that ofwhich it is the image. (Republic 520c)
Marking Jasper's and Murdoch's insistence, we come to a picture of a true
knowledge of the world in Plato, and not the avoidance of it. We cannot, and do not,
leave the world behind in Plato, but live in the midst of the world of shadows, seeing
beyond the sensibly perceived and changing world to the reality of Ideas. As Jaspers
writes, Plato indicates a two-way path:
[The thinking mind] can move from the world of appearance out in to the
eternal world (Phaedo); and again from the eternal world it can look back at
the world of appearance with a view to understanding it and shaping it
{Republic, Laws, Timaeus). Plato's philosophizing moves in both directions,
toward being and from being. Man is 'here' in the world; he must look
beyond the world in order, by touching on the essential, to become essential
himself. But then he comes back to the world.... Plato does not rise to the
higher regions in order to abandon the world; his transcending does not lead
to solitary ecstasy, deification... Plato's philosophizing takes up its task in
the world... Plato is equal to his work in the world only because he is at
home in the supracelestial realm that is the source of norms and guidance.
61 Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel (London: The Carey Kingsgate Press Limited: 1966), 4.
62 G. Grube's translation in Plato: Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed. (Hackett Publishing
Company, 1997), 1137.
63 Karl Jaspers, Great Philosophers, 145.
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In Plato, humanity through its ascent reaches an understanding of the world as it is -
not an escape, but an ascent, of going above the Cave in order to see in full that
which is below in the shadows.
Wonder and the Essence ofPhilosophy
If the ascent of the soul to encounter the divine is one of the main objectives
of Plato's philosophy, it is the idea of philosophical wonder that is the vehicle. The
notion of wonder is a strong and influential motif within Plato's philosophical
theology.64 In the Theaetetus (155d) Plato gives the vivid account of the
transformational and religious nature of wonder to the soul when Theaetetus,
confessing to Socrates that philosophical questions starts him 'wondering' and make
his 'head swim', is given the lesson that it is just such a passion that is the essence of
being a philosopher. As Socrates says, it is 'this feeling (t6 tcocGoq) ofwonder
(x6 Gaup-d^eiv)' that shows one is a true philosopher, since wonder is 'the only
beginning (dpxtj) of philosophy... ,'65 As Socrates declares, wonder is both the basis
upon which philosophy builds itself in the soul and is the passionate force of
philosophy as well. Even more, it is a religious idea that plays an important part in
Plato's philosophical theology as a whole.
The idea ofwonder in Plato attaches itself directly to the question of
humanity. The feeling ofwonder and its place in philosophy, especially within
Plato, is given by Martin Heidegger in his What is Philosophy? when he discusses
the passage of the Theaetetus giving his own translation of the passage and lifting the
issue of wonder to a prominent place. In Heidegger's rendition, Socrates says,
'Very much is this especially the pathos of a philosopher, namely, to be astonished;
for there is no other determining point of departure for philosophy than this.'66 For
Heidegger, it is the word 'astonishment' that better captures the sense of 'wonder'
that Plato employs. Whatever the case, one is able to detect the deep emotion that is
associated with the concept in Plato. As Heidegger comments, wonder
64 Aristotle, echoing Plato, says that, 'through wonder... men now begin and originally began to
philosophize. Metaphysics I. II. 9sq., translated by Hugh Tredennick {The Loeb Classical Library,
London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1933), 13.
65 H. Fowler's translation in the Loeb series of Plato.
66 Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy (London: Vision Press Limited, 1972), 79.
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(astonishment) is a feeling, an emotion, which is the beginning point for the
philosopher:
Astonishment, as pathos, is the arche [the beginning] of philosophy. We must
understand the Greek word arche [beginning] in its fullest sense. It names
that from which something proceeds. But this 'from where' is not left behind
in the process of going out, but the beginning rather becomes that which the
verb archein expresses, that which governs. The pathos of astonishment thus
does not simply stand at the beginning of philosophy, as, for example, the
washing of his hands precedes the surgeon's operation. Astonishment carries
and pervades philosophy.67
Heidegger raises a valid point that wonder is not only the beginning of philosophy
but also that wonder sustains philosophy, upholds it, and is the constant basis upon
which it rests:
Astonishment is an arche - it pervades every step of philosophy.
68Astonishment is pathos.
Wonder is then atemporal in the philosophical process, a passion which is not only a
means of entrance to philosophy, but the very necessity to maintaining the
philosophical life in Plato as well. Although wonder elates the soul, there is also the
implication of it being that with which someone is burdened, as 'anything that befalls
one, a suffering, misfortune, calamity'.69 Ifwe interpret this into Plato's meaning,
then the passion ofwonder, though not, of course a physical burden, is still an
internal unrestfulness of the soul. Heidegger interprets the philosophical wonder as
enduring or undergoing something; 'to be borne along by, to be determined by.'70 If
this meaning is accepted and interpreted, then Socrates' words to Theaetetus carry a
connotation of bearing a weighty responsibility. Thus, wonder is not only the
philosopher's joy, but is also her or his burden as well, as the philosopher is
captivated by the questions of philosophy.
Wonder represents, then, the ascent in elation to the divine encounter and also
the descent into the burden of life that it is part of existence - the philosopher's
wonder gives life but it is also that with which the philosopher, in one sense, suffers.
Both connotations unite to form a conception which describes the experience of
61 Ibid., 81.
68 Ibid., 83.
69 Lexicon abridged from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford at the Clarendon Press,
1926), 511.
70
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philosophical wonder for Plato. The wonder that begins philosophy is also that
which, for some, is a source of the philosopher's derision. The theme of the
philosopher's dying overshadows the Theaetetus as it begins with Theaetetus years
after the discussion with Socrates which the dialogue recounts, being taken back to
Athens badly wounded in battle. Reflecting this theme in the last lines of the
dialogue, Socrates is shown to be on his way to meet the indictment that Meletus71
has brought against him (Theaetetus 210d) which is told in the Apology which results
in his death. Even in Aristophanes in the Clouds72 the philosophical wondering
becomes a lampoon. What Plato pronounces through all of these is that society by its
laughter is part of its own folly of neglecting its transformation in philosophy
through wonder.
What can be seen is that the idea of philosophical wonder in Plato illumines
two notions which implicate the ways of the soul: philosophy as a journey in an
inward and outward turning of the soul, and as an idea of theological insight. Gabriel
Marcel gives a term describing humanity as a Homo viator which associates the ideas
ofjourney and pathos together in that Man is a 'wayfarer in time', 'wondering as we
7-3
wander.' Such a phrase captures an idea reflected in Plato that wonder is necessary
to the journey of the individual being a philosopher. Wonder, by its nature, signifies
the deficiency of human wisdom in that as one wonders, what is conveyed is that one
does not fully understand. Yet, this is what the nature of Plato's philosophical
theology is characterised by, a love for wisdom which is a constant and never-ending
search. Wonder is characterised by an inward and outward turning of the soul. Karl
Jaspers writes that 'wonderment' gives rise to three drives within the human soul:
'question and insight', and from the questioning, 'doubt' in the knowledge that is
attained giving rise to critical examination and certainty, and from this 'awe and
forsakenness' a sense to 'inquire into himself.'74 For Jaspers, wonder represents a
turning towards the questioning and insight, and a turning away in doubt, and then a
turning inward in knowing oneself. Thus, for Jaspers, wonder represents all that
philosophy entails: the insight that comes from enquiry, the questioning certainty,
71 Meletus was angered says Socrates on behalf of the poets. (Apology 23 e)
72
Apology 18d.
73 Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel (London: The Carey Kingsgate Press Limited: 1966), 17.
74
Jaspers, Way To Wisdom, 17.
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and lastly, from the doubt an 'awe and forsakeness' which causes a looking inward to
oneself.
Secondly, it is this wonder that proves to be a central motif within Plato's
philosophical theology. The wondering in Plato's philosophical theology leads us to
conceive of the divine, to realise it in the philosophical way of life, but it is that for
which one constantly searches never realising its full essence. However, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty comments that wonder, though welcome in philosophy, does not
prove helpful in theology:
Theology makes use ofphilosophical wonder only for the purpose of
motivating an affirmation which ends it. Philosophy, on the other hand,
arouses us to what is problematic in our own existence and in that of the
world, to such a point that we shall never be cured of searching for a solution,
nc
as Bergson says, 'in the notebooks of the master.'
Yet, Merleau-Ponty misinterprets the nature of the theological task, especially as it is
conveyed in Plato. It is Plato who offers the counter to Merleau-Ponty by
representing the use of wonder as a foundation to both philosophical and theological
thought. To wonder in Plato's sense is to find one's attention drawn to the divine not
repelled away from it. Wonder becomes the very impetus for further reflection
which Merleau-Ponty rightly notices, but he places theology within a box
disallowing any speculation whatever, which in turn does not give wonder its place
in theology as it does within Plato. For Plato, to wonder is to sense the mystery of
ultimate reality, and it is through wonder that the notion ofGod is conceived. To
feel the pathos ofwonder, to be in awe, is the beginning of philosophical and
theological reflection. The ancient theologian, Clement of Alexandria, is helpful to
offer this point when he writes, 'The beginning (of truth) is to wonder at things, as
Plato says in the Theaetetus...', and quoting a line from Matthias in the Traditions,
continues, 'Wonder at the things that are before thee, making this the first step to
further knowledge'.76 The source within the ascent of wonder is one which gives rise
to the very essence of appreciating, and contemplating the divine, a worshipping of
the divine through the act of philosophy.
75 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise ofPhilosophy (Northwestern University Press: 1963), 44-45. As
was pointed out to me, this comment is posited before Vatican II and represents a more cautious
response to wonder than falls after Vatican II in which the idea of wonder in regard to theology is
much more welcome.
76 Johann Quasten, Patrology, Vol. 1 (Spectrum Publishers: 1953), 126.
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For Plato, wonder is known as both an awe, but also a desire for that which is
divine. The idea of philosophical wonder illumines an aspect of the philosopher's
life in which the divine is both contemplated, but also that which is desired to be
known. This desire fuels the unrestfulness implicit in wondering, a constant
searching and longing which is never actually satisfied. Such wonder is to be filled
with love for that which is contemplated, a desirous love, an eros, which gives ascent
and transformation to the soul.
Eros and the Way ofTransformation
As the soul ascends through philosophy and wonder, in Plato, it is
transformed. In considering the aspect of transformation, and even salvation in
Plato's philosophy, it is the concept of Eros, or loving desire, that forms one of the
essential characteristics of Plato's philosophy, and one of the most significant
concepts in understanding Plato's philosophy as a religious experience and Plato's
philosophical theology. As Gerard Watson writes, it is this 'loving desire'that 'is
central to the philosophy of Plato.'77 Richard Tarnas, in his work, The Passion of the
• 1 ... 78 .
Western Mind, describes Eros as the 'complex multidimensional archetype' which
runs through the entirety of Plato's thought. Indeed, the concept of Eros stretches
over Plato's philosophy, underlying and saturating it. In Plato, Eros is a cosmic
reality that pervades through all things and in which all things participate. For Plato,
to speak of Eros is to explore that which is essential to the universe itself. Seen in
the dialogues of the Symposium and the Phaedrus respectively, Eros is the medium
of ascent to the divine and the soul's transformation. It is an aspect of Plato's
philosophical theology which is expressed in its centrality in Plato's philosophical
theology as a way of transformation and salvation as an essential part the
philosophical life, embodied in the world and in the life of the philosopher, and as an
expression of the interrelationship of the intellectual and the passionate, forming an
essential aspect of the religious experience of Plato's philosophy.
77
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In the Symposium, Eros is depicted as pervading the entirety of the universe,
affecting all forms of being,79 the 'preeminent force in human motivations.'80 Tarnas
describes the concept of Eros as found in the Symposium as expressing itself in the
'sexual instinct, but at higher levels impels the philosopher's passion for intellectual
beauty and wisdom, and culminates in the mystical vision of the eternal, the ultimate
source of all beauty.'81 The Symposium represents an exploration of the true
expression ofwhat love is, as Socrates, recounting Diotima the priestess' words, says
that she 'taught me the philosophy of love (icx epooxiKd eSiSa^ev).' (20Id)
The characteristic of Eros as depicted in the dialogue is one as of a mediator82
through which the philosopher experiences the divine, but it is also one in which the
characteristics of the philosophical life and the philosopher are known. Eros is
depicted as one who is filled with constant desire, need, and passion, 'in between
wisdom and ignorance.' (202a)83 He is a 'great spirit' (Saipoov peyat;) as
everything that is spiritual lies between god and mortal (mi yap Tuav to
5aip6viov peTa^b ecm Oeab xe Kat GvpTab). (202e) He is a daimon, the child of
Poros ('way' or 'resource') and Penia ('poverty'), bearing the characteristics of both.
But Love is also a schemer and a lover, a pursuer, 'resourceful in the pursuit of
intelligence' (203d), and because he loves what is beautiful, he is lover ofwisdom
(204b) which is 'extremely beautiful.'84
The goal of Eros is in the idea of relationship with that which it desires, in
order that its own love come to fulfilment. Love desires to be with that which is the
object of his love, to make the beautiful his own. (Symposium 204d) Diotima
explains that, 'All or us are pregnant... both in body and in soul...' (Symposium
206c) and the object of love is, 'giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul
(fectti yap tooto tokoq ev KaXcp mi Kara to acopa mi mxa tt)v \|/nyf|v).'
79




82 The middle way is a notion that Plato employs several times. Interestingly, thought is considered as
a middle way between opinion and understanding in Republic 51 Id, and in the Laws 792d-e God is
said to be in a state of neither seeking pleasure nor strictly avoiding pain, in other words in the middle
between the two. As the Athenian further says, that is the way of anyone who would become like
God.






(Symposium 206b) It desires the beautiful but beauty is not enough in itself, for
Eros by its nature seeks fulfilment in union with the beautiful through procreation.
(Symposium 206d). As Diotima says, 'Love is not exactly a longing for the
beautiful,' but for 'the conception and generation that the beautiful effects.'
(Symposium 206e) Our mortality constantly longs for immortality, and it is through
Eros and its desire for the divine that this desire is fulfilled.86
Eros leads to an inexpressible vision. The vision of Beauty which the
philosopher seeks, says Diotima, is one beyond the tangible manifestation: without a
face, or hands, or anything of the flesh, ofwhich no words can be spoken, nor
knowledge of it as that which exists in other things but that which is 'of itself and by
itself in eternal oneness (demo koc0' amoL povoeidet^. (211b) 'Led toward the
'sanctuary of Love,' (211c), carried from various beauties and instances, the human
lover is brought within reach of the 'final revelation' (211c), mounting the 'heavenly
ladder' (211c) until he comes at last to know what beauty is. Only in this ascent
through love, says Diotima, is a man's life ever worth living (21 Id), and only in this
can this one know true virtue (212a), for 'he shall be called the friend of god, and if
ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be given to him.'(212a)
All of these expressions which characterise Eros, also characterise the
philosopher. Like Eros, the philosopher for Plato lives as one in the middle way
between earth and heaven, even ignorance and understanding. The philosopher
exists in the world, but the soul longs for the divine which is beyond that which is
physically held and seen. The mind of the philosopher knows the wisdom that he or
she seeks, but does not know the divine in its fullness. As Eros, the philosopher is a
lover ofwisdom, but never satisfied but is in constant want and need, ever seeking
fulfilment and ever desiring. Seen in Eros, the philosopher is able to know the
characteristics of the philosophical life, but also to see that life in relationship to that
which is loved. As the Symposium shows the singular and individual characteristics,
85 As John M. Cooper notes, 'The preposition is ambiguous between 'within' and 'in the presence of.'
Diotima may mean that the lover causes the newborn (which may be an idea) to come to be within a
beautiful person; or she may mean that he is stimulated to give birth to it in the presence of a beautiful
person.' Plato: Complete Works, 489.
86 Iris Murdoch comments that, 'Eros is a form of the desire for immortality, for perpetual possession
of the good, whatever we may take the good to be.' - Murdoch, Existentialists, 415.
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so the Phaedrus shows more fully that love in correspondence to others in the
philosophical life.
In the Phaedrus, Plato carries the themes of the love of Beauty, erotic love,
and the movement and interaction of the lover with the beloved, to outline the
disposition and character of the philosophical life. In Plato's philosophical theology,
loving desire saturates all of existence, and it is this desirous love which represents
the love of the philosopher for the vision of the divine characterising the
philosophical life. Employing eternal Beauty as the theme, the philosopher to Plato
is the true lover, one whose soul is engaged in love and one who is transformed by
the love of the divine. Edith Hamilton, in her opening comments to the Phaedrus
notes that in Plato loving Beauty is, 'the first movement to philosophy, the impulse
to seek what is higher - in Plato's phrase, 'the beyond' - comes from falling in love
• 87
with visible, physical beauty.' The love which enlivens the philosophical life is
one is a constant desirous love in which the physical becomes the channel to the
eternal in an ever-abiding movement. 'All that is soul is deathless
(xj/^^l tkxqcx dcBcxvatOQ)'88 because it is ever in motion. (Phaedrus 245c)
Symbolised as a winged team of horses and a charioteer, the soul desires to ascend to
the divine (Phaedrus 246aff) drawn by a love for that which is found ' beyond the
heavens... (where) true being dwells, without color or shape, that cannot be touched;
reason alone, the soul's pilot, can behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge
thereof.' (.Phaedrus 247c) It is to this place that the soul in its love ever strives to
reach.
The love ofwhich Plato speaks is one that brings an ascent for the soul
through the love of the Beautiful, an ascent borne from a transposing of the common
Eros for physical beauty to that which is heavenly and divine which, in turn,
transforms all love. In the Symposium, Pausanias speaks of two types of Eros,
love of the heavenly Aphrodite (b TrjQ obpavtocg Geo)) fepooQ), heavenly in
himself and precious alike to cities and to men, for he constrains both lover
and beloved to pay the most earnest heed to their moral welfare, but all the
rest are followers of the other, the earthly Aphrodite (tfjq TKXvSfpou). (185c)
87 Edith Hamilton, The Collected Dialogues ofPlato, 475.
88 Eric Voegelin, Plato, 136.
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In Plato, the love for the divine is the only true love, for it is the one that allows for
virtue in the loving relationship. The way of the divine Eros is a cleansing of love to
• • RQ
be one that is not bound by simply the physical, but a love which is of the soul. In
this the idea of Eros presents a choice of a way of life: a way of being bound simply
to the earthly or ascending to the true love known in loving the divine.
The essential difference between these two lives is the way ofmemory.
Exemplified in the Phaedrus, the way of the 'heavenly' Eros is a way of the soul
remembering the vision of the divine it once beheld. It is a way of recollecting,
'those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its
vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being
(to bv 6vto<;).' (Phaedrus 249c)90 To live a life simply after the physical is to have
amnesia of the divine vision the soul once beheld. The picture Plato portrays
throughout the Phaedrus is one of transformation, a transformation known when the
soul in its love recollects the divine that was beheld before it descended into the
physical world. Through remembering, the memory (p,vf|pr|), the soul recaptures the
true love that it once had. As Socrates says, through its memory the philosopher's
soul recovers her 'wings' by communing with those things which even makes 'God'
divine. (.Phaedrus 249c)91 Because of such a love, this one 'separates himself from
human interests and turns his attention toward the divine' and in so doing is 'rebuked
by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he is inspired.' (.Phaedrus
249d)92 In this true love, the philosopher is inspired (fevGouaux^cov), desiring as a
bird to fly upward caring nothing for the world beneath (Phaedrus 249d),93 a desire
89 John M. Cooper writes in his opening notes to the dialogue Alcibiades that an exemplary Platonic
love is given in the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, seen in the Symposium and in the
dialogue that bears Alcibiades' name. Cooper writes, Platonic love is an intensely affectionate, but
not a sexual, relationship...' Cooper, Plato: Complete Works, 557.
90 H. Fowler translation in Loeb.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 H. D. F.Kitto explains the nature of eros that is applicable to Plato's entire scene by drawing a
distinction between eros and the related thought of Cupid. Cupid, Kitto argues, means desire, (as the
adjective cupidus) denoting greed and not love in the sense that eros does. In fact, Eros has different
associations: all entailing the idea of passionate joy. An example of such love and joy is given in
Sophocles' play portraying Ajax who, though contemplating suicide, is persuaded by his wife,
Tecmessa, and his own men (the Chorus) to endure life, disgrace, and go on with life. Upon this
decision the chorus sings, and dances, and gives an ode: 'I shiver with eros: my abounding joy gives
me wings.' This, in similar fashion seems to be Plato's meaning here. It is a philosophically pregnant
idea that the vision of beauty would strike a type of love that also includes a profound notion of
passionate joy - Kitto, The Greeks (Penguin Books, 1951), 251.
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which those who simply exist in the common and physical love do not comprehend
because they have forgotten.
What can be gleaned from Plato's concept of Eros is that it involves a
religious idea of transformation as a cosmic spiritual reality94 and a medium through
which the soul encounters the divine, as well as a concept which involves the aspect
of embodiment representing the joining of the intellectual and the passionate. In Iris
Murdoch's words, Eros is 'sexual energy as spiritual energy.'95 Eros is a principle,
'which connects the commonest human desire to the highest morality and to the
pattern of divine creativity in the universe.'96 The transformation that takes place in
the soul through Eros is one that, in Murdoch's conception, is a transformation of
energy. The sexual energy that is common to all is transformed to reach new heights,
to lead to an encounter with the divine. Murdoch writes that for Plato,
We must transform base egoistic energy and vision (low Eros) into high
spiritual energy and vision (high Eros).... The moral life in the Platonic
understand of it is a slow shift of attachments wherein looking (concentrating,
attending, attentive discipline) is a source of divine (purified) energy. This is
a progressive redemption of desire.... The movement is not, by an occasional
leap.... There are innumerable points at which we have to detach ourselves,
to change our orientation, to redirect our desire and refresh and purify our
energy. 7
We do not do away with Eros, but we channel the sexual energy,
transforming it to take us to the divine wherein we find the source and true love of
our souls. Eros is a turning toward ultimate reality, and the 'life-problem' that exists
• • • 08within humanity, writes Murdoch, is the 'transformation of energy'. To Plato, the
issue of transformation and even salvation of the soul is what is at stake, as Murdoch
writes, 'Never has a philosopher more clearly indicated that salvation concerns the
whole soul: the soul must be saved entire by the redirection of its energy away from
selfish fantasy toward reality.'99
94 The cosmic dimension of Eros is recognised by Empedocles who speaks of the two principles of the
universe to be Love and Strife. See 'Empedocles', fragment 17 in Kathleen Freeman's, Ancilla to The
Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1948) as well as Werner Jaeger's, The Theology ofthe Early
Greek Philosophers (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1947).








The choices of life and the way of transformation offered by a religious view
of Plato's Eros is a perspective which contributes greatly to modern considerations,
as Freud himselfwrites, 'Anyone who looks down with contempt upon
psycho-analysis from a superior vantage-point should remember how closely the
enlarged sexuality of psycho-analysis coincides with the Eros of the divine Plato.'100
However, even with this, contemporary thought still overlooks Eros's religious
nature, drawing a distinction between what Murdoch calls the Platonic 'religious
concept' and its 'quasi-scientific modern version.'101 Eros is an issue of the psyche,
the soul, and it conveys in Plato a choice that must be made between a love that is
base and a love that is for the eternal. As Karl Jaspers comments on the Phaedrus,
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sexuality is depicted as, 'origin, symbol, and as enemy' in the dialogue. The
1 A1
vision ofBeauty causes recollection in the soul, and the desire for union with that
which is beautiful compels the lover, however, when sexuality becomes
'self-sufficient',104 when it becomes the good in itself, then it becomes base, vulgar,
and self-satisfying. Such a problem is indicative of the choice that has to be made in
that Eros, as an ambiguous spirit, says Murdoch, aspires to good, but is potentially
destructive.105
In its transformational role, Eros is a concentration upon that which lies
'beyond' the physical in the divine, a searching for that which lies beyond the
physical beauty to that which is eternal. To be transformed by Eros is not to reject
the body, but a seeking to go beyond it. James Feibleman writes it well when he says
that Plato,
Never argued that the good things of this world were to be altogether denied;
he said only that we had to get beyond and above them - yes, but only by
going through them, not by denying them. This is the theme of the ladder of
love in the Symposium. Hence for Plato matter is not evil, it is simply by
itself not enough.106
For Plato, Eros represents a religious quest that humanity must go beyond the
physical by going 'through' it in order to reach the divine wherein the soul finds its
100 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 21; from Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory ofSexuality, vol.
VII, preface to the fourth edition.
101 Ibid., 24.
102
Jaspers, Great Philosophers, 155.
103 Phaedrus 249d.
104
Jaspers, Great Philosophers, 155.
105 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 24
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true satisfaction. As Eros runs through the universe in the Symposium, it is an
experience of a cosmic reality, of that which is at the centre of all existence. The
transformation offered through Eros is a transformation by that which is ultimately
real, and that in which all things participate.
To Plato, the redirection of Eros away from self-gratification to a desire for
wisdom is the path that humanity must take in order to be fully human. Through the
transformation of Eros, humanity is brought from the old life of self-gratification to
the life ofphilosophy. Anders Nygren, in his work, Agape and Eros, famous for its
discrediting of Eros in favour of agape, does, interestingly, raise the important issue
that what is involved in Plato's doctrine of Eros 'is primarily a doctrine of
• 107 i •
salvation.' According to Nygren, Plato's Eros as a doctrine of salvation is also
tied to his doctrine of the Forms in which Eros is not only the beginning, but is also
the culmination of the conception of the Forms: 'On the one hand, the idea of Eros is
the basis of Plato's religious doctrine of salvation; but on the other, the structure of
the doctrine of the Forms is such that it leads up to Eros as its natural conclusion.'108
106 James K. Feibleman, Religious Platonism (George Allen and Unwin Ltd: London, 1959), 32.
107 Anders Nygren, Agape andEros, Part I, transl. by A. G. Herbert (London: Society For Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1941), 121. To understand Eros, continues Nygren, is to understand it in the
manner of the Orphic Mysteries which played a great part in Plato's own thought processes in the
forming of Plato's philosophy. What is found in Orphism is the basis upon which Plato transposes his
use of eros to explain the understanding of philosophy. As the Orphic myth ofZagreus / Dionysos
shows: Zeus had intended to give all power to Dionysus his son, but the Titans seizing him, killed and
devoured him. 'Zeus then smote the Titans with his thunderbolt and destroyed them; and out of the
Titans' ashes he formed the race of humanity.' (121) The myth explains the central rite of Dionysiac
orgies, the dismembering and eating of the god incarnated in the form of an animal; but in Orphism
this is inseparably connected with the myth of the creation ofmankind out of the ashes.'(121, quoting
Nilsson) Man has a double nature - kinship with the divine and enmity against it as well. Formed
from the ashes, man is evil and at enmity with God, but since in the Titans' ashes there were the
remains of the god they had consumed, man also has a divine element ('a spark of the Divine'). It is
this divine element that must break its bonds to the earthly, to the bodily through purification from
earthly defilement, and pass into the nature of the Divine to which it is by nature akin. To this end
Orphism provides a way of salvation (122) by purification and ecstasy, as the soul is able to be united
again with the Divine and taken up into it. The double nature of humanity, the notion of ascent and
the liberation of the soul, is the basis for the idea of Eros. (122) Around this basic idea is a number of
other conceptions all belonging to Eros-religion: the primaeval fall of souls into matter, the body as
the prison house of the soul, the transmigration of souls, the soul's natural immortality and divine
nature (see Alcibiades), and also asceticism, mystical rites and ecstasy (divine madness?) as a way of
salvation. (122) However, for the Mystery religions as with other religions, the blessed life, the
'soul's salvation', is one found in initiations and ritual observances, but for Plato the blessed life is
one of practising and pursuing philosophy. Philosophy becomes the salvation. Nygren writes in
comparing the mysteries to Plato: 'even the philosopher can speak of a 'conversion' and a
'purification', and he cannot arrive at the desired end by way of dialectics, but only in a state of




Thus, writes Nygren, 'Plato's doctrine of the Forms leads directly up to the idea of
Eros, and his philosophy is at the same time a doctrine of salvation.'109
The point by Nygren that Plato's doctrine of Eros is one which involves a
salvation for the human soul is a valid one. However, it is an idea of salvation that is
based upon Eros as a mediator in that the soul ascends via Eros in its experience of
the divine. As Diotima says, Eros is a 'great spirit' in between 'god and mortal' and
as such, is a messenger who shuttles back and forth between the divine and
humanity, binding them both together (Symposium 202e). The encounter with the
divine is the culmination, and the source of salvation, offered in Plato's philosophy,
not, as Nygren says, the experience of Eros. In this, Nygren mistakes Eros as the
beginning and the end of humanity's salvation and not as a mediator. In contrast to
Nygren's perspective of Plato, Eros leads the soul to the divine, but is never the end
itself. This, of course, breaks a strength ofNygren's point to find justification in
pitting Eros against agape as directly linked to being a point of salvation and not
salvation's mediator. John Rist illumines the point,
Plato usually tends to describe it as a passion directed towards the supreme
Realities and as an upward movement, but that nevertheless we are justified
in seeing him as the source of a second conception, that of an overflowing of
love from higher to lower realities.110
We must, however, even be cautious with Rist's point as well in that Eros is a
medium of exchange between the soul and the divine, and between lovers, but is not
that which flows from the divine to humanity. The Forms do not lovingly desire the
world, but the world lovingly desires them. As Iris Murdoch comments, the Forms
are 'essentially objects of love',111 but they stand 'separate and unresponsive.'112
However, as we shall see in the fourth chapter, this separate and unresponsive nature
is negotiated in a quasi-personal view of the Forms. For the point here, Eros is a
medium of the soul in its salvation in the encounter with the divine.
Even though recognising Eros' role in the salvation of the soul, and that it is
•*113 •••
humanity's means to the encounter with the divine Nygren attempts to diminish
110 John M. Rist, Eros and Psyche, 39. In the Phaedrus, Plato describes that love begins to overflow
in the lover and runs outside of him to the beloved. There, love begins to grow in the beloved so that





Nygren, Agape and Eros, 135.
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and discredit the nature of Eros to the point of seeing Eros as the love of desire114 not
as desiring love, and that it is an egocentric love and not as a love which leads to the
divine.115 Nygren through this misses completely the nature and definition of Eros as
given within Plato who sees Eros not as a selfish attachment but a selfless desire for
the beloved and a desirous love for the divine. As Plato's myth of the charioteer
makes clear, the dark horse is reined because of his all consuming desire not allowed
to run free to pursue it. The lust is controlled through a purification of Love that is
transformed as a love for the divine and not the physical manifestation. Nygren
admits, however, that 'the Platonic Eros is a wholly different thing from sensual
love',116 and that it is necessary to distinguish two types ofEros as apart as, 'This
• • • •• 117distinction between the 'vulgar' and the 'heavenly' Eros is, indeed... elementary.'
(Symposium 180d) It may even be said that Plato does not distinguish between two
different 'types' ofEros, as much as that there are two directions to which the one
Eros can turn. As Iris Murdoch argues, it is the redirection 'away from selfish
118
fantasy' and not toward it, that is the mark of Plato's Eros. To Plato, only an Eros
turned toward the divine establishes truth and justice which is a far and away
different idea than seeing Eros, as Nygren does, as a love of desire.
The second idea Nygren argues: that Eros is egocentric love, is simply a
misguided point that shows Nygren's pious bias for agape and what he perceives as
remaining true to Christian thought rather than a true seeking of what Eros actually
entails. Eros is far from an egocentrism in Plato's understanding, but is, as in the
Phaedrus (250), an envisioning of beauty that is actually the prime occasion for
'unselfing.'119 Nygren's thesis desires to establish that Eros does not represent true
love at all, and that in such a choice the Greeks as a whole, but especially Plato,
advocated a love based upon the centrality of the self over the 'other'. On this,
Gregory Vlastos argues that Nygren
fails to reckon with elementary fact that philia is a near-synonym of agape,
and that, regardless what their philosophers said, Greeks, being human, were










for a passing notice of the Lysis... where Nygren translates the word by
'friendship' and uses the dialogue as further evidence 'of the egocentric
nature ofEros' in Plato...fails to take the slightest cognizance of Aristotle's
conception of it.120
As shown above, Eros is not the preservation of the self, but the desire to lose the self
and the soul's own selfish desires in the love for the divine.
Even with such a low view, in the end, of the concept of Eros, Nygren still
retains a view which is illuminating to a true understanding of Plato which sees Eros
as giving the soul transformation and salvation. To Nygren, Eros is humanity's
ascent rather than the divine's descent as it 'is the way ofman to the Divine, and can
121*
never be a way by which the Divine may descend to man.' Admittedly, this is
what Plato indicates. However, Nygren rejects an essential understanding of Eros in
that it is a means through which, as in the Phaedrus and the Symposium, beautiful
things act as reminders of Beauty so that, 'the sharp dualism' is overcome, and a
more harmonious world-view is attained.122 Nygren writes that Plato's insistence on
escape emphasises the reality of ultimate dualistic opposition so that Eros is 'a way
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of flight' and not an affirmation of the world of sense.' Yet, Nygren fails to see
that Eros is for Plato a means to the divine, an ascent wherein the idea of Eros for the
divine transforms life itself, and does not simply represent a flight away. The
spiritual nature of Eros is that it is a common experience which, as the soul desires
the divine and not simply the physical, becomes the medium through which the
divine is encountered bringing transformation, and even salvation, to the soul.
As it is a means to the divine, Plato's Eros is a recognition of the
manifestation of the divine in the world, and is embodied in the philosopher in that
the way of the philosophical life is the way of love. The central role of Eros in the
philosophical life is that it recognises the divine, known in the form of Beauty, as
present in the world. Eros is a power that enlivens the soul to seek the eternal
Beauty, which is recognised universally. Regarding the Phaedrus, Iris Murdoch
comments that, for Plato, we,
120
Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton University Press, 1973), 6.
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'see' non-visual forms of beauty. Plato, in his myth does not discuss exactly
what seeing beauty is like. He assumes his hearer will understand.124
Simone Weil comments that beauty is not simply for cultivated people, but is 'the
only value that is universally recognised' as the word beauty 'speaks to all hearts.'125
Weil continues that love is so much a part of the universe, as seen in the Timaeus,
that 'the substance of the universe wherein we live, is love.'126 The universe,
has been created by love and its beauty is the reflection and the irrefutable
sign of this divine love, as the beauty of a perfect statue, of a perfect song, is
the reflection of supernatural love which fills the soul of a truly inspired
197
artist. 12'
This immanence of the divine is part of the underlying understanding of the doctrine
of Eros in that the soul desires the Beauty that is manifest in the world. Because of
its recognition of the beautiful object Eros is a channel through which the eternal
Beauty is known, and through which this divine Beauty is encountered. In Eros,
sensual beauty is not diminished but is built up and exalted as that which participates
in the eternal. Plato's Eros does not bring a cold, hard separation between the
sensual and the divine, but sees the sensual as participating in the divine. Eros is a
mediator between the mundane and eternal, and, as such, is a realisation of their
mutual interaction.
The interaction between the mundane and eternal is seen in one aspect
through the philosophical life as Eros becomes embodied in the philosopher. The
philosopher, as a lover, is one in whom the divine Love shows itself. Although Eros
is, of course, intangible, there is still a movement toward embodiment as seen
exemplified in the philosophical life. Of course, for Plato, the chief example of this
embodiment is in the person of Socrates, an idea which figures prominently in
Plato's philosophical theology as a whole. On this, Edith Hamilton reminds that,
'the stress in the Phaedrus is on visible beauty, but the reader of Plato must always.
remember that Socrates, the most beloved and the most lovely of all...' was
completely absent of any physical beauty, but had, as Hamilton describes it, a beauty
• • 19R ••
'within.' Karl Jaspers similarly writes that, Eros is a 'movement of love' (a
124 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 15.






philein of sophia), and it is Socrates who is the source for Plato's own love and
literally the source for his philosophy,129 one who, throughout the Dialogues,
embodies the love ofwisdom. Jaspers comments that in Socrates Eros, in Plato's
thought, becomes tangible as,
No other love has ever left such a monument. Plato's Eros was real;
illumined by the reality, it became a love of everything noble that crossed his
path.'130
As Eros involves an aspect of embodiment in its transformational and even
salvific role, it also represents the interrelationship of the intellectual with the
passionate that characterises Plato's philosophical theology as a whole. Through the
concept of Eros, Plato interrelates these two ideas to the point that the philosophical
way is not the removal of the emotional or the spiritual, but is the embracing of the
passionate as an essential attribute of philosophy. As his philosophy involves this
emotional and the passionate aspect, it involves the personal being of the
philosopher.
However, Plato at some points seems to advocate the divorce of passion
altogether from the life of reason and philosophy. In the Phaedo (84b), the
philosopher's soul,
would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy
should set it free, and that then set free it should give itself again into
bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil... No his soul believes
that it must gain peace (yaXfivr|v) from these emotions, must follow reason




In Socrates' words, the soul seeks a galeae, a calm repose from the emotions of
pleasure and pain, found in reason and the contemplation of the divine. Yet, can we
deduce, then, that Plato's philosophy condones the absence of passion in order that
one must gain peace from such 'emotions'? The answer is that we cannot, for what
Socrates is advocating is not an absence of emotion, but a description of the freedom
of the soul that is found as the soul breaks free from the passions that rule the body.
129
Jaspers, Great Philosophers, 155.
130 Ibid.
131 Harold Fowler translation in Loeb edition of Plato, 1982. This translation is a better rendering of
Plato's connotation, however for an alternative reading see Tredennick's translation in Hamilton and
Cairns, The Collected Dialogues ofPlato, page 67, who translates the phrase that the 'soul secures
immunity from its desires by following reason.'
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This does not constitute a breaking away from passion altogether, but a certain type
of passion (i.e. the bodily), for the soul has its own desire and passion for the divine
which is clearly seen in the Phaedrus and the Symposium. Only when it is free from
the rules of the passion of the body does the soul find its own passionate awakening
in desire for the eternal. Plato indicates throughout that it is not the absence of
emotion, but the transforming of emotion to be a desirous love for the divine that is
the mark of the divine way of life in philosophy, a passion that is seen clearly in the
concept ofEros. As Iris Murdoch writes, 'in spite of Plato's repeated declaration
that philosophers should stay chaste and his requirement that the soul must try to
escape from the body, it is the whole Eros that concerns him, and not just some
passionless distillation.'133 In Eros the picture is given that passion is an essential
characteristic of the philosophical life.
A further illustration of how the passionate and emotional is involved within
the philosophical life is seen in Plato's use of imagery: in the myths to convey
philosophical ideas, and in the envisioning of the Forms, which, even further, betrays
the religious aspect of this question altogether. What is suggested, for example, by
the elaborate myth of the Phaedrus, and other myths, according to Murdoch, is that
Plato suggests to us 'the naturalness of using visual images to express spiritual
truths.'134 It is the vision of Beauty which enlivens the soul of the philosopher,
awaking the passionate intensity of the divine Eros. Murdoch writes that though
Plato has been 'criticised for his use of visual imagery', 'many of these images...
suggest the absolute closeness, at some points at any rate, of the spiritual world, how
1 TC
close and how numerous are its cues.' Recalling the image of Beauty, even the
contemplation of the Forms is an experience which involves the emotions. Myles
Burnyeat, in his commentary on the Theaetetus, writes regarding Plato's Forms that,
1
'a great philosophy demands a response which is more than merely intellectual.'
Such images naturally draw upon the emotional by their very nature - we are
moved imaginatively, we experience the emotion that is involved in the myth, and in
132 yocAiivri has the connotation of a 'stillness of wind and wave' (Liddell and Scott, Greek-English
Lexicon, abridged (Oxford: 1926), 137.)
133 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, 415.
134 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 15.
135 Ibid.
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beholding the Form, we are philosophically engaged. As Nicolas Berdyaev writes,
knowledge is actually attained 'by means of images to a greater extent than
knowledge reached through concepts.137 As Murdoch argues, Plato is not simply an
'intellectualist', one simply given to the rational without any reference to the passion,
emotion, or even soul, but represents a union of the passion with the intellect:
Certainly he [Plato], who returns so often and so ardently to the importance
and the ambiguity of love, cannot be called a cold or abstract or purely
intellectual moralist. It is rather the other way round. He does not
'intellectualise' love, but sees intellect as passion.138
Further, such passion indicates not only an emotional aspect to Plato's philosophy,
but the religious nature of the philosophical experience as well. Murdoch writes in
another comment, 'Throughout his work Plato understands intellectual activity as
something spiritual, the love of learning spoken of in the Symposium and the
Philebus:139
The presence of the passionate in Plato's philosophical theology argues
against the contrasting view that does not see passion or spirituality as part of
intellectual endeavour. In Plato, the metaphysical is an emotional endeavour in
which the reason and the soul are in conjunction to that point where the person
becomes involved with, and influenced by, that which is contemplated. An example
from the Laws proves this out when concerning the contemplation of the gods, the
Athenian says, 'You should wait for the future, then, before you undertake to judge
of the supreme issues, and the greatest of these, though you now count it so trivial, is
that of thinking rightly about the gods and so living well, or the reverse.' (888b) For
Plato, the correct thinking about the divine is directly tied to a way of living in that
what is contemplated forms the way one lives. In fact, the knowledge of the divine
that is striven for through philosophy in Plato involves a richer idea than simply an
agreement on its reality. H. D. F. Kitto writes, that knowledge that is spoken about
in the context of the Greeks, and specifically Plato,
is one ofBeing, of The Good, virtually of God. It is something much richer
and wider than our current, purely intellectual 'knowledge', for a moral as
137 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1952), 39.
138
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well as an intellectual passion is its driving-force, and its object is the Truth
that embraces everything....140
By understanding that philosophical knowledge is that which involves the
passion and emotion, we see how that both the inner and outer experience of
philosophy conjoins one with another.141 Such a perspective according to Iris
Murdoch recognises that the conjoining of the intellect and passion gives rise to a
'new (modern) definition' of metaphysics or metaphysical craving, which would be
acceptable to Plato,' one that contemporary thought is in need of.142 Such words
express what Murdoch terms as, 'our finite nature together with our passionate desire
to understand "the world" which we attempt to intuit 'as a whole.' 143 Therefore, she
adds, it can be said that, 'Metaphysics may thus be connected with a mystical
state.'144 Nicolas Berdyaev echoes a similar sentiment when he writes that, 'as a
system of concepts metaphysics is an impossibility, it is possible only as the
symbolism of spiritual experience.'145 It is the 'whole man', and not simply the
reason, which 'constructs metaphysics,'146 for a perspective which sees metaphysics
as a strict and objective science devoid of passion is a 'will o' the wisp,'147 for it is
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the 'apprehension of spirit, in spirit, and through spirit' Metaphysics becomes part
of the subject, influencing within, creating spiritual values and making the act of
transcendence, not a means into an object, but an influence back into the subject.149
John Macquarrie adds the significant comment when he writes,
The desire to know, the drive of the intellect, is subtly intertwined in its roots
with the desire to be, the drive of the whole person. There is a personal factor
140 Kitto, The Greeks, 194.
141 Arthur Schopenhauer writes in The World as Will and Idea, supplement to Book One, 'Criticism of
the Kantian Philosophy' that, 'We have no grounds for shutting ourselves off, in the case of the most
important and most difficult of all questions, from the richest of all sources of knowledge, inner and
outer experience, in order to work only with empty forms. I therefore say that the solution of the
riddle of the world must proceed from the understanding of the world itself; that thus the task of
metaphysics is not to pass beyond the experience in which the world exists, but to understand it
thoroughly because inner and outer experience is at any rate the principal source of all knowledge;
that therefore the solution of the riddle of the world is only possible through the proper connection of
outer with inner experience effected at the right point, and the combination thereby produced of these
two very different sources of knowledge.' (Murdoch, Metaphysics, 79)
142 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 79.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.






in all knowing, even the kind which seems most matter-of-fact. That
personal factor becomes increasingly important as we move toward the kind
of knowing that is called 'metaphysical.' For this has to do with the ultimate
convictions that also shape our lives. In other words, metaphysics has a
religious dimension - using the word religious in the widest sense so that it
would not be restricted to those who finally come to a theistic metaphysic.150
As philosophy in Plato is defined to include the passionate, it involves the
individual philosopher within it, the entirety of the philosopher's being and the
philosopher's search for meaning. Berdyaev writes strongly that, 'Dispassionate
knowledge there cannot be and never has been among real philosophers; it can only
exist in dissertations which are devoid of any creative gift.'151 Berdyaev comments,
'Plato, the greatest of all philosophers, was an erotic philosopher. The true
philosopher,
has fallen in love with wisdom. In real true-born philosophy there is the Eros
of truth; there is the erotic attraction of the infinite and the absolute.
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Philosophical creativity is intoxicated with thought.
For Plato philosophy represents that which is known in the depth and involvement of
life so that intellect, passion, and religious thought become intertwined. When this is
understood, it is the entirety of the person that is involved, which Plato advocates
throughout the Dialogues. As Gerard Watson writes, such personal involvement is
an,
aspect much emphasized by Plato which we cannot afford to neglect. This is
that any real knowledge involves the emotions and that knowledge is in fact
impossible without such an involvement.154
Echoing this point, Nicolas Berdyaev writes, 'Philosophical knowledge is personal
in character and the more personal it is the more important it is.'155 To know, to have
cognition, as the philosopher desires to do, is for Berdyaev indicative of even a
search for meaning, as he writes,
It [cognition] is a spiritual struggle for meaning, and it is such not merely in
this or that line of thought or school, but in every true philosopher even
150 John Macquarrie, Existentialism, 198-9.
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although he may not recognize the fact himself. Cognition is not a
dispassionate understudy of reality.156
For Berdyaev it is the depth of passion that determines the intensity of the
philosophical endeavour. Berdyaev comments that,
The significance of any philosophy is decided by the passionate intensity of
the philosopher as a man, as one who is present behind all his efforts to know.
It is decided by the intensity of the will to truth and meaning; it is the whole
1 S7
man who takes knowledge of a thing.
For Plato, the determining factor of philosophy in one's life is where the
passion is directed whether to the sensual or to the divine. For him the passionate
and the intellectual are interrelated, even to the place that the degree of intensity of
passion for the divine is the determining factor of how deeply one may know wisdom
and encounter the divine. It is Eros that represents the major point at which the
intellectual and passionate, as well as the philosophical, and the religious meet.
Conclusion
Philosophy for Plato is a way of transformation and even salvation for
humanity. As it involves this way of transformation, it is a profoundly religious idea.
Through examining the question of philosophy in terms of its transformational role
for humanity, we discover the underlying purpose of the Dialogues and the objective
ofPlato's philosophy as a whole. The key transformational aspect of Plato's
philosophy is found in that it is a means of humanity to ascend to encounter the
divine but such an ascent is not an escape from the world, but a transformation of it
in that human existence finds its true existence and meaning in such an encounter.
Plato's philosophy does not represent a simple mental game, but a way of life which
is a religious quest, a seeking for the divine - which is not an option for humanity,








An essential aspect of Plato's philosophy as a religious experience is
expressed in the idea that it is a religious way of life and existence. As it is a way
which transforms humanity, philosophy for Plato is a way of being, a perspective that
practices the presence of the divine through a way of life. Because of this, the
notions which surround this way of life of philosophy that Plato teaches are deeply
theological. In this chapter we will examine five themes which are involved in the
religious aspect of the philosophical life in Plato: the symbol of the philosophical life
in philosophy as a way of dying, the dictum of the philosophical life in knowing
thyself, the practice of the philosophical life in the dialogue, the personification of
the philosophical in the principle of embodiment, and the goal of the philosophical
life in the notion of homoiosis theo. Relating these themes to the religious dimension
of Plato's philosophy, we see through these themes the experience of transformation
within Plato's philosophy, and the theological ideas implicit in the philosophical life.
The Symbol: Philosophy as a Way of Death
The symbol of the philosophical life is that philosophy for Plato is a way of
dying. To die to the passions of the body and flesh in order to be made alive in
wisdom and the soul is the symbol that the philosophical life in Plato inhabits. In the
Phaedo the image of dying is given as the way of the life of philosophy. Similarly,
the same idea colours the Apology as well, even the rest of the Dialogues,
particularly through the figure of Socrates. Indeed, the constant memory of
Socrates'own death overshadows Plato and Platonism as a whole, as it is, in the
words of Pierre Hadot, the 'radical event which founded Platonism.'1 The historical
event of Socrates' death is augmented by Plato into a vivid symbol of the
philosophical life.
In the Phaedo philosophy is symbolised by death, represented as a catharsis
of the soul in which it is liberated from the pull of the body and the flesh. This idea,
religious in its nature alone, is one which also, in Plato, provides meaning to human
1
Hadot, Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 94.
50
existence. The dialogue is set within Socrates' prison cell on the day of his death and
is pervaded by a union of the idea of dying with the idea of the liberation that is
given to the soul within the philosophical life. Socrates, using the theme of his own
death in the early part of the dialogue, considers sending a message about his death
to Evenus the poet to 'bid him farewell' and to 'tell him if he is wise, to follow me as
quickly as he can.' (61b) The link of the symbol of death with the philosophical life
is so strong that being told by Simmias that Evenus would not take his advice,
Socrates questions if Evenus is even a philosopher. (61c) The expectation, implicit
in these early words of the dialogue, is that the way of dying is an image of the true
philosopher's way of life. As Socrates says,
Ordinary people seem not to realize that those who really apply themselves in
the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing
themselves for dying and death. (64a)
For Plato the philosopher constantly prepares for and lives this way of death in his or
her existence. The catharsis of the soul from body, therefore, is not a means of
simple asceticism, but a means of acquiring wisdom and the development of the soul,
or in short, a way of existence. For Plato, only in seeking that which is of the soul
does humanity ever find peace, for the philosophical life is one that does not attach
importance to seeking those things of 'the body' but of the soul:
Do you think that a philosopher attaches any importance to them (attentions
paid to the body)? I mean things like providing himselfwith smart clothes
and shoes and other bodily ornaments; do you think that he values them or
despises them - in so far as there is no real necessity for him to go in for that
sort of thing... but keeps his attention directed as much as he can away from
it (the body) and toward the soul? (64e)
Plato's is not a calling the giving up of all pleasure, but a philosophical ethic in
which ultimate importance is not attached to such things as what one holds in one's
hand or wears. The unrest that humanity faces is caused, for Plato, by attempting to
fulfil the desire to acquire such things as wealth at the expense of a knowledge of the
divine and wisdom:
War and revolutions and battles are due simply and solely to the body and its
desires. All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth, and the reason
why we have to acquire wealth is the body, because we are slaves in its
service. That is why, on all these accounts, we have so little time for
philosophy. (Phaedo 66d)
The soul seeks a freedom from the passions which, for Plato, entrap it. Thus, the
seeking of wisdom, is a way of freedom.
For Plato, the philosophical life in seeking the divine seeks that which is
ultimately real and liberates the soul, instead of that which is sensual and ultimately
binding to the soul. The soul, liberated through death, strives for the realisation of
this divine 'reality', and is able to think best when it does not rely upon, nor is
troubled by, 'hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure' but, 'so far as
possible...takes leave of the body...avoiding, so far as it can, all association or
contact with the body reaches out toward the reality (xob ovxot;).' (65c)2 The act of
looking away from a raw desire of the material body frees the soul so that it is able to
comprehend that which is absolute: the Just, the Good, the Beautiful, (Phaedo 65d)
and the 'realm of the pure and everlasting and immortal and changeless.' (79d)
And it is then that the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and
seeks to be by itself?.. .Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself,
or not?.. .And the Beautiful, and the Good?.. .have you seen any of these
things with your eyes?.. .Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches
the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought,
or dragging in any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure
thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing
himself as far as possible from eyes and ears, and in a word, from the whole
body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire
truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it. Will not that man reach
reality, Simmias, if anyone does? (Phaedo 65d-66a)
As the absolute and eternal stands 'alone', so does the soul seek to be 'alone' without
the influence of any other hindrance in its contemplation of reality. Socrates says,
'We are in fact convinced that ifwe are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we
must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by
itself.' (66e) The seeker of wisdom in contemplating this reality is then 'freed' from
the prison of simply seeking the pleasure of the body:
Every seeker ofwisdom knows that up to the time when philosophy takes it
over his soul is a helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body,
compelled to view reality not directly but only through prison bars, and
wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy can see that the imprisonment
is ingeniously effected by the prisoner's own active desire, which makes him
2 Fowler translation in Loeb.
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first accessory to his own confinement... philosophy takes over the soul in
this condition and by gentle persuasion tries to set it free. (82e-83a)3
So strong is the symbol of death to Plato's philosophy that to follow the way of
dying in one's own existence is the objective of the philosophical life. The
embracing or rejection of this way of death is correlative to loving the way of
wisdom or loving the way of the body and that which is opposed to it,
if you see anyone distressed at the prospect of dying, said Socrates, it will be
proof enough that he is a lover not of wisdom but of the body. As a matter of
fact, I suppose he is also a lover ofwealth and reputation - one or the other,
or both. (68c)
To Plato the soul is independent of the body as their nature is of two different
realms. Whereas the body changes, dies, and decays, the soul, being like the divine,
is immortal and ever the same. (Phaedo 80cff.) This separation, however, is a
problematic one for thinkers such as John Macquarrie who argues that the correct
understanding of the soul is one which is united with the body. He writes,
it can hardly be denied that there are many difficulties attendant on it [the
idea of the soul as separate from the body]. The activities of the soul, our
mental and spiritual life, are all closely correlated with physical occurrences
in the brain and in the bodily organism generally, and it is hard to see how the
soul could exist apart from the body.. .the human being is a psychosomatic
unity... if one could imagine a soul existing apart from the body, it is hard to
see how it could relate to a world or to other people or have any content to its
experience. It is through the body that we relate to that which is other than
ourselves, and there could be no worthwhile human existence without
relatedness. So even if there were an independently existing soul, which
seems improbable, it would still be doubtful if it could sustain in any
significant way the hope of a life beyond death.4
To Plato, it is the very idea of the soul as separate from the body that is a crucial
understanding of his philosophical theology and, more, a key to wisdom. For Plato,
the soul possesses its existence because of its relation, not to the body, but to the
divine which is independent and non-contingent on anything. As Plato says, the soul
seeks to be by itself (auto kath auto; Phaedo 64c) in order that it may know the
divine (the Forms) which exists by themselves as well and in this know wisdom.
{Phaedo 65e) For Plato, the only way that we are able to relate to the world is
3 The images here are reminiscent of the myth of the Cave {Republic^II). The images and themes of
shackles and liberation are common in both instances. The Cave may thus be not only a picture of the
world, but also a picture of that state when the person concentrates only upon the body and its desires.
4
Macquarrie, In Search ofHumanity. A Theological and Philosophical Approach (SCM Press Ltd,
1982), 250.
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through the soul, as it is the soul alone which realises true reality over and against a
changing world known only by the senses. Plato would see Macquarrie's doctrine as
too linked with the material to know wisdom. The reliance upon the body that
Macquarrie advocates: that it is only through the body that we are able to relate to
anything or anyone else, is argued against by Plato's notion that it is only through
the soul that we are able to know anything, and that there is nothing known or
realised without the soul - only the soul knows itself, others, and the true nature of
the body. Further against Macquarrie, for Plato, the reason that the soul is able to
live on after death is because of its dissociation with the body and its association with
the divine. The soul's own immortality is based upon its very nature being like the
divine. To tie the soul with the body is for Plato to be associated with change and
death, not immortality and life at all.
The well-being of the soul at death, literally its immortality, is guaranteed for
Plato in following the philosophical life, a life symbolised in death itself, in knowing
the soul to be separate from the body. Death is not feared by the philosopher, for the
philosopher expects to reach a place after physical death where the good and wise
have gone. The philosopher is protected by God, as Phaedo indicates when he says
that he felt an 'incomprehensible emotion' at the death of Socrates, one of pain and
pleasure combined fPhaedo 59a).5 Phaedo confesses that he never really felt sorry
for Socrates as one would of a dear friend who is going to die, for there was an
assurance that Socrates would be taken care of by the providence of God, and that all
would be well with him - as well as anyone could be. (Phaedo 58e) Socrates
himself confesses an assurance of eternal life because of his philosophy in that:
If I did not expect to enter the company, first, of other wise and good gods,
and secondly ofmen now dead who are better than those who are in this
world now, it is true that I should be wrong in not grieving death. As it is... I
shall find there divine masters who are supremely good. (63c)
As lovers ofwives, husbands, children, companions, etc. long to be with those that
have died to the point that they wish to follow them in death, Socrates asks if the
philosopher as the,
5 &W' &texvco<; &ion6v xi poi jkx0o<; mxprjv xai xiq &fi0r|<; Kpaau; &n;6 xe xfj<; hSovfjQ cruYKeicpa
gfevri bgou Kod &n6 xfj£
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true lover of wisdom who has firmly grasped this same conviction - that he
will never attain to wisdom worthy of the name elsewhere than in the next
world - will he be grieved at dying? Will he not be glad to make the
journey? We must suppose so... that is, if he is a real philosopher, because
then he will be of the firm belief that he will never find wisdom in all its
purity in any other place. If this is so, would it not be quite unreasonable...
for such a man to be afraid of death? (68b)
What is counted by many to be the termination of existence is for Plato the point of
life. Where many seek to satisfy physical passions solely as the way of the wise,
Plato finds the way of death to these passions the true way ofwisdom, and where
death is seen as an ending of existence altogether, Plato finds in it the way of
existence.
Through the image of death Plato points back to a way of human life, even an
image of philosophical existence. The symbol of death, known acutely in Socrates,
manifests such a great tie of philosophy with death in Plato, that Pierre Hadot sees
the training for death as what philosophy is in itself.6 Hadot writes that the
understanding that philosophy is a training for death is 'profoundly true' for anyone
'who takes philosophy seriously.'7 Such thinking has had an enormous influence on
Western philosophy, as Hadot writes, even on such 'adversaries of Platonism' as
o
Epicurus and Martin Heidegger. Hadot comments that in Heidegger, 'we have... a
system which makes of the anticipation or forestalling of death a precondition of
authentic existence.'9 In Plato, however, this forestalling of, and turning away from
death is contrasted with death as the symbol of the true philosophical way of life.
Hadot urges that, 'We must not forget that in Platonic philosophy, the point is not
simply to think about death, but to carry out a training for dying which is, in reality, a
training for life.'10
The philosophical death for Plato is a remedy for humanity's situation. By
facing death, Plato confronts the depressing and constant change of the world by
securing his thought and life in a reality which is only found through dying. As Eric
Voegelin writes, in the Phaedo, 'Thanatos (death) becomes the cathartic power that






Hadot, Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 121, n. 123.
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cures the soul of the sickness of the earth.'11 But such a death, for Plato, is a
'training for life', a way of life to be lived in the world, not simply a resignation from
the world. As Guthrie comments, the Phaedo presents 'not the life which the
• 19 •
philosopher refuses, but that which he embraces.' In such perspectives, the
philosophical death, contrary to those such as Grace Jantzen, is an ethical position
rather than one intended to discredit our physical existence.13 For Jantzen the
philosophical death of Plato means that we throw away the body, discrediting all that
the body means, or should mean, to our existence. But Jantzen, however, greatly
misreads Plato's teaching of the philosophical death in that what Plato calls for is not
a throwing away of the body, but an ethical and positive position of seeing the soul
as ultimately important and that the material, that which is of the body, changes,
decays, and dies, incapable of providing any source of hope or virtue.14 To see the
philosophical death as the casting aside of the body altogether is to see the dualism
that Plato (admittedly) indicates as a violent one, rather than seeing its true intention
of establishing that that which is eternal and of the soul is far more important and
virtuous than a life spent seeking after fame, fortune, and physical pleasures of the
body without any reference to one, or another's well-being. The correct reading of
the Phaedo is to see that Plato's position is an ethical position of warning against
allowing the passions of the body to rule a person's existence. For Plato, to see
beyond the physical to the individual soul is the embellishment of the worth of the
person and not his or her diminishing. By emphasising that the seeker ofwisdom is
not lured by the physical at all, Plato establishes an ethic of human existence in that
11 Eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. Ill (Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 12.
12 W. K. C. Guthrie, A History ofGreek Philosophy (Cambridge: 1965), vol. IV, 338.
13 See Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism, (Cambridge University Press, 1995),
30-31ff.
14 Guthie's pondering is worth noting here:
'Some of the finest parts of the dialogues give the impression not that he (Plato) despised the body,
but that, although the soul was the higher principle and must maintain the lead, soul and body could
work in harmony together. Yet this unnatural dualism of the Orphics, which divides the two so
sharply and makes the body nothing but an encumbrance, the source of evil, from which the soul must
long to be purified, permeates the Phaedo... 1 would go so far as to name the Orphics as at least one
of the influences which went to form the most characteristic part of Platonism, the sharp separation of
the lower world of sensa from the heavenly world of the Ideas. It is often puzzling to see how this
doctrine, which in itself leads naturally to a lack of interest in the sensible world and a concentration
on the higher, seems to be at war with Plato's inborn longing to interfere effectively in practical
matters. I believe in fact that it was the teaching of the hieroi logoi that set the feet of the philosopher
on the upward path from the Cave into the Sunlight, whereas it was the voice of Plato's own heart that
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the worth of an individual lies within the soul, and not the physical appearance - an
appearance which may be deemed as attractive or unattractive and the worth of the
individual based upon that. What can certainly be said is that Plato's way of
philosophical death is not escapism, nor a rejection of or withdrawal from the world,
but a way of the philosophical life that involves the love ofwisdom in all aspects of
existence.
Existentially, the way of death is, for Plato, to see philosophy as the struggle
with the self and to find, for Plato, one's true existence. To be philosophical in
Plato's estimation is to be one who rejects one's own selfish ambition or the exalting
of one's pleasure or popularity over wisdom. In the Apology, Socrates justifies
himself being a true philosopher in that he has put away own selfish ambition due to
philosophy within his soul. Because of his trying to help 'the cause of God' through
the investigation of his and others' souls, Socrates' ambition for political power or
wealth are cast aside because of his divine calling in being a philosopher: 'I do not
have the leisure to engage in public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my
own, but I live in great poverty because ofmy service to the god.' (Apology 23)15
Hadot comments that Socrates,
preferred to die rather than renounce the demands of his conscience, thus
preferring the Good above being, and thought and conscience above the life
of his body. This is nothing other than the fundamental philosophical choice.
If it is true that philosophy subjugates the body's will to live to the higher
demands of thought, it can rightly be said that philosophy is the training and
apprenticeship for death.16
The image ofdying and the loss of the self is one taken up by Simone Weil when she
writes,
Plato does not say, but he implies, that to become wise.. .one must become,
already in this life, naked and dead. The examination of conscience exacts
this breaking of all the attachments which make up our reasons for living.17
Iris Murdoch, following on from Weil's thought, says that, 'Simone Weil tells us that
the exposure of the soul to God condemns the selfish part of it not to suffering but to
sternly bade him return and help his fellow-prisoners still fettered in the darkness of the cave.
Guthrie, A History ofGreek Philosophy, vol. IV, 339-40.
15 G. M. A. Grube's translation in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works. The sarcasm by the use of the
word 'leisure' (ayok'ri) is key, for the service to the god in philosophy is its own great pleasure, but it
is the way of salvation for the soul.
16
Hadot, Philosophy, 94.
17 Wei/, Intimations, 82.
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death.' In such thinking, only in dying to the flesh are we able to behold the Divine
reality, the absolute, and in so doing, the selfish part, which seeks its own satisfaction
in its own body, and not the idea of universal truth, wisdom, and philosophy, is put to
death. In the 'Fire and the Sun', Murdoch explains that,
Philosophy is a training for death, when the soul will exist without the body.
It attempts by argument and the meticulous pursuit of truth to detach the soul
from material and egoistic goals and enliven its spiritual faculty....19
Through the philosophical death, the 'spiritual faculty' of humanity, to use
Murdoch's words, is the basis of a 'spiritual exercise' which has in mind the notion
of liberation, a freedom from '.. .a partial, passionate point of view -linked to the
senses and the body - so as to rise to the universal, normative viewpoint of thought,
90
submitting ourselves to the demands of the Logos and the norm of the Good.' Such
a life consists,
in changing one's point of view. We are to change from a vision of things
dominated by individual passions to a representation of the world governed
by the universality and objectivity of thought. This constitutes a conversion
• • 21
(metastrophe) brought about with the totality of the soul.
The universality of thought which is achieved by the liberated soul becomes a
self-less pursuit which ends in wisdom. The training for death that Socrates speaks
of is the dying to oneself in order to see the truth, as Hadot describes it, 'training to
die to one's individuality and passions, in order to look at things from the perspective
of universality and objectivity.'22 This is the point of dying to self and the ambitions
of the self which is characteristic of the body. It is to put away all earthly passions
and ambitions and to know the absolute reality. P. Schroeder says it well when he
writes,
We may see in the Socratic practice of death (melete tou thanatou) not merely
a rehearsal for physical death but the transformation of self, a dying to the
identity that experience, circumstance, and inclination may have presented to
us. Thus, the Phaedo is very much about life, a life in which archaic passivity
before fate is replaced with contemplative will and control.23
18 Iris Murdoch, 'The Sovereignty of the Good Over Other Concepts', Existentialists, 385.
19 Murdoch, Existentialists, 404.
20 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 94-95.
21 Ibid., 96.
22 Ibid., 95.
23 Schroeder, Classical Mediterranean Spirituality (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1986), 348.
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Therefore in the Phaedo, the symbol of philosophy in the way of death is one which
is a loss of selfish motives in order to find true existence.
In the idea of the philosophical death, there is a blend of death with life for
Plato in that philosophers, like Socrates, actually die; but there is a life to follow and
to call others to, which forms the way of the philosophic life, a life which leads on to
philosophical holiness. At the basis of such a life is the recognition that for Plato
philosophy means a way of life, a way of salvation for humanity. It is a perspective
that does not see an utter and final end to the search for wisdom nor the ongoing
pursuit for it, but a continuous 'dialogue' between life and death as one fosters the
other.
The Dictum: Know Thyself
Established in the Apology and in Alcibiades I, to 'know yourself
(yvcoGi aeamov) is the dictum of the philosophical life.24 As philosophy as a way of
death is the symbol of the philosophical life, to know oneself describes the essence
and practice of philosophy within one's life. But, as the philosophical death may be
seen, at least in one aspect, as the loss of the self, to know oneself is the balancing
and equalising of that concept so that the self is regained. In this, to know oneself
involves two aspects which are part of the religious dimension of Plato's philosophy:
one is that it represents a spiritual exercise of the soul that leads to the soul's
transformation in knowing one's motives and desire for wisdom, and secondly, it
conveys a theological understanding of the soul as reflecting the divine. To know
oneself is to know one's own motives and desires and concomitantly to know
oneself in relationship to the divine.
Philosophy, for Plato, begins with the recognition within one's soul of the
need for wisdom. In the Apology, Socrates' own questioning of himself leads him to
establish that wisdom is solely the property of God, and that true wisdom only begins
when the individual understands his or her need.
24 As the inscription on the walls of the temple of Apollo at Delphi, 'Chilon's yvcoBi creaoTOv, 'know
thyself... lent the initial impulse to the great philosophical movement in Greece... The wisdom he
(Socrates) sought was essentially ethical: it turned on the principle of virtuous conduct.'
{Encyclopaedia ofReligion and Ethics, James Hastings, ed, Vol. 12 (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark,
1921), 745.)
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But the truth of the matter... is pretty certainly this, that real wisdom is the
property of God (rep ovti o 0eo<; aoboQ eivai) and this oracle is his way of
telling us that human wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me that he is
not referring literally to Socrates, but has merely taken my name as an
example, as if he would say to us, The wisest of you... is he who has realized,
like Socrates, that in respect ofwisdom he is really worthless. That is why I
still go about seeking and searching in obedience to the divine command, if I
think that anyone is wise... when I think the person is not wise, I try to help
the cause ofGod by proving that he is not. (Apology 23b)
To Socrates, it is this very lack of self-knowledge that is the Athenians' trouble, as he
challenges:
let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about
which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the
very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of
examination is not worth living.... (Apology 38a)
In Socrates' words, it is the element of self-reflection that is missing in most lives,
but it is this which is the beginning point of wisdom. The problem is that many do
not look inward to confront and know their own desires, their own motives, and their
own lack ofwisdom, but attempt to convince themselves they are fully whole and
wise as they are. In his defence, Socrates asks, 'Are you not ashamed that you give
your attention to acquiring as much money as possible, and similarly with reputation
and honor, and give no attention or thought to truth (aletheia) and understanding
9 S
(phronesis) and the perfection of your soul {psyche)T (Apology 29e) Pierre
Hadot's translation of Socrates' words is well formulated when Socrates says:
I set myself to do you - each one of you, individually and private - what I
hold to be the greatest possible service. I tried to persuade each one of you to
concern himself less with what he has than with what he is, so as to render
• 96
himself as excellent and as rational as possible. (Apology 36b-c)
What is shown here is the concern for the relationship of the individual to truth in
which lies the well-being of the soul - not in what one possesses in power or wealth.
The famous phrase of Socrates centres this entire theme that, 'life without this sort of
examination is not worth living.' (38a)
What we are given in the idea of knowing oneself is what may be termed in
Hadot's useful comment, a 'relationship of the self to the self, which forms the basis
25 See Pierre Hadot's translation in Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 89.
26 Pierre Hadot's, Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 90.
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• • 27 •of a spiritual exercise. Socrates is one who knows himself and his own lack of
wisdom which he, in turn, calls on others to recognise as well. As Socrates claims,
he does not possess wisdom at all but that he is only aphilo-sophos, a lover of
wisdom. An underlying message of Plato seen in the Apology, and in the Dialogues
as a whole, is that the beginning ofwisdom lies in the difference between thinking
one possesses wisdom already, and the humility of loving and desiring wisdom -
knowing that one does not possess it, and knowing that its source is in the divine. To
know oneselfmeans, as Hadot puts it, among other things: 'To know oneself qua
non-sage: that is, not as a sophos, but as aphilo-sophos, someone on the way toward
98 •
wisdom.' Yet such a knowledge is also, as Hadot goes on to say,
to know oneself in one's essential being; this entails separating that which we
are not from that which we are. Finally, it can mean to know oneself in one's
• • • 29
true moral state: that is, to examine one's conscience.
However, all three of these concepts are united in Plato and not separate: to know
ourselves is to know our own soul as on the way to wisdom, but it is to begin with
knowing that we are not wise, and to examine our lives as seekers ofwisdom in order
that we may live a virtuous life through the life of philosophy.
The knowledge of oneself is also characterised by literally an inner speech
within oneself, and thus becomes intertwined with the formational idea of the
dialogue. In the Apology, Socrates calls upon those at his trial to examine their souls
in this way, to give consideration to themselves, to dialogue with themselves, not in
terms of priding themselves in terms of their possessions, or what they think they
have in terms ofwisdom, but what they truly are within their souls. Hadot comments
that ifwe can trust the portrait painted by Plato, and even Aristophanes, we see that,
'Socrates, master of dialogue with others, was also master of dialogue with
himself.'30 Such a concept is deeply meaningful in Plato, for the notion of being a
lover ofwisdom means directly being honest with oneself in one's own motives and
need. The whole mission of Socrates is this calling to reflect upon one's soul in this





Yet, as much as to know oneself is to reflect upon oneself in relationship to
one's own soul, to know oneself is to be led back to the divine, and to know oneself
in relationship to that divine. This second aspect of 'know thyself found in
Alcibiades I conveys the profound relationship between the soul and the divine in
which the soul is seen in Plato's philosophical theology to be a reflection of the
divine. Socrates alludes in the dialogue that the knowing of oneself comes by
knowing the soul in 'itself:
Tell me, how can we come to know the self itself (abx6 xabxb)? Maybe this
is the way to find out what we ourselves are - maybe it's the only possible
way. (Alcibiades 1129b)
Yet, such a knowledge comes through an even more evocative understanding in that
the soul resembles God as in a mirror. (Alcibiades 1132,ff) As Socrates asks,
And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this,
which is the seat of knowledge and thought?... Then this part of her
resembles God (Tcp 0ecp &pa Tom eoiKev abxfjQ), and whoever looks at
this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best
knowledge ofhimself. (133c)31
In Plato is a relationship between the soul and the divine in that the soul reflects the
divine. We may even read 'know thyself as 'see thyself and understand the same
meaning. (Alcibiades 1132d) That the soul in its 'thinking part' resembles God is a
concept established in the Phaedo as well (80a), illuminating the close relationship of
the soul to the divine in which the relationship of the soul and the divine is
reciprocal. As in Plato's symbol of the 'mirror'(Alcibiades 1132e), to see the soul is
to see the divine, and vice versa. The soul in knowing itself becomes intertwined
with the knowledge of God. Thus, to 'know thyself takes on a reciprocal dimension
in that to know oneself is to know God as well; a looking inward upon the soul and
seeing God reflected there.
Gerard Watson writes the synopsis of Plato's doctrine that, 'God is the mirror
ofwhat is best in us, and by knowing Him we will know ourselves....' In this line
of thought, to examine one's soul is to know the divine, but the opposite is also true
in that to not undertake an understanding of the soul is to miss the understanding of
31 W.R.M. Lamb transl., Plato, vol. VIII, Loeb Classical Library (William Heinemann, Ltd:
Cambridge, Mass., 1927).
32
Watson, Greek Philosophy, 16. A word about the authenticity ofAlcibiades I and this particular
passage is offered by Gerard Watson in a note that both have been questioned, but without good
grounds.
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God, wherein alone is found wisdom. Theologically, in a circulating and
reciprocating fashion, to know oneself is the knowledge of the divine in that the
inward self-inspection brings the philosopher to reflect upon both their self and the
divine simultaneously. Soren Kierkegaard puts it, 'In the Socratic (or Platonic) view
each individual is his own centre, and the entire world centers in him, because his
self-knowledge is a knowledge of God.' But it is the mystical perspective that is
even more helpful to understand this concept as when Meister Eckhart comments:
'To get into the core of God at his greatest one must first get into the core of himself
at his least for no one can know God who has nor first known himself,'34 or as Iris
Murdoch quotes Eckhart: 'Do not seek God outside your own soul.' 5 What is seen
in Plato's philosophical theology is that a knowledge of oneself and one in
relationship to the divine cannot be seen as two different ideas, but ideas which are
complementary, indeed reciprocal, flowing into one another. As the dictum of the
philosophical life, to know thyself is that which the philosophical life aspires, to
know oneself and a knowledge of the divine is a reciprocal and mutual reflection.
Knowing oneself is of great importance in Plato for it involves a concept of
existence and a concept of transformation through the philosophical life. In Plato,
the meaning of knowing oneself is to reach into the depths of one's own soul, but
also to bring oneself into relationship with the divine and wisdom. Karl Jaspers
writes that the meaning of the philosophical life begins with one's self-inspection as
it,
Springs from the darkness in which the individual finds himself, from his
sense of forlornness when he stares without love into the void, from his
self-forgetfulness when he feels that he is being consumed by the busy-ness
of the world, when he suddenly wakes up in terror and asks himself: What
am I, what am I failing to do, what should I do?36
It is this type of self-inspection of the soul which Plato indicates in the Apology that
the Athenians lacked. Indeed, ifwe further take the Athenians as representative of a
general theme of humanity then, for Plato, we suffer from self-forgetfulness, the loss
of self-inspection, leaving us at a loss in the truly meaningful questions of life. As
33 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J.: 1974),
14.
34 Meister Eckhart in George Seldes' Great Thoughts (Ballantine Books: New York, 1985), 117.
35 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 70.
36
Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, 121.
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Jaspers continues, philosophy is at its root, 'the decision to awaken our primal
source, to find our way back to ourselves, and to help ourselves by inner action.'37
Taking Plato's conception, philosophy is, at its essence, a way of self-inspection that
leads the soul back to itself, literally back upon itself, and therein does the soul find
truth. By knowing oneself, one becomes identified with the truth, for the wisdom
that one is searching for is found ultimately within the divine, but, as seen above, a
divine that is reflected within the soul. In Socrates' own case, his own
self-inspection and identification with the divine through the knowing of his own
soul caused his martyrdom. Reflecting upon this, Jaspers writes that, the martyr
actually suffers not out of'emotional enthusiasm', or 'defiance of the moment', but
'after a long and arduous conquest of himself.'38 For Plato, Socrates became a
martyr for knowing the sort ofwisdom which begins in knowing oneself, a way
which, for some, is too unsettling to undertake.
The Practice: The Dialogue
It is the dialogue - the philosophical conversation and even communion -
that is the practice of the philosophical life. The dialogue takes its place as one of
the foundational ideas in considering Plato's philosophy as a religious experience,
and particularly in the philosophical life, because it is through the dialogue that the
soul is transformed by engaging with others in the philosophical conversation and
communion. The dialogue represents the philosophical soul in communion and
community, outside the nature of self-knowledge that the ideas of philosophy as a
way of death and 'know thyself brings. Indeed, Plato's whole intention of writing
the Dialogues is to bring the reader to a knowledge of their own soul but to do so
through the act of dialogue, to join the philosophical conversation, and through this
to be transformed. What is found in the idea of the philosophical dialogue in Plato is
an aspect of the religious nature of the philosophical life, but also an idea which is a
foundational aspect of Plato's philosophical theology as a whole.
Throughout the Dialogues, Plato conveys various aspects of the dialogue
itself in its transformational role. The dialogue for Plato is described as an act of
37 Ibid.
38
Jaspers, The Perennial Philosophy, 10.
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transformation in that it is an engagement in 'living speech', and as an act of
communion and communication. In the Phaedrus (276a) the dialogue is said by
Socrates to be that which is 'living and breathing' (^covxa Kai Eptpuyov), beyond
the written word, of which the written word is only an image (el8coA,ov). As writing
lies dead on the page, immobile and undynamic, the dialogue is in the soul, moving
and alive. The dialogue is that which is ever current and fresh whereas the written
word is only a tool for memory {Phaedrus 275a). Thus, the dialogue is that which
makes philosophy alive as that which is organic and dynamic - without the dialogue,
philosophy becomes simply idle words.
This life of the dialogue as a transformation of the soul is seen as well in the
TO • •
Seventh Letter (34Id) as Plato gives encouragement, but also caution, that
philosophy is known through 'communion' (cruvouaiocc;), literally through the act of
joining to it, and with those who love philosophy. As Plato writes cautioning those
who take philosophy too lightly, 'acquaintance with it must come after a long period
of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship...',
wherein philosophy is born in the soul as a spark gives rise to a blazing fire (34Id).
The 'communion' in this context is a communion with philosophy itself, but also
implied is the idea of being in community with those who love philosophy as well.
Through the philosophical community, the would-be philosopher is led by a teacher
to philosophy through the dialogue, giving them an 'acquaintance' with the subject.
It is the dialogue that is the uniting endeavour of everyone engaged in the
philosophical life.
The religious aspect of the dialogue is seen in that it is centred in the act of
the philosophical conversation which transforms the soul. Iris Murdoch comments,
making the point,
39 The authenticity or inauthenticity of the Seventh Letter has been a topic of debate over the course of
years. Today, the position is one of controversy to some extent, but as John M. Cooper comments the
Seventh Letter is, 'the least unlikely [of all the Epistles] to have come from Plato's pen.' (Cooper,
Plato: Complete Works, 1635) The work ofGerard Watson in his Plato's Unwritten Teaching
(Appendix, 'The Authenticity of the Seventh Letter', 134-135) is significant in that it provides
thoughts of the argument in a concise form. Aside from stylistic questions, which are easily put to
simple changes or evolution in a writer themselves, the Seventh Letter in my own view is not in any
way contrary to what Plato says in other undisputed dialogues, but is an accentuation of these
doctrines, making the case ever more clearly for the nature ofphilosophy to be that which is to be
taken seriously as a life-transforming experience especially from 340ffonwards. However, for an
alternative reading see Edelstein, Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden, 1966).
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Now what exactly is philosophy? Some might say that philosophy is certain
arguments in certain books, but for Plato (as indeed for many present-day
philosophers) philosophy is essentially talk. Viva voce philosophical
discussion (the vj/t^ot. Xoyoi of Theaetetus, 165a) is the purest human activity
and the best vehicle of truth. Plato wrote with misgivings, because he knew
that truth must live in present consciousness and cannot live anywhere else.
He expressed these misgivings in the Phaedrus and (if he wrote it) in the
Seventh Letter.40
The theological meaning of the dialogue is found in that it is an active participation
of the soul in philosophical exchange with others, in speaking but also in listening,
beyond the written words of a page. However, the dialogue represents in Plato more
than a conversation, but is also a way of transformation through the purging of the
soul. The religious dimension of this notion is evident in Iris Murdoch's words as
she continues that Plato,
was concerned throughout with how people can change their lives so as to
become good, the best, though not the only, method for this change is
dialectic, that is, philosophy regarded as a spiritual discipline. The aim of
Socrates was to prove to people that they were ignorant, thus administering
an intellectual and moral shock. In the Sophist (230c), dialectic is described
as a purgation of the soul by SAxy/oc;, argument, refutation,
cross-questioning; and in the Phaedo (67e) true philosophers are said to
'practise dying'. Philosophy is a training for death, when the soul will exist
without the body. It attempts by argument and the meticulous pursuit of truth
to detach the soul from material and egoistic goals and enliven its spiritual
faculty, which is intelligent and akin to the good.... 1
In a lucid comment, Murdoch writes that, 'It is always a significant question to ask of
any philosopher, 'what is he afraid of?'42 In the type of transformation offered
through the dialogue, nothing remains hidden, for all thoughts surface in the act of
the dialogue and questioning. The persistent questioning of Socrates, the constant
dialogical nature of philosophical exchange, 'outs' the hidden agenda or the false
thought. As the Stranger says in the Sophist, the dialectic seeks to 'eradicate the
spirit of conceit' (230b-d). Through the dialectical process, inconsistencies are
revealed that exist in one's opinion, and the one who sees this becomes 'angry with
himself in turn becoming more gentle toward others (230c). The individual is
changed in his outlook, delivered from falsely held notions, dogmas, and prejudices,
knowing only what he knows, and no more. In effect this one has been transformed
40 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, 404.
41 Ibid.
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into a seeker and lover ofwisdom, into the 'the best and wisest state ofmind', rather
than one who has convinced himself that he knows already (230d). The vibrancy of
this idea is seen in the words of Karl Jaspers who comments that the contradiction,
an essential part of the dialogical question and answer and to the dialectic itself, is an
'art ofpurification' as,
the way to knowledge by showing men what they do not know. People who
think they know refuse to learn... Openness to correction is acquired by
education and is a sign of distinction, whereas the man who is inaccessible to
correction, be he the king of kings, must be regarded as an uncultivated man,
whose mind has suffered hideous neglect.43
To think that one knows already is to miss this essential notion, to know that one
does not already know wisdom is salvation. As Gadamer correctly writes, 'Dialectic
is not so much a techne - that is, an ability and knowledge - as a way of being.'44
What is seen therefore is that the dialogue is part of a religious way of life. It
is Pierre Hadot who emphasises this point that the dialogue, to be understood
properly, must be seen in its religious dimension as part of a philosophical
spirituality. Plato's dialogue, writes Hadot,
turns out to be a kind of communal spiritual exercise. In it, the interlocutors
are invited to participate in such inner spiritual exercises as examination of
conscience and attention to oneself....4
Hadot writes that such a perspective is founded upon two ideas. Firstly, the dialogue
is the means of the movement of the participants toward a transformation, even a
conversion of the soul in philosophy:
the dialogue guides the interlocutor - and the reader - towards conversion.
Dialogue is only possible if the interlocutor has a real desire to dialogue: that
is, if he truly wants to discover the truth, desires the Good from the depths of
his soul, and agrees to submit to the rational demands of the Logos. His act
of faith must correspond to that of Socrates: 'It is because I am convinced of
its truth that I am ready, with your help, to inquire into the nature of virtue.
(.Meno 81e)46
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every dialectical exercise, precisely because it is an exercise of pure thought,
... turns the soul away from the sensible world, and allows it to convert itself
towards the Good. It is the spirit's itinerary towards the divine.47
Even when read, Plato's Dialogues reveal an objective in Plato himself that
always seeks to engage and transform the reader so that after reading a particular
dialogue, the reader will begin to live the philosophical life. 48 Jill Gordon,
commenting on Wolfgang Iser's reader-response theory writes that,
Plato's dialogues thus induce us to engage in dialectic while we are reading
them. In addition, they convey to us the tools necessary for living the life of
dialectic beyond the act of reading. Ifwe take seriously the moral component
of Socratic dialectic as a way of life, then Plato's dialogues act in a parallel
fashion to exhort the reader to live the Socratic or philosophic way of life.
The act of reading one of Plato's dialogues, therefore, can serve as the
beginning of a transformation 49
Gordon's consideration is echoed by Hadot who, in Arnold Davidson's words, once
called the thinking ofPlato's Phaedrus: the 'ontological value of the spoken word.'50
The concept is of a 'living and animated discourse', not intended for information, but
as Hadot says, 'to produce a certain psychic effect in the reader and the listener.'51
As the Platonic dialogue strives for transformation, one is able to see the
place of the transformational role of the myth and the symbolic images Plato
employs within its context as involving the reader in the midst of the dialogue. The
myths, as Murdoch writes, are sources for Plato 'to explain his conception of human
life.' The subject of how the mythical relates to the dialogue is legitimised in that it
is the mythical that Plato employs to illuminate the subjects given in Dialogues, and
in many cases, encapsulate and house the central themes that the particular dialogue
discusses: Plato's myth of the Cave in the Republic, the soul as a charioteer and
horses as in the Phaedrus, and Plato's extent references to the religious myths
well-known in his own day portray in picturesque terms the points of the discussion.
The myth draws the participant into the midst of the philosophical discussion through
47 Ibid.
48
'Although every written work is a monologue, the philosophical work is always implicitly a
dialogue.' (Hadot, Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 105) In consideration of Hadot's work as a whole, the
missing element in current philosophical and theological endeavour is the art of ancient philosophy in
its search for wisdom and which warrants a certain way of living.








the faculty of vision and imagination, attaching themselves to the soul lending to its
transformation. Through the power ofmyth the participants in the dialogue, even
ourselves, are enabled to envision truths which are difficult to convey, 'thoughts that
do not lend themselves to direct statement.'53 Because it is visionary, we become
emotionally involved in the dialogue through the story, aided by the imagination, and
are cast, with both reason and emotion, into the middle of the issues at stake, and
because it is dramatic, the dialogue affects us personally by drawing us into the
discussion. Thus, the dialogue is the union of mythos and logos - an argument that is
not 'flat' but multi-dimensional, giving meaning to, and comprised of, different
levels of perception and philosophical awareness.
The idea that the dialogue represents a living discourse in which the reader is
brought into the midst of the dialogue and the soul transformed through this
interaction, has led some to ponder the objective of the Dialogues as a whole. Such a
question is emphasised by those such as Francisco J. Gonzalez 54 who sees
philosophy in Plato as being defined by its transformational role in the person.
Gonzalez writes that aside from the more historical interpretations that Plato is
establishing some form of doctrine, or refuting the doctrine of another, there is a
'third way' of interpreting Plato that goes beyond that even offered by ancient writers
such as Diogenes LaDrtius in his Lives when he writes that,
an interpretation of a Platonic dialogue must decide, among other things,
whether the statements in it are meant to establish Plato's own doctrines
(eiq 5oyp.axdov KaxaaKeoijv) or to refute the interlocutor (III.65).55
For Gonzalez and others, the 'third' way seeks to read the Dialogues as being a
means of transformation to the soul rather than a way of doctrine. Gonzales writes
that instead of simply seeing the dialogues as either the establishment of Platonic
doctrines, or the refutation of other antithetical ideas, the Dialogues are to be seen as,
inspiring us, as expanding our imaginations, as 'orienting' us in our own
inquiry, as communicating a form of reflexive, practical, and
nonpropositional knowledge, or as inviting us to a conversation in which we
must actively participate in order to arrive at the truth.56
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Within the same perspective as Gonzalez, Gerald Press writes in his reflection of
reading Plato's Dialogues that,
rather than speak of doctrines, I believe it is more accurate to call this all a
'vision.' There are several reasons for doing so. For one thing, it is
consistent with the language of psychic seeing that Plato sometimes makes
Socrates use. (Phaedo 99b) For another, the terms theoria and theasthai as
indicating what philosophy is and what philosophers do are used in
significant contexts in several dialogues. Moreover, it captures the peculiarly
Greek sense of theoria as a cognate of theatron. The dialogues are certainly,
from one point of view, full of theories, but theories more as visions than as
doctrines.57
Pierre Hadot echoing this similar point writes that the dialogue must be represented
in terms of its ethical transformation, a transformation that is experiential and not
doctrinal:
The dimension of the interlocutor is, as we can see, of capital importance. It
is what prevents the dialogue from becoming a theoretical, dogmatic expose
and forces it to be a concrete, practical exercise. For the point is not to set
forth a doctrine, but rather to guide the interlocutor towards a determinate
mental attitude.... The point is worth stressing, for the same thing happens in
every spiritual exercise: we must let ourselves be changed, in our point of
view, attitudes, and convictions.58
One must agree that the dialogue concerns the soul's transformation, but
contrary to Gonzalez, Press, and Hadot, Plato does not abandon doctrine in order to
have a concept of transformation, or conceive transformation as contrary to doctrine,
but sees doctrine and the transformed life in philosophy as conjoined. In fact, the
dialogue itself is the medium through which the Platonic philosophical and
theological perspectives become known - perspectives which lend themselves to the
soul's transformation. As is stated in the Laws, the belief of what the divine is or
what it is like leads directly to the living of the ethical, and hence, philosophical life,
as the Athenian draws the correlation: 'You should wait for the future, then, before
you undertake to judge of the supreme issues, and the greatest of these, though you
now count it so trivial, is that of thinking rightly about the gods and so living well, or
the reverse.' (888b) Further, as is written in the Republic and the Laws, certain ideas
concerning the divine are non-negotiable, as that God is 'good' in the Republic





these ideas for Plato is that a correct and philosophical perspective of the divine
affects the type of life that is led. As in the Republic (3801^, the stability of the
society is linked to a correct understanding ofGod as one who does good and not
evil. And similarly, in the Laws (907c), the 'wicked' fancy themselves free to act as
they will because they entertain strange and unphilosophical ideas about the divine.
For Plato, the philosophical way known through the dialogue changes the perspective
of how all things are viewed and how life is lived. Doctrine and transformation are
not separated but correlate together. Gonzalez', Press', and Hadot's point if left to its
own relegates Platonic thought to be simply a practical way of life absent of any
transcendent vision. Yet, what is experienced in Plato is the simultaneous encounter
with the divine which leads to transformation which Gonzalez, Press, Hadot nor even
Laertius' positions portray on their own without a balancing view. Even with this, it
is a striking fact that whatever doctrine Plato has, is indeed borne out of the
philosophical experience, even the soul's transformation through the divine. Plato's
is an intertwining of doctrine and transformation (experience) in which one is
involved in the other.
The point at which the transformational role of the dialogue, and the union of
doctrine and transformation can be clearly seen, is within the figure of Socrates, and
the ideas that are given by him when considering the role of the dialogue and its
impact upon the soul. In Plato's philosophical theology of the philosophical life it is
Socrates who, as the grand interlocutor questioning and probing the individual
toward transformation, is also the figure through which the dialogue is modelled, and
through whom the philosophical theology of the dialogue is expounded. Through
Socrates the dialogue becomes the source of attending to one's soul, as the
confession of Alcibiades in the Symposium makes clear: 'he [Socrates] makes me
admit that while I'm spending my time on politics, I am neglecting all the things that
are crying for attention in myself.' (215e-216a) In the Apology, the entirety of
Socrates' speech is given in the attitude that the listener (or the reader) will begin to
follow the philosophical way of life and engage with him in the philosophical
dialogue. Yet, Socrates is one who, as Jill Gordon points out, is a model of such a
transformation as one that not only transforms those around him but is transformed
himself. Gordon writes:
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Dialectic is not merely a tool of logical analysis, nor simply a method of
breaking down an interlocutor in argument. Dialectic, as practiced by
Socrates, is the fundamental moral enterprise that comprises the Socratic way
of life (Apology 20e-23b). In practicing it, Socrates benefits his soul and,
ideally, the souls of his interlocutors are opened up to the same possibility.
Dialectic is, I would therefore argue, a fundamentally moral enterprise. Its
aim is the improvement of those who engage in it, and it has the capacity to
transform those who put it to use.59
The dialogue is a two-way transformation, as Hans-Georg Gadamer writes reflecting
on the Meno, that reveals,
what Plato has in mind is the failure of Socrates' sophist inerlocutors when
they want to do the questioning themselves. The questioner seems to them to
play a superior role, to which, accordingly, one should aspire. But
questioning is not a technique of role playing. The questioner is always one
who simultaneously questions himself.60
What the role of Socrates reveals is that, as in the Theaetetus and the Meno,
the dialogue's transforming nature is possible because of the knowledge that is
already present in the soul. The transformation that is known through the dialogue is
a reawakening in the soul of that which it already knows. The image of Socrates as a
midwife, as in the Theaetetus, and the understanding that nothing is ever learned but
only recollected as Plato shows in the doctrine of anamnesis in the Meno, means that
the dialogue is the way of bringing out that which is latent in the soul's memory. For
Plato, the dialogue does not import knowledge to the soul but rekindles it.
Kierkegaard describes it in his Philosophical Fragments, as that Truth, 'is not
introduced into the individual from without, but was within him'61 already. Such
thinking, Kierkegaard continues, is developed through Socrates, and 'ultimately
becomes the point of concentration for the pathos of the Greek consciousness.. ,'62
In the Theaetetus, Socrates describes his role as a midwife, and through this
image, the dialogue is seen to be maieutic in its nature.
My art ofmidwifery... is not with the body but with the soul that is in travail
of birth. And the highest point ofmy art is the power to prove by every test
whether the offspring of a young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct
with life and truth. I am so far like the midwife that I cannot myself give
59 Jill Gordon, 'Dialectic, Dialogue, and Transformation'. Philosophy and Rhetoric 29, pt. 3 (1996),
266.
60 Hans Georg-Gadamer, The Idea ofthe Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, P. Christopher
Smith, translator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 59.
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birth to wisdom... because there is no wisdom in me... Those who frequent
my company at first appear, some of them, quite unintelligent, but, as we go
further with our discussions, all who are favored by heaven make progress...
although it is clear that they have never learned anything from me. The many
admirable truths they bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from
within. But the delivery is heaven's work and mine. (Theaetetus 150c-d)
As truth already exists within the soul, the dialogue, in the hands of Socrates, is a
means for the seeker of wisdom to give birth to wisdom. Of his own, Socrates
remains 'barren', admitting that he has no wisdom of his own. This same position he
maintains in the Apology, one of ignorance who only knows that he is not wise. Yet,
he is the midwife, administering the dialogue, in which those who are 'favored by
heaven make progress' though, as Socrates says, they learn nothing from him.
Kierkegaard's commentary on this wise is worth repeating:
In the light of this idea (the soul's remembrance, its immortality, its
preexistence) it becomes apparent with what wonderful consistency Socrates
remained true to himself, through his manner of life giving artistic expression
to what he had understood. He entered into the role ofmidwife and sustained
it throughout; not because his thought 'had no positive content,' but because
he perceived that this relation is the highest that one human being can sustain
to another... Socrates was a midwife subjected to examination by the God;
his work was in fulfilment of a divine mission (Plato's Apology), though he
seemed to men in general a most singular creature (dtOTtcoxaToq, Theaetetus,
149); it was in accordance with a divine principle, as Socrates also
understood it, that he was by the God forbidden to beget (pau)8C"0ai |ie o
0eoq dvayKd^et, yevvav 5e dTteKcoXvaev, Theaetetus, 150); for between
man and man the maieutic relationship is the highest, and begetting belongs
to God alone.63
The dialogue is the point where one realises the knowledge latent within, that which
God alone provides and brings forth.
Yet, regarding the dialogue and its ability to help the soul remember, there is
the issue of 'Meno's paradox' (.Meno 80d-e) where Meno asks: How do you seek for
what you already know, or if you do not know, how do you even know what to look
for, or how will you ever know if you have even found it? Meno's question
challenges the whole premise of what the dialogue is attempting to do for, as Meno
asks, how do you search for that which is already in the soul (in the memory of the
soul) or if you do not understand anything, how will you know when the dialogue
has resulted in your finding truth? For Plato, the answer to the paradox lies in that
63 Ibid., 12-13.
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though the soul remembers and hence knows, it does not remember in full. The soul
by the very act of trying to recollect, which is brought on by the dialogue, is
attempting to know something more to fulfil the remnants of knowledge already
present. For Socrates, the act of acquiring knowledge is the act of the soul's
remembering. Knowledge is not imported, but brought out from the depths of the
soul, as Jill Gordon calls it, 'an act of re-covery rather than dis-covery.' 64 As
Socrates explains,
The soul has learned everything, so that when a man has recalled a single
piece of knowledge - learned it, in ordinary language - there is no reason
why he should not find out all the rest, if he deeps a stout heart and does not
grow weary of the search, for seeking and learning are in fact nothing but
recollection. (Meno 81 d)
The dialogue then in Plato's thought does not import anything into the soul, but is an
exercise from the inside, from the experience of recalling the knowledge which is
latent in the soul. In short, for Plato, learning is a process of re-gathering, recovery,
recollecting that knowledge already within the soul and it is the dialogue that is the
means to this remembrance.
As it is a literal reaching back into the soul within itself as well as an ongoing
conversation with others, the dialogue in Plato can be seen as a journey of the soul
both individually and communally, in its striving for wisdom. As Socrates asks in the
Republic (532b), 'And what about this journey? Don't you call it dialectic?'65
(oh 5iaA.8KTiKf|v xampv xpv ttopeiav KaXetg) As it is a journey, it is a
movement of asking and answering of questions (Cratylus 390e) which does not end,
for as the Phaedo (66e) states, nothing can be finalised for the philosopher until the
philosopher reaches the world of the divine at death. Generally speaking, the
Dialogues as a whole cannot really be said ever to draw to a final conclusion as each
dialogue leaves the reader with questions unanswered which, as I understand it, is
Plato's purpose to draw the reader toward philosophy. Further, because the
philosophical conversation for Plato is centred in the eternal and inexpressible, it
64 Jill Gordon, 'Dialectic, Dialogue, and Transformation'. Philosophy and Rhetoric 29, pt. 3 (1996),
265. According to Gordon the idea of recollection makes known several aspects of the dialogue: First,
that the dialogue 'takes place through question and answer, inquiry and response.' Secondly that,
'there is no teacher who tells the learner what there is to learn' but rather, 'the student has access to
learning through an examination of himself and his beliefs through dialectic.' And thirdly, learning
can take place only when the walls of self-righteousness and arrogance 'are torn down and one admits
ignorance.'
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never is able to draw to a close due to what it is searching for. As Murdoch's insight
puts it, 'Plato pictures human life as a pilgrimage from appearance to reality,'66 and it
is this idea of 'pilgrimage' which is one of the main aspects of the dialogue as it a
means ofmoving the soul toward the encounter with divine reality.
The dialogue as this journey can be seen to be characterised by movement,
and is dynamic. In one aspect the dialogue is a movement inward within oneself but
also outward toward divine reality and truth. To Plato, truth is found both in
knowing oneself, in the subjective and self-inspecting journey of one's own dialogue
within, but also in the encounter with the divine through the philosophical
conversation with others who are outside of the self. The dialogue within is a
psychological journey realising one's own ignorance or beliefs in a purification of
the soul. Yet, the dialogue is also a journey to seek that reality which lies outside the
selfbeyond time and the sensual world. To dialogue is to undertake the facing of
contradictions, exemplified by Socrates who explores contradicting viewpoints in
order to clarify and define the terms which are used in the conversation. As thought
is challenged, it is moved and never allowed to stagnate. Karl Jaspers gives a
perspective of this aspect of the dialogue when he writes that the demonstration of
contradictions
brings thinking into its natural movement. Its consequence in the dialogue
form is that the thought content is suspended in the movement of thinking.
While in an exposition thoughts are set forth as definitive, in dialogue the
truth develops spontaneously, in the course of the exchange, as an objective
reality that is not contained in any one position. It is not as though a truth
that might be expressed directly and more adequately in an exposition were
superfluously cloaked in dialogue form. For in the dialogue my opponent
ft7
also makes an indispensable contribution to the truth in its entirety.
By it being a journey that is both inward and outward and that faces
contradiction, the dialogue, though establishing a certain doctrine of the divine, does
not provide for the formulation of that doctrine to be hardened and stagnate. The
nature of the dialogue is one of a philosophical endeavour that is fluid and dynamic
ever expressing the divine in new ways. This of course does not mean that there is
no foundation for the dialogue to build upon, as in the absence of an eternal reality or
65 G. M. A. Grube's translation, revised by C. D. C. Reeve in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works.
66 Murdoch, Existentialists, 387.
67 Great Philosophers, 1, 136.
75
position to which it ascribes, but that by its very nature represents that which cannot
be proverbially placed in a box or ended. The dialogue in Plato represents a constant
moving reflection upon an eternal and stayed divine which seeks for new and deeper
perspectives and expressions of that divine reality to which it is striving. On this
Gabriel Marcel reckons that it would be better for the philosopher to regard his or her
doctrine as, 'a limited participation in the meaning of being,' rather than a
self-centred 'definitive theoretical encapsulating of the universe.'68 Comparatively,
to Plato's use of the dialogue, Marcel's own use of the 'journal-form of
communication'69 prohibits any surmisation that reality is exhausted, or that there is
not a continuous search, even journey, toward the goal of wisdom. In Plato, one
understands that there is a divine reality which is non-negotiable, but how that reality
is expressed fuels the dialogue. Truth is comprised ofmany individual experiences
but not one incarnating full truth. Plato's Good, Beauty, the One, the changeless, the
invisible, etc., are expression of one reality experienced in a multiplicity ofways, and
not separate realities all vying for the same position. The doctrinal position that is
reached through the dialogue is that there is a true reality beyond the physical and
changing, described in similar ways through the dialogue in the various Forms, all
part of the dialogical experience.
In short, the dialogue is in Plato a means to the transformation of the soul
representing the soul's encounter with the divine as found through the philosophical
conversation within oneself and with others. As it is an encounter with the divine, it
moves toward an end in the knowledge of the divine, but never reaches a finality or
conclusion. For Plato it is the major vehicle through which the soul is transformed
and led to an encounter with the divine.
Embodiment
As the dialogue involves the philosopher within it, the philosophical life
involves itself in the philosopher as the philosopher is called to be the embodiment of
the philosophical ideal by living out the philosophical life. Such an idea is central to
understanding the nature of the true philosopher in Plato, and especially seen in the




figure of Socrates who embodies and personifies the divine gift ofphilosophy. C.
Taylor has written that one of the central theme of the Dialogues is one in which
Plato 'writes as a philosophical apologist, who seeks to present Socrates as the ideal
embodiment ofphilosophy... '71 The centrality of Socrates in Plato's mind is such
that Karl Jaspers is moved to write that Plato's philosophy builds itself upon a
person:
Plato's philosophy is grounded in a lifelong personal attachment. The fixed
point in this philosophy is not nature, not the world, not man, not a problem,
not a theorem, but all of these because the center upon which the whole rests
is one man. To discern the nature of this attachment is one of the conditions
for an understanding ofPlato...We may say that what Plato first expresses is
not the philosophy but the philosopher as he saw him in reality. He discloses
philosophy in his presentation of the philosopher. Plato's poetic invention
found the philosopher in the real man whom he knew and loved.72
What is shown through the figure of Socrates is that philosophy in Plato is
linked to that which is ultimately personal and incarnational: philosophy as
embodied in the individual and in a person. As Hadas and Smith write in their work
Heroes and Gods, the image of Socrates is Plato's 'greatest creation and his most
effective vehicle for teaching' Socrates is one in whom philosophy is embodied
and personified, but also is one whom the would-be philosopher takes as his or her
model of life. As Gerard Watson writes, Socrates 'was the most important
theological influence on Plato, emotionally and intellectually...'74 and it is this figure
that Plato presents in his dialogues as a model of what the philosopher is to be.
In the Dialogues, Socrates is the central dramatic figure with whom the
reader comes into contact and in whom philosophy is, for Plato, embodied.
Challenging the crowds of Athens in the Apology, Socrates himself points to himself
as a model to be followed:
69 Ibid.
70 The works of Paul Gooch, Reflections on Jesus and Socrates who considers the similarities and
differences between the portrayal of Socrates' and Jesus' deaths, and Mark McPherran's, The Religion
ofSocrates (Penn State University Press, 1996), discuss the religious beliefs and aspects of Socrates
philosophical mission, finding their source and centre in the personage of Socrates himself.
71 C. C. W. Taylor, 'Socrates', in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press,
1995), 836.
72 Karl Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, Volume 1 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.: New York, 1962),
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73 Moses Hadas and Morton Smith, Heroes and Gods: Spritual Biographies in Antiquity (Routledge
and Kegan Paul: London, 1965), 56.
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But the truth of the matter, gentlemen, is pretty certainly this, that real
wisdom is the property ofGod, and this oracle is his way of telling us that
human wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me that he is not referring
literally to Socrates, but has merely taken my name as an example (fep£
7tapd8eiYp.a ttotobp-evoq), as if he would say to us, The wisest of you men
is he who has realized, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really
worthless. {Apology 23b)
As Plato indicates, Socrates is the paradeigma, the pattern and model of one who
has realised that the source ofwisdom is in God and is a paradigm in realising this
truth. Socrates claims his role as a blessing of God, saying, 'This, I do assure you is
what my God commands, and it is my belief that no greater good has ever befallen
you in this city than my service to my God.' {Apology 30b) It is Socrates who even
hears a divine voice, the daimonion, {Apology 3Id; 40b)75 which prevents him from
doing what he should not. The nuance of the Apology is the idea that the blessing of
philosophy rests upon Socrates, that in him we encounter divine wisdom, and that the
acceptance or rejection of Socrates is the acceptance or rejection of this philosophical
way of life, and for Plato, the way of truth.
The aspect of embodiment is raised in several further examples in the
Dialogues. Eric Voegelin comments that the Republic is characterised by the motion
of descent and that it is Socrates who counters the descent by his ascent to the light
as 'the savior' as it is Socrates 'who has travelled the way up from the night ofHades
• 7f\ •
to the light of Truth.' Thus, Socrates by the very nature of his person is the
embodiment of philosophy that saves the soul. Pierre Hadot also makes the case that
in the Symposium we are given the sight of Eros which is directly tied to the person
of Socrates.77 Hadot comments that,
To be in love with Socrates... was to be in love with love... The whole
dialogue is constructed so as to make the reader guess the identity between
78
the figures of Socrates and Eros.
Plato's Eros thus becomes tangible in the figure of Socrates, embodied in the
sensible world. Karl Jaspers writes that,
Plato's thinking has its source in his love of Socrates. No other love has ever
left such a monument. Plato's Eros was real; illumined by the reality, it
became a love of everything noble that crossed his path.7
75 See also Phaedrus 242b, Republic 496c.
76 Eric Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 59.




Even with these, it is in the Phaedo that the aspect of Socrates as embodying
the philosophical ideal is perhaps more poignantly seen than in any other place in the
Dialogues. In the Phaedo the matter ofwho is doing the talking (i.e. Socrates) is just
as important as what is being said. The portrayal in the dialogue of the soul that
follows philosophy, and the particular elements of philosophy as a way of death
(61cff), the argument for the immortality of the soul (70(7), and the actual account of
Socrates drinking the hemlock (116)7) centre upon, and are given life through the
image of Socrates. The centrality of the person of Socrates is so strong that Gerard
Watson has even commented that in the Phaedo,
The fate of Socrates gave a weight to Plato's arguments for the immortality of
the soul which they do not merit in themselves, and it also gave a popularity
to the dialogue itselfwhich ensured that the views of the relations between
gods and men contained in it were well-known in the ancient and early
Christian world.80
Critically, we may say that Watson's view is correct, but it raises a general
religious issue in Plato that philosophy though based upon a person is still linked
with an idea of the divine which is beyond that person altogether. We may certainly
say, in fact, that the personal aspect of Plato's philosophy is that it is to be lived out
in existence, embodied in life, an aspect which is proven by Socrates being the one
central character within Plato's philosophy. Yet, it is a perspective of life that
envisions the divine beyond the physical world to which that life points. Using the
example of the Phaedo, Hadas and Smith take the understanding of embodiment too
far when they write that, 'it is his image of Socrates rather than any specific doctrine
o 1
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that Plato wished to crystallize and perpetuate.' They continue that, 'in such an
issue it is the personality of the teacher rather than the cogency of his arguments that
89 •
is most persuasive.' For Hadas and Smith, one comes from the dialogue regarding
the immortality of the soul as one that is a
belief in Socrates, not in immortality. Only an occasional reader of the
Phaedo could rehearse its arguments for immortality years or months after he
oi
had laid the book down; the sainlliness of Socrates he can never forget.
79 Karl Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, vol. 1, 155.
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Against Hadas and Smith, it is actually the 'doctrine' of the philosophical life that is
shown through Socrates that is the important issue for Plato rather than simply seeing
Socrates. For Plato, we are to see both: the philosophical life as truly and uniquely
expressed through Socrates' life. We may certainly remember Socrates as a person,
but to indicate Plato is separating his 'doctrine' from the person of Socrates is to miss
a keynote in Plato's philosophical theology which is seen in this idea of embodiment.
It is no accident that Socrates is remembered, for Plato does not build his doctrine in
opposition to, but in conjunction with, the person. We may say that Socrates' life
gives his arguments solidity, but we can never say that Plato's intention is for us to
see Socrates rather than the arguments, because for Plato they are intertwined. The
principle of embodiment, then, as seen in Plato, is one of giving life to inanimate
doctrine, making that doctrine come alive, breathe, and become dynamic by uniting
that which is believed to that which is encountered in the person.
Reflecting upon the philosophical theology implicit in Plato's portrayal of
Socrates and in the paradigm he presents, the aspect of embodiment is crucial in that
philosophy in Plato must be lived out in life or it becomes a system of idle thoughts,
detached without substance. Metaphysically speaking, it is certainly not the case as
John Macquarrie writes in his classic work, Existentialism, that the 'whole tradition
that stemmed from Plato has exalted essence at the expense of existence.' The
word 'exalting' may be applicable, but it is certainly not the case that Plato's thought
is one which is 'at the expense' of existence, but is one which strives to perceive and
to understand the ideal within existence. At the basis of Plato's philosophical
theology is the essential need to have that particular understanding embodied in those
who live that perspective out, or carry out the philosophical life.
It is Edward Caird who, reflecting on the general idea of incarnation, writes
of a perspective that is seen to be present in Plato in that,
It is a law of human history that principles and tendencies which are really
universal, should at first make their appearance in an individual form, as if
bound up with the passing existence of a particular nation or even of a single
man. The general idea needs, so to speak, to be embodied or incarnated, to be
'made flesh and to dwell among men' in all the fullness and realization in a
finite individuality, before it can be known and appreciated in its universal




effect that reflection is able to detach the idea from accidents of time and
place and circumstance, and present it as a general principle.85
What is expressed by Caird is not only the desire, but as he writes, 'the need' for an
incarnational aspect to be included in philosophical and theological thought. What is
needed is not simply a hero, but that which is much deeper, that which represents a
universal idea in bodily form. It is a search for a 'synthesis', Caird writes, 'of the
• ... 8A
universal and the individual.' In particular regard to Plato, the individuals, who
embody the philosophical ideal, the universal, become, in turn 'universal'
representations - the ideal is given the factor of tangible reality as one that can be
touched, handled, seen. In this, the embodiment gives validity and immanence to an
otherwise ethereal and distanced idea as the intangible and tangible are brought into
union. Caird writes that philosophy,
as it belongs to the reflective stage of consciousness, might seem independent
of the personality of its teachers - the same laws [of incarnation] still
partially hold good; for the greatest of all philosophical movements is
associated with the life and death of Socrates, the first representative of the
. . . . 87
subjective principle of thought.
Though 'incarnation' is a very laden term, it is for Caird a meaning that is included
in the aspirations of Plato's philosophy. Socrates is certainly not the only
philosopher,8 but he presents a unique culmination of one in whom philosophy
dwells, an individual representing philosophy which any seeker of wisdom is to
naturally emulate.
Interestingly enough, the way of life is accentuated in a way of death in that
not only is the one who embodies the ideal known in life, their status is accentuated
in their death. Thus, in the example of the Phaedo, Socrates in his practice of
philosophy as a way of dying is seen in his life, but through the episode of his own
dying, Socrates' status as a model of the philosophical life is substantiated. Caird
comments that death is important for the incarnated universal to be realised, for,
'men never have full spiritual or ideal possession except of that which has ceased to
85 From Edward Caird's, The Evolution ofReligion (James Maclehose & Sons, 1893), Vol. II,
217-34, in John Macquarrie's Contemporary Religious Thinkers: From Idealist Metaphysicians to
Existential Theologians (Harper and Row, 1968), 11.
86 Caird in Macquarrie, Contemporary Religious Thinkers, 11 ff.
87 Ibid.
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Pythagoras would also be one who is the embodiment of philosophy, along with those such as
Heracitus, Parmenides, and in the Platonic tradition, Plotinus.
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be empirically present to their senses... They need the real to be removed to some
distance, ere they can fully apprehend the ideal that is behind it.'89 As such, the
incarnational aspect learned by the life lived, is known not only in the living but also
in death. Further, it is the dying of the individual who represents the universal, the
ideal, that gives new and greater life, not only for the individual but for those who
would reflect upon and emulate that life lived out. Socrates' death elevates him as
much as the life he actually lived. Caird offers this comment:
For its (Christianity's) fundamental lesson that man must 'die to live'
involves as a consequence that it is just through the last sacrifice of life itself
that the divine principle of life in humanity reveals itselfmost clearly. In
such complete devotion of himself, man becomes, what it is his innate
vocation to be, the organ and manifestation ofGod. From this principle it
necessarily follows that the idealizing process which death sets on foot, and
by which the individual is lifted out of the limitations or mortality, is no mere
visionary or poetic exaggeration, but only a recognition of the inmost truth of
things. If life and death are the process whereby the image ofGod is realized
in man, then there is no illusion in the correlative process by which, in the
thought of those that come after, the history of a man is regarded as a stage in
the manifestation ofGod.90
From all of this, there are two interrelated issues which are raised in this
philosophical context of embodiment in the religious nature of the philosophical life.
Firstly is that as philosophy is embodied, the transcendent is known in bodily form in
which the division between the divine and mundane, the ideal and the individual, is
relaxed. Employing Caird's terms above, the embodiment of the ideal is the joining
of the 'universal' and 'individual' as the divine is manifest in a life. Philosophy
becomes immanent and intimate within the reality of a person as a manifestation of
the divine in which all of humanity can participate. Thus, a literal example of the
divine is produced, not in a miraculous sense, but in the ordinary realm of existence
in which all humanity may participate. As it is then, the perceived strict wall of
separation, or dualism between the divine and mundane is not completely maintained
for the sensual is transformed and is able to know the divine.
Secondly, because of this embodiment, life is transformed in light of the
individual who incarnates the ideal as he or she becomes the paradigm of life
creating a new level of humanity in light of the ideal itself. The one who embodies
89 Caird in Macquarrie, Contemporary Religious Thinkers, 13.
90 Ibid., 17.
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the ideal points beyond himself or herself realising that he or she is not the ideal of
which he or she speaks. Instead, this one, as the embodiment of the ideal, calls
others to that ideal through the life lived, and although considered an embodiment of
the ideal, never considers himself or herself equal to the ideal. If such were the case,
the individual would become the ideal itself, creating opposing ideals in opposing
personalities and individuals, producing fragmentation. For Plato, Socrates calls
others by his life to the ideal of philosophy, not to be simply the followers of
Socrates, but followers of Socrates in that they are philosophers themselves. Thus,
Socrates words to 'know thyself, or to examine one's life, are those which not only
those who would follow Socrates would practice, but those ofwhich Socrates
himself would be the chief follower.
However, to respond to the ideal ofphilosophy is to respond to Socrates as
the one in whom the ideal is embodied. For Plato, the philosophical ideal is known
through Socrates who is one with the ideal and the divine, and one whom student or
reader is called upon to imitate in life. Socrates is a point of reference, a place where
the philosophical ideal is centred, and one to which those who follow wisdom must
refer.
The Goal: Homoiosis Theo
Lastly, the objective and goal of the philosophical life in Plato, may be
expressed in the idea that the philosopher is to become like God, to be homoiosis
theo. It is this idea that encapsulates all that the philosophical life in Plato aspires to.
In the Theaetetus Socrates conveys this objective of the life of philosophy when he
says to Theodorus,
it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed. But it must
inevitably haunt human life, and prowl about this earth. That is why a man
should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means
becoming as like God (opoioatg Beep) as possible; and a man becomes like
God when he becomes just and pure, with understanding. (176b)91
Theologically speaking, the idea ofHomoiosis theo presents a union between
human existence and a religious ideal. The way ofwisdom for Plato in becoming
like God in conduct is aparticipation in the divine through an ethical ideal,
91 M. J. Levett's translation, rev. by Myles Burnyeat in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works.
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establishing God as the 'measure' of the philosophical life. To become like God, for
Plato, is neither an option nor a lofty aspiration, but is a matter of human existence
representing the true way of life for humanity. As it is the divine that is ultimately
real, humanity's true existence begins when it imitates that divine reality. The way
of homoiosis theo is a drawing together of the human with the divine, a practice of
pursuing righteousness which is an aspect of what God is.
The divine, for Plato, is that reality which affects all of life. Because of the
reality of the Divine the life of philosophy is not concerned with the pursuit of wealth
or fame, nor is it concerned about cultic religious practices and rites, but is concerned
with holiness and justice as realities and sees life as practising this divine ethic.
Socrates says in Alcibiades II that it would be,
a strange and sorry thing if the gods took more account of our gifts and
sacrifices than of our souls and whether there is holiness and justice to be
found in them. Yes, that is what they care about, I believe, far more than
about these extravagant processions and sacrifices offered year by year by
states and individuals who may, for all we know, have sinned greatly against
gods and men. (150a-b)
For Plato, that which is believed about the Divine directly affects the life that is led,
for it is a belief and concern for that which is ultimately real. By understanding the
true nature of the divine, even God, one gains an understanding of the true attributes
of the philosophical life. As utter righteousness is an aspect ofwhat the divine is
Q9
(Theaetetus 176c), then as the individual strives to become like God he or she
participates in an aspect of the divine existence. It is a likeness to the divine that
conveys more than simply reflecting the divine, or copying it, but one in which the
soul participates in the reality of the divine righteousness. In the Laws it is God who
is the measure of life, as the Athenian says, 'Now it is God who is, for you and me,
of a truth the "measure of all things" (o 81) Geoq fpi v 7tdvicov xPfiftbacov
pfetpov), more truly than, as they say, man.'(716c) For Plato, the true life of
humanity is measured through the ultimate and eternal standard of God, and cannot
be led by a changing and passing standard of humanity and its varied opinions, which
93
Protagoras espoused. Socrates, repeating Protagoras' concept, says that we cannot
92 Cf. Republic 379b where the notion of God and goodness are directly linked as God is described as
'good in reality' (dtyot06<; 6 ye 6ed<; tcp 6vxi).
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Protagoras' words: 'Man is the measure of all things', '...of the things that are, that they are, and of
the things that are not, that they are not.' (Freeman, 'Protagoras', Fr. 1) 'About the gods, I am not
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live by the attitude, 'that things are to me as they appear to me, and they are to you as
they appear to you.' (Cratylus 386a) For Plato, it is ultimately important that
humanity's model be God (SIkociov Kod ocriov jiexd (f)povf]C8coq yeveaSar).94
For Socrates, this way of existence in becoming like God is not is a simple
mimicking of God, a seeming to be innocent and good, which is not better than 'an
old wives' tale'(176b), but a becoming like the divine in conduct for 'God is in no
wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous (doc, oiov xe
6iKai6xaxog)95, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn
becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness.'(176c)96 As Socrates says it in the
Republic, 'For by the gods assuredly that man will never be neglected who is willing
and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto God so far
as that is possible for man.' (Republic 613b, cf. Philebus 39e) The way of
philosophy for Plato centres upon the idea of is to become like God in one's life,
which entails a taking on of the divine attributes into one's existence.
For Plato, humanity must live by that which is eternal and divine in order to
find wisdom. Werner Jaeger comments that the idea of setting God as the standard
for the philosophical life represents a long-standing notion that philosophy is the
07
'supreme 'art ofmeasurement'. 'Such an art,' Jaeger continues,
could not as the sophists and the mass of ordinary men believed in
Protagoras, use the subjective scale of pleasure and pain. It must employ an
entirely objective standard.98
In the numerous passages of the Dialogues where theos is used, it applies to the ideal
of philosophy and the philosophical life. Gerard Watson writes that God, 'as a
model to be approximated or as a criterion of behaviour recurs again and again in
able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors
preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human
life.'(Freeman, 'Protagoras', Fr.4)
94 Meta is with the genitive phroneseds which conveys the meaning ofjustice and righteousness as
arising out of the company with wisdom. One may translate the words as becoming righteous and
pure by becoming wise. The point is that these are not extractable from each other but linked.
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Plato.'99 As Watson continues,
Is the notion ofmorality necessarily connected with the notion of God? It is
for Plato, in at least one meaning ofGod.100
According to James Duerlinger, because of this, the philosophical life that Plato
espouses is one that is the practice of that which may be called the 'divine life.'101
Duerlinger writes of this important point that as the goal of philosophy is the
attainment of likeness to the Divine, the 'theory and practice of the Platonic
• 109
philosophy also constitutes a religion, and its ethics, a religious ethics.' This
aspect, as Duerlinger points out, 'is not often discussed, much less accorded its
• • • • 109
traditional central place, in contemporary treatments of his philosophy...' In such
a case, Plato's ideal of homoiosis theo is a philosophically religious ideal, a
practising of the 'divine life', which is 'the final end towards which the practice of
the Platonic philosophy aims.'104
As a religious ideal, homoiosis theo implies by its nature an existential notion
of the soul's union through the practice of its becoming like the Divine in its
conduct. Gerard Watson writes that becoming like the Divine through philosophy is
in Plato 'the aim of existence' for it is the 'immortal union of the soul with God that
Plato is primarily concerned with,' as it is 'fundamental to his philosophy.'105
Simone Weil, writes that with this underlying desire for unity with the Divine Plato
is the 'authentic mystic.'106 It is in the recognition of homoiosis theo as a striving
for unity with God that the notion takes its most profound form. Reflecting upon the
Theaetetus Weil describes this underlying thought of becoming like the Divine as an
assimilation107 to the Divine, entailing the idea of likening oneself unto, or even
being absorbed into the Divine. But such an assimilation does not involve an escape
99 Gerard Watson, Plato's Unwritten Teaching {Talbot Press: Dublin, 1973), 78. Gorgias 507d-e;
Symp. 188d; Phaedo 63,80; Rep. 500c, 613b; Theaetetus 176b; Statesman 309c; Timaeus 90a; Laws
716b, 907b-c.
100 Gerard Watson, Plato's Unwritten Teaching (Talbot Press: Dublin, 1973), 78.
101 James Duerlinger, 'Ethics and the Divine Life in Plato's Philosophy', Journal ofReligious Ethics
(13), Fall 1985, 312-331. Duerlinger, however, does not go into any detail of how Plato's idea ofGod
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from the moral retreating to some divine union, but it is a living of that union out in
the life ofjustice within existence.108
For Plato, the union with the Divine is not an escape from the life or a
mystical encounter divorced from everyday life, but is one which is a way of full
existence. Evelyn Underhill provides a helpful model of such a perspective as one
who in her own life sought to bring the mystical union with the Divine to bear upon
the way that life was lived. James Home explains that in her preface to Practical
Mysticism Underhill
writes that ifmystical experiences have the transcendent value that the
mystics claim, and, if they reveal to us a world of higher truth, then that value
and that truth will be even more precious if discerned within 'the
overwhelming disharmonies and sufferings of the present time.109
The mystical union that is known through Plato's concept of becoming like the
Divine is one of a participation within the Divine, a union with God through the
ethical life lived in imitation of the ways of God, joining a religious and
philosophical ideal within a way of existence.
Yet, for others, homoiosis theo though a way of life conveys another side in a
desire for escape, a means to flee from the world and its system. Reflecting on
Socrates' words to Theodorus that we should 'escape from earth to heaven', that we
must make flight (^enyetv) away, Andre-Jean Festugiere comments that there is an
existentialist motif in Socrates' words which depicts a characteristic of humanity.
For Festugiere, Plato's idea of union with God through homoiosis theo recognises an
uneasiness with the world which displays,
a profound disgust with life. Those who experience it have suffered. For
them the earth is truly a vale of tears. As is set forth in the Theaetetus, they
are aware of the evil of this world. The remedy they seek in flight, in a flight
that will make them like unto God....110
Yet, the way of becoming like the Divine, presents not only an ethic, but also a
remedy for the ills of this world, and its system."1 Homoiosis Theo finds its
108 Ibid.
109 James Home, The Moral Mystic (Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion: Waterloo, Ontario,
1983), 81.
110 Andre-Jean Festugiere, Personal Religion among the Greeks (University of California Press:
1954), 20.
111 Such a disgust with life, if agreed to be present in Plato, may have been brought on through the
death of Socrates, which interestingly enough is alluded to in the last sentences of the Theaetetus.
Yet, to say that there is no joy with living may be to put too much weight upon what Socrates is
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expression, writes Festugiere, out of a 'homesickness for heaven, an aspiration to
lose oneself, to pass from this world, into the unsounded depths of divine peace.'112
Expressed in Hellenistic mysticism, this desire, writes Festugiere, finds 'its most
finished expression' in Plato.113 However, as Festugiere continues, Plato uses the
soul's desire for escape as a notion of the ethical life.
In Plato, of course, the formula for becoming like the divine takes on a moral
ring; one becomes like God by leading a pure and holy life with an
enlightened mind. But this is, as so often with Plato, a transposition; Plato
shifts to the plane of philosophy a preexistent tendency which was not
essentially an ethical principle. It was much more a fundamental aspiration
of the human spirit. Above all our unhappiness, above this earth where men,
like beasts, rend one another, where injustice reigns supreme and we live in
an age of iron, the gods are perfectly happy.114
By attaching a dramatic and ancient notion ofworldly unrest to his philosophy,
joining a psychological anxiety with a spiritual lesson, Plato attracts the ones who
understand the disappointment of this world and leads them to an answer in the
philosophical ethic in which to become like the Divine.
There is certainly an unrest with the world within Plato's philosophy in that it
responds to what it perceives as wrong in human existence, but it is not simply a way
of union with the Divine or a flight away from the world, but is one seeks to bring
these desires into a way of existence. Plato's is a two-faceted understanding of a
spiritual unrest united with an ethical life. For Plato, it is not simply the desire to
escape to the divine world, nor to live the ethical life without reference to a union
with the Divine, a way of life that is lived in and through the idea of becoming like
God. To have one or the other notion exclusively is to have an imbalance, a way of
life without an aspiration, or an aspiration without a practical and meaningful
saying. It may even be said that living is not a weight at all, not 'a vale of tears', but a 'game' to be
played (Laws) which John Passmore mentions in his work on The Perfectability ofMan. There is a
certain lightness in Socrates, a philosophical playfulness that never lets the reader and the philosopher
to take things, including oneself, too seriously. On the other hand, the gravity of the Theaetetus' two
ways of life, the philosophical and the not-philosophical, seems very serious indeed.
His point is perhaps valid, what one may truly say is that Socrates' death moved his band of students
toward a philosophical discontent with life. For Plato this discontent is found in the philosophical,
ethical life found ultimately in the Divine. Even though there is perhaps this philosophical unrest, this
tendency to flee, Plato finds solace in the life of philosophy.
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application to existence. Homoiosis theo represents a philosophically religious ideal
of the soul's union with God, but a union which is a way of life and existence.
Conclusion
Through the philosophical life, philosophy is legitimised in existence.
Philosophy, for Plato, is one of existence, of living out the divine way which
philosophy contemplates. In this way, philosophy is more than a way of thought, but
is a religious way of existence in which human life interacts with the divine through
the medium of philosophy as the love ofwisdom and the knowledge of the soul,
forming an entry into communion with the divine itself. By being a way of
existence, Plato's philosophy exhibits itself as a religious undertaking as it involves
the formation of the soul and the embodiment of the divine way of life where the
ideas of the divine are brought to bear upon an ethic. Plato's philosophy as this way
of life is not an escape, but an incarnation of the philosophical ideal in existence in a
form that gives tangibility and an ethical substance to the intangible and the
metaphysical. In Plato, such a life is a means of knowing the divine, which is the
greatest aspiration of humanity.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE HUMAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE DIVINE
The religious dimension of Plato's philosophy is seen in that it is the human
experience of the encounter with the divine. In Plato, this experience of
encountering the divine involves a religious understanding of the Forms. The Forms,
in their most important aspect represent an experience of divine reality, and the
related ideas ofparticipation (methexis), the immanence and transcendence of the
divine, the philosophical striving of unity with the divine, and the doctrine of
anamnesis, are to be seen as philosophical theological ideas involving a religious
dimension. The doctrine and experience of the Forms in Plato involve a personal
encounter with the divine which transforms the soul, deeply interrelating
philosophical and theological thought. Only when the Forms are considered in this
religious context and dimension can a full account of Plato's philosophy can be
given.
The Religious Experience of Divine Reality
In Plato the human encounter with the Forms is a religious experience of
transformation through a vision of divine reality. For Plato, the Good and the
Beautiful exist in a reality which eternally is. In the Republic the Good is that which
gives to all things knowledge and truth, a reality described as one of light and
sharpness of reason, in direct contrast to the world of change, a world that is dark
causing the soul to be blunted and to grope for wisdom. As Socrates says,
When it [the soul] is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine
resplendent it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason, but
when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of
becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it
shifts its opinions hither and thither... This reality, then, that gives their truth
to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you
must say is the idea of good.... {Republic 509d)
As the cause of knowledge and truth, and as the object of knowledge itself {Republic
508e), the Good exists as that which is 'beyond being' (etteKEtva Trj<; oixriat;), a
reality by itself, beyond even that which it gives, and above that which it causes:
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In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only
receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very
existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not
essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.
(.Republic 509b)
The Good as being 'beyond' all things betrays a transcendence and an eternal nature
within and of itself. Christopher Stead comments that in this entire section of the
Republic (Books VI and VII) obaia is no longer phrased with a dependent genitive
as in the definition of something or as an attribute, but is employed by Plato as 'a
collective singular denoting reality, or the sum total of real being; and in this absolute
use denotes 'eternal reality.'1 Stead writes that as Plato describes the Good as
'beyond being', he 'does not mean that it is too excellent to be real; in his view it is
• • 2
more real than any of its instances.'
Similarly in the vision of the Beautiful in the Symposium, Diotima's words
convey that which is ultimate reality:
It is an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes, which neither
flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same then
as now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to every worshiper as it
is to every other. Nor will his (the initiate into Love) vision of the beautiful
take the form of a face, or of hands, or of anything that is of the flesh. It will
be neither words, nor knowledge, nor a something that exists in something
else, such as a living creature, or the earth, or the heavens, or anything that is
- but subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness [ocbto Ka0' abx6
pe0' abtob povoeibeq], while every lovely thing partakes of it in such sort
that, however much parts may wax and wane, it will neither more nor less,
but still the same inviolable whole. (Symposium 21 la-bff)
The vision of the Beautiful is one of an eternal reality which, as Iris Murdoch writes,
for Plato, comes by grace as, 'when one directs his thoughts toward beauty of the
mind and spirit he will suddenly receive the vision, which comes by grace,
# T
0ela poipa, of the Form ofBeauty itself, absolute and untainted and pure....' The
philosophical soul sees Beauty as above the fray and change of the world as that
which eternally is, that which is never known fully through particular manifestations,
always remaining as that which is complete reality. In the words ofWerner
Beierwaltes, the beautiful is, 'nothing on or in an other - thus no attribute of an
'






other, but rather pure being-in-itself.'4 The form ofBeauty never alters, never grows
dim, but remains the same forever in every circumstance and from every view. It is
not part of the changing material world which constantly alters and fades, but is by
itself in a divine and eternal unity, an inviolable whole. The Forms themselves are in
their reality even beyond aesthetic description altogether, for such a reality is,
without color and without shape and without solidity, a being that really is
what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the
soul's streersman. (Phaedrus 247d)
Yet, what is seen in Plato's philosophical theology of the Forms is that they
are not simply a vision of the soul, but are that to which the soul is akin. The soul's
knowledge of the Forms as that which truly exists does not come through the senses
but through the soul, a knowledge based upon a relationship of the soul with the
divine. As Socrates rhetorically enquires in the Phaedo,
Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself... the Beautiful, and the
Good?... have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes?... have you
ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses? I am speaking of.. .the
reality (xrjq obaiaq) of all other things, that which each of them essentially
is. (Phaedo 65d-e)5
It is this reality that captivates the soul of the philosopher, for Plato, an existence that
is 'itself by itself (oebxo Ka0' abx6, Phaedo 78d, 100b). Such a reality exists in its
own glory, by itself, and the philosophical soul seeks this reality 'by itself as well,
away from the pull of the senses and the body, and in so doing, reaches the
&Wme.(Phaedo 66a)6 The philosopher, says Socrates,
approaches the object with thought alone.. .using pure thought alone, tries to
track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible
from eyes and ears, and in a word, from the whole body. (Phaedo 66a)
The philosophical soul, away from the influence of the body and its senses,
recognises its kinship with this divine and longs to remain in this reality:
... [the soul] passes into the realm ofwhat is pure, ever existing, immortal
and unchanging (xd KaOapov xe kou del ov Kai dOdvaxov Kai
4 Werner Beierwaltes, 'The Love of Beauty and the Love ofGod', Classical Mediterranean
Spirituality, ed. by A. H. Armstrong (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1986), 297.
5 Grube's translation in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works. One may say that change is acutely
witnessed as it surrounds the death of Socrates. In this scene of the Phaedo, the eternal reality which
the philosopher sees is not only one on which philosophical reason bases itself, but is a reality that has
a passionate meaning as well. It is to this reality that the philosopher, even Socrates, longs to go.
6 As the soul is related to the divine, to seek wisdom is to seek the divine through the soul, and to seek
it within the soul (i.e. to know thyself).
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cbaabxoq), and being akin to this it always stays with it whenever it is by
itself and can do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in
touch with things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is called
wisdom? (Phaedo 79d)7
However, for Plato, we do not simply move away from the senses to glimpse
the eternal but, as shown in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, move through the
senses to envision the eternal. In the Symposium and the Phaedrus, the philosopher
moves from one vision of beauty to the next until he draws near the vision of the
eternal Beauty which is the encounter with the divine. In the Symposium, the
philosopher moves progressively from a vision of the various things of beauty to the
one eternal vision of the Beautiful (21 la//). In the myth of the Phaedrus as well, the
philosopher seeing the beauty of the beloved recovers the wings of his soul as his
memory is stirred of the Beauty his soul beheld before coming to earth. (249d\ff) In
these cases, balanced with the Phaedo, Plato indicates that the philosopher does not
shut away the senses but goes beyond them, superseding them in order to encounter
the divine reality.
This ultimate reality for which the philosophical soul strives and encounters
beyond the senses is a reality that always is, changeless and unalterable. In the
Phaedo, the unchanging nature of the Forms is a significant point as Socrates
questions,
are they (that which is of the divine reality) ever the same and in the same
state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the
Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change
whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform by itself,
remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever?
{Phaedo 78d)
Relatedly, in Plato, even God is one who is in reality good and changeless in nature.
As Socrates says in the Republic (379b), 'whether in epic, melody, or tragic verse',
in whatever way we depict God, we must convey God's 'true quality' of ultimate
goodness, as Socrates asks, 'And is not God of course good in reality and always to
be spoken of as such (ObKobv dyotOoq 6 ye Oeoq xcp 6vxi;)?' By being good in his
essence, God can never be, for Plato, the cause of evil but only of the good, never
capable of deception, and in this state is changeless. (380c) For Plato, to be
deceptive is to change, to be unpredictable, and as goodness is the measure of the
7 Ibid.
93
divine itself, such a concept links directly with God's changeless nature. 'But God,'
says Socrates, 'and everything that belongs to God, is in every way in the best
possible state.' {Republic 381b) God is a simple unity, possessing a wholeness of
being and ultimate reality, one that is,
simple and true in word and deed. He doesn't change himselfor deceive
others by images, words, or signs, whether in visions or in dreams. (382e)
Yet, for Plato, such changelessness in this divine reality does not warrant a
static nature devoid of life. Along with this unchanging nature, Plato offers a more
complex idea in the thought of the Sophist. For Plato, a reality that is static, as
seemingly indicated in the Phaedo, does not remain, or never was appealing over
time, for such a reality, to Plato, is one devoid of life. In the Sophist Plato confronts
a concept of utter changelessness as the Stranger, addressing the 'friends of the
forms', proclaims,
But for heaven's sake, are we going to be convinced that it's true that change,
life, soul, and intelligence are not present in that which wholly is, and that it
neither lives nor thinks, but stays changeless, solemn, and holy, without any
understanding? {Sophist 248e)8
The Stranger introduces the element of life and intelligence into a divine which is
changeless, one that is solemnly holy and without relationship to the world. As the
Stranger suggests, if it is to be known, then this divine must be considered as being
changed by 'having something done to it.' (248d)9 According to the Stranger, we
cannot say that such a reality, that which wholly is, can neither live nor think as one
aloof in its holiness and solemnity without understanding. As he asks further, 'are
we saying that it has intelligence, life, and soul, but that it's at rest and completely
changeless even though it's alive?' (249a) Thus, both the elements of change and
changelessness, 'holy solemnity' and involvement with life, must be given to a
conception of reality. The philosopher must, as the Stranger says, be as a child
begging for both ideas, as the Stranger says,
8 Nicholas P. White's translation in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works.
9 The argument in the Sophist is one that posits that if something is known then it has something done
to it (248e). The same idea is given in the Euthyphro (10c) that change comes by something having
some other thing act upon it. The modern understanding finds this argument as being strange, and at
worst wrong as nothing is changed simply because it is known. Whether or not this is Plato's own
thought is speculative, for like the rest of the Platonic corpus, one is unclear as to whose position Plato
is positing as his own, if any at all. However, the traditional position, and one which I adopt as well,
would see the major protagonist of each dialogue to be reflective of Plato's own position be it
Socrates in the Socratic dialogues, or in this case the Stranger or Visitor.
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then, it seems that only one course is open to the philosopher who values
knowledge and rest above all else. He must refuse to accept from the
champions either of the one or of the many forms the doctrine that all reality
is changeless, and he must turn a deaf ear to the other party who represent
reality as everywhere changing. Like a child begging for 'both,' he must
declare that the reality of the sum of things is both at one - all that is
unchangeable and all that is in change. (Sophist 249d)
The Sophist presents, Gerard Watson comments, 'a very important
modification of his (Plato's) thinking about the unchanging nature of the perfect,'
one that is a different stance than that which was taken by one such as Parmenides.10
To Plato, without this one sense of'change', the divine is void of the element of life
and meaning to existence. Iris Murdoch writes that,
The early picture of the Forms is unsatisfactory not only because of the
unclarified relation of these separate changeless perfect entities to a changing
imperfect world, but also because the Forms are supposed to be the only
realities... The attribution of life and movement to ultimate being in the
Sophist brings this 'mediation' into the area of philosophical argument... he
creates a fundamental division in the structure of the ultimately real since
Ktvr|(Tic and £cor| and and (ppovf]aiQ (movement, life, soul,
intelligence) are now allowed somehow into the company of the still
changeless Forms."
What may be said is that here, as elsewhere, Plato admits to a dynamic element in his
theological conception which incorporates differing conceptions as complementary.
Life enters the static and the changeless so that the entirety of reality embraces both:
a changeless nature on which wisdom builds itself, and a dynamic element of life and
'change' applicable to existence.
What can be seen through all of these aspects of the divine reality in Plato's
philosophical theology is the religious nature of the philosophical vision that Plato
describes. As Andre-Jean Festugiere has written, it is this 'impulse toward the
• • • 19
Eternal' that is the 'profound current which moves the Platonic doctrine.' Plato's
perspective is that,
only the Eternal exists, because it alone is unchanging. All else, all that the
senses perceive, is fleeting and corruptible. They pass, the Eternal remains.13
10 Gerad Watson, Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion ofGod, 26 ff.
11 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 428.
12
Festugiere, Personal Religion, 42.
13 Ibid.
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The 'Eternal' which is sought in Plato is that which always is, embodied in the
Forms as the 'supreme categories of Being.'14 The Forms, as ultimate and divine
reality, are that which are religiously encountered. W. C. K. Guthrie comments that
even in the 'developed Platonism' of the middle dialogues, the Forms are spoken of
in an 'exalted and religious language as divine (e.g. Symp. 21 le), eternal and
changeless, having their being in a world 'beyond the heavens', removed from space
and time.' 5 This same persuasion is seen in the Republic, and as Guthrie further
comments,
As the earlier books have shown, the Forms are still in part a religious
conception. They are divine, and apprehended, after suitable preparation, by
faith or intuition (v6r|ai<;). They are still, as in the Symposium and Phaedrus,
the epopteia, the revelation vouchsafed to initiates in the intellectual
mysteries of Platonism.16
Such a vision of divine reality moves some to consider Plato's philosophy
mystical in its nature. F. M. Cornford argues that ifPlatonism is considered to have
one of its essential points in the theory of the Forms, then we must see that Platonism
belongs to the mystic tradition.17 The first appearance of the Forms in the Phaedo,
Cornford writes, associates them as proofs of the soul's immortality and because of
this understanding and association, 'there is therefore a strong prima facie case for
holding that the Theory of Ideas should be interpreted from the mystic
10
#
standpoint....' Even in the specific example from the Symposium above, A. E.
Taylor describes Socrates' words as conveying a 'spiritual voyage', even describing
it as a mystical vision.19 What is at stake in such an understanding is a beginning
point of interpreting Plato's vision as one that is religious in its nature. The
descriptions of Cornford and Taylor betray this religious nuance through their
understanding of the mystical nature of Plato's philosophy. Flowever, some are
careful not to link Plato's words at all with a philosophical mysticism. In contrast to
14 Ibid.
15 W. C. K. Guthrie, A History ofGreek Philosophy, Vol. IV, 116.
16
Ibid., 552. The analogy to initiation is also in the Phaedo 69c-d where the ones who have truly
practised philosophy are those who are 'purified and initiated' and will dwell with the gods.'
17 F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 242.
18 Ibid.
19
A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man andHis Work (Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 1926), 225. Taylor
likens this experience to that of St. John of the Cross described in the opening lines of the Dark Night
in the song, En una noche oscura or even to the visions of Bonaventura.
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Taylor, Constantin Ritter is careful not to link Socrates' vision in the Symposium, nor
any other philosophical vision, with mysticism, as he says that such,
are wholly based on forged passages of the Epistles, which I can only
consider as inferior achievements of a spiritual poverty which seeks to take
refuge in occultism. I am astonished that anyone can hail them as
• • • • • on
enlightened wisdom, as the final result of Platonic philosophising.
For Ritter, and even others, Plato speaks mystically and poetically when, as
Frederick Copleston writes, he is feeling his way, but when, as in later dialogues, his
doctrines are more certain, he speaks more scientifically, dropping the poetic and
• 21*
mystical genre altogether. Interestingly enough, the arguments put forward by
Ritter and others do not attempt to establish the religious nature of Plato's philosophy
at all, even in regard to comparing it to that which is mystical, but make the deciding
factor of the argument the idea that there is a certain development in Plato's work
which moves from one position to the other negating that which was held before.
Though we may say that Plato, as any thinker, develops in thought, there is a unity to
Plato's thought throughout the Dialogues that makes Ritter's dismissing statement of
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desiring a 'final result of Platonic philosophising' a moot point on its own. The
visions of the Good and the Beautiful are those which intertwine with other aspects
of the Dialogues portraying a common theme of the philosopher as one who seeks
the eternal and encounters the divine. The religious status of the Forms never alters,
as it is a basic understanding of Plato's doctrine. Even Guthrie's comment above
that the Forms are 'still' part of a religious conception is a bit misleading, for the
Forms are never separated from their ultimate religious connotation in Plato at any
• • • 9T • •
time. As is shown by the Timaeus (considered a Tate' dialogue) the religious
conception of the Forms as a divine reality which the Demiurge contemplates and
copies in the formation of the created order, makes clear that Plato retains the
religious and theological nature of the Forms. As Huntington Cairns writes,
the evolutionary view of the dialogues is difficult to maintain... [as in them]
the same thoughts appear again and again, expressed in different words, in
different contexts, with varying emphasis... there is not shift in his
20 Ritter, Essence, 11.
21 Frederick Copleston, A History ofPhilosophy, volume 1, 198.
22 Cf. Paul Shorey, The Unity ofPlato's Thought (The Chicago University Press: Chicago, 1960).
23
Guthrie, History, IV, 50.
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convictions... The world view they [the Dialogues] display is clear., when
seen as a whole.24
Beyond the textual arguments against it, there is an understanding that rationality and
mystical intuition are not separate in Plato's mind but part of the one philosophical
experience.
The philosophical vision that Plato conveys is not one which separates
mystical or religious vision from rational thought, but joins the two together so that
the philosophical vision is both rational and mystical or religious at the same time: a
philosophically religious vision of that which is 'real'. In regard to this
understanding, Gregory Vlastos writes that there are two meanings of this word 'real'
in Plato when describing the Forms. One implies a 'cognitive meaning' as that the
Forms are 'more' real than anything else, so that, as Vlastos terms it, there are
degrees of reality in Plato. But there is also another meaning, Vlastos writes, which
is more to the point here that the word 'real' can convey the Forms as 'objects of
• • 9S • •
mystical experience.' In such a meaning, the word 'real' functions as a
'value-predicate' - one that even 'transcends the usual specifications of value, moral,
aesthetic, and religious' by connoting, as Vlastos puts it, 'more than goodness,
9 f\
beauty, or holiness, or even than all three of them in conjunction.' In an even
further comment, Vlastos comments that the vision of the divine described in the
Phaedrus of the'unblemished, whole, tremorless, blessed apparitions' (250c) convey
• 97 •
a status of divinity even 'more so than traditional gods.' What is gathered from
this, is that Plato speaks of a reality which is ultimately divine, which is
philosophically envisioned, and which literally transforms the soul intertwining the
philosophical with the religious.
24 Hamilton and Cairns, Plato, 'Introduction', xvii.
25
Gregory Vlastos, 'Degrees of Reality in Plato', Platonic Studies (Princeton University Press, 1973),
64.
26 Ibid. In a note explaining his use of the term, 'value-predicate', Vlastos writes that, 'so far as
things fail to be real they are regarded by Plato as 'trash' (<j$,txxpioc<;, Republic 515d), unworthy of any
'serious concern.' («. 26) The same connotation is found with the word obSevia ('nothingness')
meaning 'worthlessness' (Phaedrus 235a and Theaetetus 176c) which Vlastos writes may be
compared with the words of Meister Eckhart when he writes, 'a stone, to the extent that it has being,
would be better than even God and the Godhead without being.' («. 26) The reality of the Forms is
such that all things which are not ultimately real have nothing to offer. Using Vastos' comparison
with Eckhart's words, the 'being' of the divine is its essence to Plato and without it, it can no longer




Divine Reality and the Meaning to Human Existence
What is to be clearly stated in Plato is that the religious nature ofPlato's
philosophical vision is not one which implies a lofty escape, but one which involves
the soul's transformation and corresponds to and affects human existence. For Plato,
the reality of the Forms elicits a religious way of life and existence that seeks and
responds to this divine reality. Iris Murdoch comments that,
The connection of the Forms with morality and the spiritual life emerges at
the same time naturally, together with their 'ontological' or existential
• • • 98
function, out of reflection upon what serious truthful thinking is like.
In Plato, for Murdoch, is a coalescing ofmorality, spirituality, and existential
meaning which provides a backdrop for the Forms' religious meaning to be seen. As
Murdoch indicates, the various meanings emerge simultaneously, in one accord,
reflecting one another. As Gerard Watson writes of the Good, the Good provides the
soul with a point of 'fixity' that it needs and desires.29 For Plato, it is certainly the
divine reality that humanity needs and must contemplate if any meaning is to be had
within life, and it is in this that at least one view of the Forms' religious meaning can
be seen. It is only this encounter with divine reality that, for Plato, leads to the soul's
transformation.
For Plato, the answer to the human dilemma lies in the vision of the Forms, a
vision which forms the basis of a philosophical spirituality. Iris Murdoch writes that,
'Plato's Forms, as objects ofmoral desire, and principles of understanding, are to be
• • TO
thought of as active creative sources of energy in the world...' Although the Forms
are posited as moral definitions, there is an attempt, Murdoch writes, to reify the
Forms as objects of a spiritual and philosophical vision as well, even in the earliest
dialogues:
from the Phaedo onward Plato develops, especially in moral and religious
contexts, a picture of the Forms as changeless and eternal and separate
objects of spiritual vision known by direct acquaintance rather than through
the use of language (propositions)... The discovery of truth and reality, the
conversion to virtue, is through the unimpeded vision of the transcendent
Forms.31
28 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 398
29
Watson, Greek Philosophy, 27.
30 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 223.
31
Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, 408.
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Seen in this meaning of the Forms, it is only the divine, manifested particularly in the
Form's transcendence above the world, that provides, for Plato, the meaning and
salvation for which humanity seeks.32
Within this basis of a philosophically religious way of life, the Forms as
divine reality provide humanity with existential meaning. Iris Murdoch comments
that,
The original role of the Forms was not to lead us to some attenuated
elsewhere but to show us the real world. It is the dreamer in the cave who is
33
astray and elsewhere.
The Forms present that which is divine, an ontological unity transcendent above the
fragmentation of the world. As exemplified in the case of Beauty, the Form exists
'itself by itself in an 'eternal oneness' (povoeiSeQ beet 6v), and though all things
participate in it, it remains in this same unified whole. (Symposium 211b) Plato,
through the Forms, addresses a perceived need of humanity for that which remains
against a world in chaos. As Murdoch comments, such a search for unity drives our
own existence:
the idea of a self-contained unity of limited whole is a fundamental
instinctive concept. The urge to prove that where we intuit unity there really
is unity is a deep emotional motive to philosophy, to art, to thinking itself.
Intellect is naturally one-making.34
We naturally cannot tolerate chaos, or the chaotic derivatives of violence, the tearing
apart of all knowledge, as Murdoch writes, for we fear the chaos, the fear of
'plurality, diffusion, senseless accident....' For Plato, the divine Form is the way
out of and beyond the meaninglessness of this Heraclitean flux. Philosophy builds
upon a vision of the transcendent divine which provides an existential meaning for
life. To Plato, the philosopher cannot look to the world for his or her knowledge, nor
most of all salvation, for the remedy of the soul and the society is that which is
eternal and ultimately real. Gerard Watson writes,
32 The vision of the Forms is one which leads literally to the soul's transformation. George Thomas
notes Gregory Vlastos' suggestion that, 'Plato regarded the philosophers's vision of the Ideas as
analogous to the vision or epopteia which was the culmination of the rites of the Eleusinian mysteries'
- a vision which was a 'personal' rather than communal experience that resulted in a transformation
of one's personality and character. George Thomas, Religious Philosophies ofthe West (Charles
Scribner's Sons: New York), 21.






it is understandable that there should be such an emphasis on the unchanging
nature of forms in a philosophy (Plato's) which was evolved in an attempt to
provide the moral convictions derived from Socrates in particular with an
unshakable metaphysical basis.36
However, as Eric Voegelin comments, we cannot simply see Plato's desire for
transcendence as being a lofty desire out of touch with reality but must see it as part
of the experience of philosophy in life, as Voegelin writes,
The Platonic realm of changeless eternal being was not a wanton assumption;
it was experienced as a reality in the erotic fascination of the soul by the
Agathon as well as in its cathartic effects. The realm of ideas was one of the
T7
symbols which expressed the philosopher's experience of transcendence.
Within the religious experience of the divine reality of the Forms is one
which, for Plato, is needful, essential to, and involved within human existence. As
Gerard Watson comments on Plato's thought, the transcendent reality forms an
essential need ofhumanity, for without the it, 'man's life can seem pointless and
TO
futile.' Plato's is not simply a matter of 'propositional' knowledge, of simply
TQ
knowing the Forms, but is a knowledge that is one of 'acquaintance', in which he,
as Watson writes,
wishes to retain the abstract, intellectual formulation because of his need for a
knowledge that is 'pure', unchanging, mathematical in its certainty and
consistency. But he is also aware that man does not live by intellect alone,
that such perfection is too often arid, and that not only the unexamined but
also the uninvolved life is not worth human living.40
The transcendent divine reality of which Plato speaks involves humanity within it, or
better, through its contemplation humanity reaches a state of transcendence,
becoming involved with the divine through a correspondence within the soul. As
John Macquarrie writes, the human act of transcendence is a quality of life, a way of
being.41 It is a way of 'becoming more': a qualitative 'deepening, enhancing and
enriching of life, or, if one prefers, a fuller, truer humanizing of life.'42 Macquarrie
writes that when we speak of human existence, we are faced with a fundamental
choice between a life of transcendence or the life of immanence, in which, contrasted
36
Watson, Greek Philosophy, 26.
37 Eric Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 275.
38




Macquarrie, In Search ofHumanity (SCM Press Ltd: London, 1982), 26.
42 Ibid.
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to transcendence, is a way, 'of drift and conformity in which one decides nothing for
oneself but lets one's life be formed by passing appetites, social pressures, the latest
fashions and so on.'43 However, for Plato, the way of transcendence is not simply a
'fuller' way of life, as Macquarrie says, but is a way of necessity for humanity to be
fully human. For Plato, the way of envisioning the transcendent divine reality forms
a deep contrast with the life that does not; as in the myth of the Cave, the soul's
ascent is the 'turning of the soul from a day that is a kind of night to the true day -
the ascent to what is, which we say is true philosophy.' (.Republic 521c) It is in the
application of the vision of divine reality to a way of life that the Forms' meaning to
human existence can be fully seen.
As the reality of the Forms relates back to human existence and a way of life,
what is seen is that the human question is always central to Plato, as in the opening
lines of the Republic, a concern with 'the way people live.' {Republic 329d)
Humanity's contemplation of the divine is ultimately important for Plato for it
governs the way life is lived. As Gadamer writes, 'in the end, any talk about the
universal idea of the good always takes as its point of departure this human question:
What is the good for us?'44 The Ideas can never be separated from their religious or
existential meaning as the envisioning of the Beautiful or the Good has as much to
say, and do with the way an individual lives or the way that society conducts itself as
it does the philosophical vision or experience of ascent. Herein we find the indelible
union in Plato between the divine and the human experience as the transcendent
vision of the divine has direct implications to the human situation and experience. In
Plato the divine and human are joined in an interrelationship that is based upon
humanity's experience of the divine, and its ascent to be united with and encounter
the divine in everyday existence.
43 Ibid., 25. Macquarrie is responding to the contrast Alister Kee develops in his Way of
Transcendence between the way of 'transcendence' and the way of 'immanence'. On another
comparative thought, Augustine's City ofGod portrays the earthly city as one that secures its order
through 'violence,' (Hauerwas in Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, 25), as Augustine's
cities are metaphors for the two types of human life, the one who is given to the way of immanence,
the way of the earth, lives only for material gain as Alister Kee's words also conveys.
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Divine Reality and the Contrast ofLives
The point where the speculations about the vision of divine reality become
ultimately important, for Plato, is when they are seen to affect human life directly. In
his conception of humanity and society, Plato conceives of a deep contrast between
those who are philosophers and those who are not: a contrast of lives that involves
an equally contrastual difference in visions of reality where the philosophical life,
based upon the divine reality, is contrasted with a way of that turns away from this
reality following mere appearances. These contrasting visions involve a theological
and ethical implication, for one can never separate, for Plato, what is contemplated,
or not contemplated, from the way one's life is lived, as the two are inextricably
linked.
In the Sophist, Republic, and Theaetetus, respectively, Plato presents three
aspects within this image of the contrast of lives: the contrast between the
philosopher as a lover ofwisdom and the sophist as the lover of arguments, the
contrast between the philosopher and the lover of opinion (philodoxos), and a
contrast between the philosopher and the lover of popularity. In the Sophist, the
philosopher is portrayed as one who seeks divine reality while the sophist satisfies
himselfwith the world and that which is not, a world of change, instability and
opinion. The sophist loves and desires words, the turn of obscurities that wins
arguments but does not seek wisdom. Through the contrasting symbols of light and
darkness, Socrates describes the sophist as one who 'runs off into the darkness of
that which is not', becoming difficult to see. (>Sophist 254a). The philosopher, on the
other hand, leads a life which stays 'near the form' of'being,' (Sophist 254a)45 and in
contrast to the sophist lives in the company of divine reality, certainty, and light.
The philosopher is one 'whose thoughts constantly dwell upon the nature of reality'
and in contrast to the sophistic darkness, 'is difficult to see because the region [in
which the philosopher exists] is so bright, for the eye of the vulgar soul cannot
endure to keep its gaze fixed on the divine.' (254a)46
44 Gadamer, The Idea ofthe Good, 30.
45 Nicholas White's translation, Plato: Complete Works.
46 The Good is always associated with light as it is depicted in the Republic. Such a thought can be
remembered and applied throughout this thesis in the contrast of light and darkness which is very
symbolic of the religious nature of philosophy.
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A further contrast is drawn in the Republic between the philosopher and the
lover of opinion, the (f>i?i68o4o<;.47 For Plato, the lover of opinion does not see the
reality of the divine but only loves the numerous beautiful things, the spectacles,
never contemplating the Form of the eternal Beauty itself. As Socrates says:
Let him answer me, that good fellow who does not think there is a beautiful
in itself or any idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and
unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things - the lover of
spectacles...who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one
48
and the just one, and so of other things.... (Republic 479a)
The lover of opinion can only endure and see that which is becoming, they cannot
'bear the idea' that 'the beautiful itself is one or that the just is one or any of the
49
rest...' In Plato's thought, no true life can be based upon seeking only beautiful
objects aside from the one eternal Beauty for everything that is beautiful is in some
way ugly, that which is just is in some respects unjust, and that pious in some ways
impious. The way of the philodoxos is actually a midway point between the
Beautiful itself and all beautiful objects, it is a way of'becoming', a point between
existence and non-existence {Republic 479c); a way that neither commits to certainty
nor uncertainty, but one that is simply that of opinion. (476d ff.) Reminiscent of
Heraclitus' words,50 to live in such a middle state, says Socrates, is to live as in a
dream:
What about someone who believes in beautiful things but doesn't believe in
the beautiful itself... Don't you think he is living in a dream rather than a
wakened state?... But someone who, to take the opposite case, believes in the
beautiful itself, can see both it and the things that participate in it and doesn't
believe that the participants are it or that it itself is the participants - is he
living in a dream or is he awake? {Republic 476c)51
47 One important point of the word <jnko8oi;o<; connotes that such is not only a lover of opinion, but,
as is pointed out (Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, abridged (Oxford: 1926), 759), a lover of
glory and honour.
48 Eric Voegelin comments that Plato uses for that which is 'in itself the term 'idea,' and as he does,
the 'Parmenidean Being is made to embrace the realm of ideas, while his world of illusion (doxa)
becomes the realm of the many things in which the ideas are incarnate.' Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle,
67
49
Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 67.
50 As Heraclitus writes: 'The Law (of the universe) is here explained; but men are always incapable of
understanding it... As for the rest ofmankind, they are unaware ofwhat they are doing after they
wake, just as they forget what they did while asleep.' (Fragment 1) Kathleen Freeman, Freeman,
Kathleen. Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1996), 24.
51 Grube's translation, Plato: Complete Works.
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In contrast to the philodoxos the philosopher embraces (aoTtdc^ojaevcuq) true being
(to 6v). (Republic 480a) The philosophers are those, 'who in each and every kind
welcome the true being..those who embrace the whole of all things rather than the
parts (474c). The philosopher contemplates and embraces the reality of beauty and
justice, grasping that which never changes and which is 'always the same.' (484b)
They are lovers of truth (aletheia) and not falsehood (485c).
In the Theaetetus (17Off) Plato makes a further contrast between the lover of
wisdom and the lover ofpopular opinion. In the dialogue Socrates digresses to give
honour to the philosophical life by showing what a true philosopher is, and contrasts
the lover of wisdom to the man who is a slave to the system of the world, one bound
by the desire for social and political popularity. Such an individual, says Socrates, is
found constantly in the law courts seeking approval from those like himself, chasing
after reputation, offering flattering words to please the crowd, always in a hurry and
watching the clock, (\12efj) Such a soul is small and warped (173a-b), says
Socrates, one who glories in the self and one's own accomplishment counting
himselfwise, practical, and worldly. Such a one is fooled in considering himself a
free individual as he esteems himself to have a reputation and popular but is actually
held by these in a prison (174e), and bound by these, his soul sinks into its own
worthlessness. Such a life is one that chases after what can be held in the hand.
These are the lives, says Socrates, of the 'uninitiate' (tcov dpftriVTCOV, the profane)
who believe that 'nothing is real save what they can grasp with their hands and do
not admit that actions or processes or anything invisible can count as
real.'(Theaetetus 155e) Such an individual is the worldly man of affairs who
believes he is wise as he thinks himself able to work the system to his own best
advantage, but who is, in reality a slave of the system, unaware that his unscrupulous
53
conduct condemns his life to be its own curse and punishment (176d-177a).
The philosopher in contrast to such a one, is, on the other hand unbound by
popular opinion and free to converse leisurely with fellow seekers ofwisdom.
Taking no interest in that which would make him popular, the philosopher's interest
is in that which is eternal. He takes no interest,
52 A Lexicon abridged from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford at the Clarendon Press,
1926), 42
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in the rivalries of political cliques, in meetings, dinners, and merrymakings
with flute girls... Whether any fellow citizen is well- or ill-bom or has
inherited some defect from his ancestors on either side, the philosopher
knows no more than how may pints ofwater there are in the sea. He is not
even aware that he knows nothing of all this, for if he holds aloof, it is not for
reputation's sake, but because it is really only his body that sojourns in his
city, while his thought, disdaining all such things as worthless, takes wings,
as Pindar says, 'beyond the sky, beneath the earth,; searching the heavens and
measuring the plains, everywhere seeking the true nature of everything as a
whole, never sinking to what lies close at hand. (173d—174a)
As an example of such a life, Socrates recounts the tale of Thales who was
lampooned by the Thracian servant girl for falling into the well for looking up to the
sky and missing that which was at his feet. (174a)54 As the story shows, the
philosopher pursues an entirely different path of life. The life of the philosopher is
marked, in the end, by his or her aspiration to a life ofwisdom that seeks to become
like God (176a) and not like the crowds and so-called leaders of society.
What is given in these three examples are pictures of lives violently
contrasted in their outlook and their views of existence. Eric Voegelin points out in
specific reference to the Republic, yet generally applicable to this whole idea, is that
such a state is a 'state of the soul', a 'wandering or erring between being and not
being.'55 Voegelin notes that it is on this basis that the Heraclitean picture of the
sleepwalker offered by Socrates is to be seen as one who lives his life by putting
'images in place of reality.'56 (Republic 476c) Gregory Vlastos describes it as the
mistake of taking 'half existents for full existents... deceitful resemblances ofF for
the real F' This contrast of lives is not one simply of ideas, but a contrast of
existence. Eric Voegelin continues that,
Today Plato has become a philosopher among others; and our modem term
even includes the philodoxers to whom he was opposed. For Plato the
philosopher is literally the man who loves wisdom, because wisdom puts
substance in the freedom of his Arete and enables the soul to travel the road
53
Myles Burnyeat, The Theaetetus ofPlato, 34.
54 Smith recounts that in his lectures at Boston College, Gadamer pointed out that in fact Thales would
not have fallen into the well, as the maidservant presumed (174b), but would have climbed down in
order to view the stars without the interference of peripheral light. A contemporary reader of Plato
would have understood just whom Plato is portraying as ignorant here - not Thales, but
self-proclaimed 'practical' people. (Hans Georg Gadamer, Idea ofthe Good, 39.)
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toward salvation. In the philosopher who resists the sophist lives a soul
which resists the destruction of Arete.58
For Plato what is contemplated is a deciding factor in how an individual life is led, an
understanding greatly overlooked. As Gilbert Ryle put it, defining philosophy as a
whole, philosophy is 'talk about talk', a view widely held that philosophy is about
the use, misuse, abuse, etc. of language.59 However, such a definition is in utter
contrast to Plato who sees the philosophical way of life as an existence arising from a
contemplation of the divine, not simply about the use ofwords, or as in the case of
the sophist, turns of phrases simply for the sake of winning arguments. Myles
Burnyeat writes in his commentary on the Theaetetus that we are invited by Plato to
contemplate the lives in which the rival theories are put into practice and not about
rival theories about the relation of justice and prudence. Burnyeat writes that in at
least 'one interpretation' of the 'Digression' in praise of philosophy in the
Theaetetus,
We are to be stirred to really serious reflection on what it is worthwhile and
important to know. To make sure that we do not take the issue lightly, Plato
puts the full power of his rhetoric into an extreme expression of his own
vision of the human condition.60
However this perspective is not only 'one' interpretation, as Burnyeat indicates, but
is the main one we must adopt in order to see the full objective of Plato's philosophy.
Hans-Georg Gadamer's perspective on Plato proves helpful when he comments,
Philosophers not only think differently, they exist differently - differently
from das Man (everybody), or as Plato would say, hoi polloi (the many).
They are differently disposed insofar as they hold to what is true. The
decisive passage in Plato is Theaetetus 174aff, where the otherworldliness of
the philosopher is portrayed from the viewpoint of hoi polloi: he appears
hopelessly inept and is mocked by maidservants (and sophists).61
The contrast of vision implicates different perceptions of existence.
Through the contrasting lives Plato shows the common human experience
and dilemma of the choice of lives, but also the universal help that is found within
philosophy. Within such a contrast of lives is the idea of a universal human dilemma
of choice between types of existence, but also the universal help that is given through
58
Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 70.
59
Bryan Magee, Confessions ofa Philosopher (Phoenix: London, 1997), 80.
60
Myles Burnyeat, The Theaetetus, 36.
61
Gadamer, Idea ofthe Good, 39.
107
philosophy in the experience of the reality of the divine. Eric Voegelin comments
that within philosophy, for Plato,
the motivating experience became clear, that is, the discovery of a universal
humanity which can be recognized as such only in relation to a universal
transcendental realissimum. The one, unseen, greatest god, who is the same
for all men, is correlative with a sameness ofmen that is now found in the
f\~)
sameness of their transcendental experiences.
Voegelin writes that such a conception is borne earlier even in Heraclitus who,
employing the symbol of humanity being divided between those asleep and those
awakened through the search for wisdom,
distinguished between the men who live in the one and common world
(koinos kosmos) of the logos which is the common bond of humanity
(homologia) and the men who live in the several private worlds (idios
kosmos) of their passion and imagination, between the men who lead a
waking life and the sleepwalkers who take their dream for reality.63
The basis of this contrast of lives is a way of perception through the enlightenment of
philosophy. The idea and metaphor of vision and the philosophical life is taken up
by Murdoch who writes that, 'Sight is the dominant sense' in our world, and a 'visual
world' is the 'source of our deep imagery and thought-modes.'64 For Plato, the
problem which lies in these contrasts is one of a lack of perception ofmany, the
looking constantly to that which is seen with the eye and missing entirely the truth
which is known by the soul. For Plato, 'ordinary awareness', Murdoch writes, is a
'state of illusion', what is needed within the soul is a 'gradual change of
consciousness whereby the veil of appearance was (is) penetrated by
moral-intellectual cognition.'65 Murdoch continues, 'Life is a spiritual pilgrimage
inspired by the disturbing magnetism of truth, involving ipso facto a purification of
energy and desire in light of a vision of what is good.'66 The perception that is
achieved rests upon the desire and love of the seeker to go beyond the sensibly
perceived, and to see with the eyes of the soul. The human dilemma is one of choice
between differing visions which in turn affect directly the way life is lived.
Humanity must go beyond the sensually perceived and see with the soul as
philosophy is not only a way of perception, but a change of perception as well. Such
62
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65 Ibid., 222.
108
a point is even made by Karl Barth, who, in a remarkable comment in his
Commentary on St Paul's Epistle to the Romans, reflecting on the words ofRomans
1:20 that the 'invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead,'
is reminded of Plato's own thought in that,
This we have forgotten, and must allow it to be brought back once more to
our minds... Plato in his wisdom recognised long ago that behind the visible
there lies the invisible universe which is the Origin of all concrete things...
The clear honest eyes of the poet in the book of Job, and of the preacher
Solomon had long ago rediscovered, mirrored in the world of appearance, the
archetypal, unobservable undiscoverable Majesty ofGod.67
What is learned through Plato is that the life ofwisdom is found in seeing beyond
that which is temporal and changing to that which is eternal reality. Such a vision is
not, for Plato, an escape from the world, but is an ascent in order to find a true way
of life, a way of knowing that which is ultimately real. For Plato, such a life is found
when the soul literally participates in the divine reality.
The Religious Aspect ofMethexis
In Plato is a perspective of an interaction between the world and the divine
reality, a relationship of the objects of the world involved with the divine Forms
which is described through the idea of participation {methexis). Yet, this
participation, methexis, speaks of the Forms in relation to the world as well,
implicating a mutual interaction between the two. Because it is a way of interaction,
the notion ofmethexis is a philosophically religious idea which gives insight to the
religious dimension of Plato's philosophy as a whole, and a perspective of his
philosophical theology.
In the Phaedo Socrates conveys the relational role between the divine and the
world as one of participation when he says:
if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no





68 Grube's translation in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works.
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For Socrates, the explanation of how something is Beautiful is due to an idea of its
literal participation in the Form itself. Similarly, Diotima's words in the Symposium
echo this same perspective as things participate in the Form: Beauty is , 'not
anywhere in another thing... but itself by itselfwith itself,... always one in form; and
all the other beautiful things share in that, in such a way that when those others come
to be or pass away, this does not...' (Symposium 211b) In the Republic, Socrates
says that it is through this recognition of participation that one is 'awakened' to that
which is true:
But someone who... believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the
things that participate in it and doesn't believe that the participants are it or
that it itself is the participants - is he living in a dream or is he awake?
(Republic 476d)69
For Plato, the recognition that all things participate, in some way, in the Forms
provides the basis for the life ofwisdom.
Yet, how the objects participate in the Idea is one that is, for Plato,
mysterious and difficult to put into terms, as Socrates says in the Phaedo:
I no longer recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells
me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such
thing, I ignore these other reasons - for all these confuse me - but I simply,
naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it
beautiful other than the presence of (Ttapouaia), or the sharing in
(KOivcovia) or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we
mentioned.... (Phaedo 100c-d)70
That methexis is a reality is unquestioned, but to explain the experience of this idea
in its fullness is utterly difficult. As Socrates admits, he is at a loss at explaining how
the relationship between the Form and the particular can by conveyed for
'sophisticated' causes are confusing, but in some way it is that the presence
(parousia) of the Form, or the communion (koinonia) with the Form, describes the
Form's presence in the world.71 What is seen through Socrates' words is not the
explanation of the idea as much as it is that the philosopher knows and experiences
the divine interactive with the world and upon that constructs the notion.
69 Grube's translation, revised by C.D.C. Reeve in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works.
70 Ibid.
71 David Ross however considers both parousia and koinonia in terms of immanence. Ross, Plato's
Theory ofIdeas, 228 ff..
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Yet, for certain, the explanation of how objects participate in the Forms is a
crucial problem for Plato's own thought as witnessed in the Parmenides. (\29ff) In
the dialogue, Parmenides begins with attempting to clarify what Socrates' means by
'participation':
Have you yourself distinguished (8njpr|aai) as separate... certain forms
themselves, and also as separate (xcoptq) the things that partake (pexfexovxa)
of them?... Is there a form, itself by itself (abxo koc0' a ireo), ofjust, and
beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort?... Things that might seem
absurd, like hair and mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and
worthless? (Parmenides 130b-c)
How the Forms are able to remain separate but in some way involved with the world
is the issue that Parmenides focuses upon, and how one is able to define that
relationship: Do objects partake of the Forms? What are there Forms of? Is there a
form for everything? even things that seem as absurd as hair and dirt (as possibly
79 •
Republic 596a indicates)? In attempting to answer Parmenides' questions,
Socrates' thought that things 'resemble' the Forms is met with Parmenides'
• • • 73
explanation that this leads to a 'vicious regress' (the 'third man argument'). The
Forms in the end seem so separate as to be unknowable altogether. However,
Parmenides, interestingly enough, never questions the reality of the idea of
participation, or doubts the Forms' existence, but questions how this idea of
participation is to be defined. As Parmenides concludes, to convey how participation
occurs is itself a difficult subject, one that escapes a full answer,
The forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides...
Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some
kind, a being itself by itself, but only a prodigy more remarkable still will
discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these
difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself. (135a)74
But, as Parmenides establishes, the idea of the Forms and the notion of participation
is needful for any philosophical discourse to take place, as he says to Socrates,
if, in view of all these difficulties and others like them, a man refuses to admit
that forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite form in every case, he
will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow
72 Murdoch, Existentialists, 409.
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that each thing has a character which is always the same, and in so doing he
will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. But of that
consequence I think you are only too well aware. (135c)
Though the notion of methexis is mysterious and beyond explanation, it is an
essential understanding of philosophy and a reality of the philosophical experience.
By way of commentary, several have seen in the Parmenides a great insight
into the question of the Forms as a whole. Gregory Vlastos writes that Parmenides,
is a record of honest perplexity. Plato now recognizes the gravity of
difficulties he had taken lightly heretofore.... He is taking a second, very
hard, look at his ontological theory - which is not to say that he is ditching
it.75
Iris Murdoch even writes that in the end, 'No sense can be made of the idea of
'participation', the relation between a particular and a 'similar' Form.'76 Yet, as
Gerard Watson writes, the 'testing' by Parmenides, ends with a paternal admonition
to a young Socrates77 that however great the apparent difficulties in the theory might
• ... 78
be, the theory of the Forms' and the notion of participation must be pondered.
(Parmenides 135c) Watson comments that,
The Parmenides is regarded by many as a turning point in Plato's thought. It
is certainly an important dialogue and the second half is not simply exercise
or gymnastic. Plato is obviously very much concerned with the problem of
the one and the many in the Parmenides, with the difficulties in the notion of
. 70
the one, and with the relations between one and being.
The dialogue remains, as Watson writes, 'a sort of balance sheet on the question to
OA
date.' All said, we are left in the Parmenides with a great awareness of a problem
of expression. However, the problem ofmethexis is one which must be understood
in a philosophical and religious context. Methexis is a doctrine that is first and
foremost for Plato an experience, an experience beyond description, and one that
incorporates various terminology to explain the idea.
The religious experience of the idea ofparticipation is found when the
various phrases are considered to describe the doctrine. As Socrates admits above in
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the Phaedo (lOOc-d), he is at a loss when it comes to the 'sophisticated' explanations
and terms of how the Forms and the world relate, but that such a relationship exists is
a certainty for the true philosopher because it is one which they experience.
Gadamer writes that it is striking that, 'throughout the dialogues the terminology
used for the relationship between idea and appearance is extremely free: parousia
(presence), symploke (interweaving), koinonia (coupling), methexis (participation),
O 1
mimesis (imitation), and mixis (mixture) are all found alongside each other.'
Gadamer comments of the Parmenides,
Might it have been Plato's actual intent in the Parmenides to make us so
acutely conscious of the ontological problem in the relationship between idea
and appearance that the very inappropriateness of the solutions discussed
demonstrates the dogmatism implied in the question itself?82
Although the actual relationship of the Form and the particular is beyond any one
word which houses the entire thought, what can certainly be said is that methexis is
an experience and a religious experience because of the fact that it involves an idea
of the divine in relation to the world. Indeed, all of Plato's terms used in describing
the relationship of the Forms and the world are relational, communicative, and not
simply one-sided either on the part of the Form forcing its attributes onto the
particular object, or the objects simply passive to the Form, but in relation to one
another. It is this relationship that the philosopher realises and into which he enters
through the practice of the philosophical life.
The importance of the idea of methexis to Plato's philosophical theology is
that it bespeaks an aspect of the relationship and connectedness between the divine
Forms and the world, which the philosopher experiences. For Aristotle, such an idea
is not new in Plato nor unique, but he comments that the idea of Plato in his doctrine
of methexis is simply an alteration of the Pythagorean word of 'imitation'
(|il|ir|Gtq).83 However, the significance of Plato's term betrays an important aspect
of a 'connectedness' of the world with the Forms more than Aristotle admits,
enhancing an understanding of the relationship of the world to the divine which is
more 'participatory', revealing the aspect of the idea as a whole. Gadamer writes of
81 Gadamer, Idea ofthe Good, 10.





methexis as a 'new word' which, 'brings out the logical connection of the many to
the one, the thing 'in common,' a connection which is not implied in the Pythagorean
notion ofmimesis. Cornford, going even farther, suggests an even more religious
meaning by arguing that the term, Mimesis, has the same significance as the
• 8S •
mythological meaning. Mimesis, Cornford writes, is not 'imitation', but carries the
sense of 'embodying' or 'representing' the Form.86 Thus, the idea that Plato is
simply changes the name of the idea to something else is not correct but methexis has
a greater significance than what 'imitation' can convey. The experience ofmethexis
of the divine is not to simply envision the divine and be aware of one's distance, but
it is to become involved with the divine, to be part of it, and to relate to it through
participation. In contrast, the Pythagorean notion of 'imitation' still connotes
distance, of standing outside and away from the Forms, observing at a distance and
imitating what one sees. With Plato's methexis, a far deeper relationship of the
divine in relation to the world is portrayed.
Through the idea of methexis the object 'participates' in the Form by not only
as imitating the Form but also taking part in the aspect of the Form itself. Through
methexis the object participates and becomes involved within the divine and does not
simply stand at a distance. Gadamer comments that ifwe pay attention to Plato's use
of terms, we will see that methexis involves not simply a way of perception but a way
87
of seeing 'real relationships.' Thus, to understand the Forms' relation to the
particulars as conceived in the human experience is not to say that such a relation is
only a construct of the imagination, but that methexis entails a 'real' relationship, one
which is an ontological, objective reality. Ifwe understand methexis in this way,
then the relationship conveyed in methexis is one of depth that links the particular
and the divine together. In turn, methexis leads to a more profound concept of
understanding the world's involvement with the divine in that all things do not
simply imitate but participate in the Forms, and through this participation are in
relationship to the divine.
84
Gadamer, Idea ofthe Good, 11. As noted by Gadamer: See J. Klein, 'Die griechische Logistik' in
Quellen undStudien zur Geschichte Mathematik, vol. 3, no. 1 (1934), and vol. 3, no. 2 (1936).
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86 Ibid.
87
Gadamer, Idea ofthe Good, 11.
114
However, as much as Plato speaks of the relationship and connectedness of
the world to the divine Form, he insists that the Forms always remain distinct in their
glory from the world. Plato describes the Forms as 'themselves by themselves' (auto
kath auto), and speaks of the Forms as existing in 'separation' (chorismos) from the
world. (.Parmenides 130b). Throughout the Parmenides, the idea of the separation of
the Form from the world is a foundational debate within the dialogue. Parmenides'
criticism of the Forms is how that the Forms as divine remains separate, 'themselves
by themselves', while still recognising that objects participate in them, recognising
the Forms' relationship with the world (130b//) Gregory Vlastos, concerning himself
with this conception of separation (choris), writes however that'chorizein does not
occur here nor anywhere else in the debate nor is it ever applied to the forms by Plato
anywhere in his corpus' - the forms are 'distinguished from their participants,
while nothing is said here to separate them from the latter.'89 For Vlastos, Plato
does not draw a deep separation between the Forms and the particulars as he uses the
word diairein rather than chorizein in which the Form is not completely separate,
but 'distinguished' from the particular. Though Vlastos' point raises the issue of the
presence of the Form in all things and a closeness of the divine to the world, he
misleads by saying that chorizein is not mentioned when the word choris is actually
used by Parmenides to describe the Forms to which Socrates agrees. {Parmenides
130b) Plato himself grapples with this whole idea in his own writing, for it is an
issue of how the Forms are separate while still retaining a notion of participation.
In Plato, however, the two ideas ofparticipation and separation share a
complementary role in the philosophical theology of the Forms which arises from the
philosophical experience of the divine. In an example from the Symposium (211a),
both ideas are joined together in the vision of the Beautiful. As Diotima says, after
being 'initiated so far in the mysteries of Love' and 'viewing all aspects of the
beautiful in due succession', the lover finally draws near the 'final revelation' of the
envisioning of Beauty itself. The vision and experience of this Beauty is one that
exists in its own glory but is that which is experienced in the beautiful objects as they
participate in the Form. As Diotima says, the lover will see Beauty itself,'subsisting
itselfand by itselfin an eternal oneness, while every lovely thing partakes of it in
88
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such sort that, however much the part may wax and wane, it will be neither more nor
less, but still the same inviolable whole.' (21 lb)90 Even in the Parmenides, the
question at the beginning of the exposition on the One is a quest to discover the
relation of the many and the One, what each is in relation to themselves and itself,
and in relation to the other. (136a#) Thus, as in the exposition of the One, the full
understanding comes when it is understood as in itself, separate, but also in
relationship to others - a similar question to that which is included in the notion of
participation. Even further, the philosophical vision of the One is that which the
philosopher envisions and experiences.91 The exposition of the One is based upon
the experience of the divine, as Parmenides says to Socrates, 'All this you must do if,
after completing your training, you are to achieve a full view of the truth.'(136c) It
is such an experience that is the underlying quest of Plato throughout his work, and it
is this experience which governs the ideas of the nature of the Forms.
The philosophical experience of the Forms for Plato shows that they are both
separate (chorismos), in utter distance from the world, but also near, known through
the act of objects participating within them (methexis). The two notions form a
complementary view and not one that is contrasting, as Plato's theory is based upon
an experience of the divine and not one based upon an idle speculation removed from
existence. The confusion of ideas regarding the notion of participation occurs when
the Forms are taken away from the philosophical experience, and made to fit within a
framework of a treatise. Gadamer displays the confusion of questions surrounding
this issue when he writes,
Did Plato at first really underestimate the problem in the participation of the
appearances in the ideas? Did he teach that the ideas were apart for
themselves until one day he too recognized that the problem of participation
entailed in the postulation of such ideas was altogether insoluble? Do both
postulations belong together: the ideas for themselves the so-called
chorismos (separation), and the difficulty, to which one is thereby exposed,
concerning participation, or methexis, as it is so-called? Could it be that
09





Historically, Parmenides' own vision of the One was one of a philosophical and mystical
experience. See Kathleen Freeman's, Ancilla to the Presocratic Greek Philosophers, 'Parmenides',
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Gadamer's last question is the most important, for it is in such a perspective which
attempts to not relegate an 'either-or' position to the idea ofmethexis, especially in
relation to chorismos, but joins both ideas together, affirming what is experienced
through the experience of philosophy itself. Indeed, the philosophical theology of
the Forms is an explanation of the philosophical experience, and as such is difficult
to put into final terms. As Aristotle writes, Plato never settles the problem of
participation, of how it occurs, but leaves it an open question. His biting comment
even shows the futility of such an enterprise:
.. .Although Wisdom is concerned with the cause of visible things, we have
ignored this question (for we have no account to give of the cause from which
change arises), and in the belief that we are accounting for their substance we
assert the existence of other substances; but as to how the latter are the
substances of the former, our explanation is worthless - for 'participation,' as
we have said before, means nothing.
It may be said that it is the logic that has been placed upon the Forms, a logic to
some extent warranted and needed, has given the theory of Forms trouble, causing
for some, its relegation to the heap of past, irrelevant, indefensible philosophies - a
product of Plato's lofty speculation. Yet, for Plato, the Forms are a philosophical
experience of the divine which transform the soul, and it is out of that experience that
the doctrine of the Forms is established.
In attempting to answer the charges levelled at times against the Forms,
Festugiere writes that the application of logical categories upon the Forms is one that
is 'forced' upon the theory in a way that attempts to address a problem they never
address. Speaking of the Forms as a 'great philosophic doctrine,' Festugiere writes,
that which exercises the most profound influence on men's souls is neither
always nor even mainly that doctrine's logical and metaphysical structure.
The influence comes rather from the ferment which gives the whole doctrine
its life; from the impulse that leads it in one particular direction, from the
impulse that lies in the heart of the philosopher and communicates itself to
our hearts.94
Exhibited in Festugiere's words is the aspect that in the Forms we are speaking of the
philosophical experience which transforms the soul. For Festugiere, Plato seeks the
Eternal, an experience of the divine, and not the logic of a system:
93 Aristotle, Metaphysics I. 9. 26, translated by Hugh Tredennick (William Heinemann Ltd.: London,
1933).
94
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The essence of concrete things is, as it were, forced upon him by the logic of
the system and even brings him into much difficulty, as one can see from the
well-known problems of the Parmenides. They are not the primary objects of
his search. The primary object is what we today should call the supreme
categories of Being: the Beautiful (the Symposium), the Good (the
Republic), the One (the Philebus).95
Similarly, for those such as Cornford, Plato's theory of the Forms, especially the idea
ofmethexis, is in the end mysterious. How the Forms relate to the world is beyond a
full definition as Cornford writes,
How is this relation to be conceived? How is it possible for one form or
nature to be present in a plurality of things, and yet to remain one? This is
the much-vexed problem of 'participation' (pieBfe^iq), which Plato could
never solve to his satisfaction. We understand the problem and its
insolubility, when we grasp that this relation called 'participation' (methexis)
is, from the first, a mystical, non-rational relation, which defies rational
analysis.96
Perhaps neither rational analysis nor logical construction can bear the full idea of
participation. In fact, Plato never forces that which is eternal and divine into the
finite constructions ofphilosophical language or terms. As early as the Phaedo,
Cornford comments that Plato has become 'uncomfortable' about using terms such
as presence and communion to signify his meaning of how the Forms and the world
relate.97 One is not sure, however, whether Plato was ever 'uncomfortable', but
attempting to describe the how the Ideas and the world related by various terms
which are all aspects of the one true relationship. The unrest with language always
plagues Plato, as it does any philosopher who wishes to conceptualise the
transcendent and divine in finite words and definitions. Throughout his writings,
Plato seems more comfortable with a multiplicity of expressions of the divine, rather
than in simply one, and seems to find that inexpressibility is the best way to describe
the divine altogether (e.g. Symposium 211b, Seventh Letter 341c).
What the words of Festugiere and Cornford indicate is the difficulty of
putting Plato's philosophy into hard definitions and analyses. The difficulty of
terminology is due, at least in part, because the knowledge of the Forms is one which
is of a personal encounter with the divine, one that goes beyond mere words. To say
95 Ibid.
96 F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, 254. Cornford writes the concept of participation is
illumined by the description of the worshippers of Dionysus who believed that, when they performed
the mysterious rites of their religion, the one God entered into all of them becoming present in each.
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that the relationship between the world and the Forms is one that is beyond
description is not to question its factuality nor to say that certain terms can describe
it, but to say that the power ofwords to express and define such a relationship is
limited. Plato's objective is the human experience ofthe Forms as that wisdom is
known in and through the encounter with the Ideas.
It is the embracing of both ideas ofmethexis and chorismos that gives Plato's
full thought of the nature of the relationship of the Forms and the philosophical
religious experience of the divine. The need in Plato to separate the Forms is to
establish glory of the divine which, being separate from the world of flux, is that
which is eternal and true reality. Flowever, for Plato, the Forms are also experienced
in the world as that things participates in them. Both aspects give meaning and value
to existence in that the Forms, as divine, are the sources ofwisdom and truth beyond
the world of flux and change, but also are the sources of truth within the world in
which all existence participates.
The Human Experience of Immanence, Transcendence, and Union
The questions of separation and participation which surround Plato's
philosophical theology of the Forms are brought to another level of understanding in
the questions of immanence and transcendence as related to the human experience of
the divine in Plato. In short, the Forms are experienced as both near and at a distance
and it is this nearness and distance that elicits a further perspective of the religious
nature of Plato's philosophy. Iris Murdoch, speaking in religious language,
comments that,
The Forms are magnetic, not just passively stared at, they enliven the energy
of Eros in the soul and participate in the world. They are both transcendent
and immanent.98
With Murdoch's words we are given a perspective that emphasises the religious
implications of the immanence and transcendence of the Forms as directly related to
the encounter with the divine. In Plato, these two ideas are held in tension in the
philosophical experience, for though the philosopher experiences the divine as near





philosopher. Yet, from this experience of the divine as both immanent and
transcendent, arises the further notion that the philosopher strives to be in relation
with, even united to, that divine which is contemplated and experienced. What is
shown within these three ideas of immanence, transcendence, and the union with the
divine, is an aspect of Plato's philosophical theology which describes humanity in
relation with the divine involving the sense of closeness to, distance from, and the
desire for union with the divine, and what these mean to human existence.
Immanence
In one aspect, the nature of the divine is immanent and near. Plato speaks of
the Forms of Beauty and the Good as being seen shining through the mundane,
(iSymposium 211; Republic 507 ff.) In the Phaedrus and the Symposium, the Form of
Beauty is one that is directly linked with the act of vision, 'the sharpest of our bodily
senses,' as that which is 'most visible and the most loved.' (Phaedrus 249d)" We
experience the philosophical vision of Beauty, radiant in its divine splendour, as it
'shines' forth from those particular things {Phaedrus 250d), even those things 'which
makes it visible' {Symposium 212a), shining through the beauty of the beloved
{Phaedrus 250dff), and drawing the beholder to virtue. It is when one has 'reared
this perfect virtue' that he will be called 'the friend of god' and will 'put on
immortality.' {Symposium 212)
Similarly, in the description of the Good in the Republic, it is the 'presence'
of the Good (ton AyaOob Ttapeivai) that gives to objects the ability to 'their being
known.' (509) Socrates declares to Glaucon that the 'very existence and essence' of
all things is derived from the Good itself. The centrality of the Good, although
existing in transcendence, is for Plato profoundly immanent in all things. Plato's use
of the imagery and symbol of light and sight in the description of the Good,
symbolically brings the Good near in as it is that which illumines all things by its
truth: a 'truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower.' (509e)
Yet, the Good is an 'inconceivably beautiful thing', the very source of knowledge
and truth which even surpasses them in beauty {Republic 508e).
99 Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruffs translation in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works .
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Vision, enlightened by philosophy, plays an important role in the realisation
of the immanence of the Forms. Etymologically, the word idea defined as the eternal
form in the world of being is synonymous with eidos or the way something looks.100
Within this understanding, Gadamer writes that, eidos always refers to an object,
'how something looks', but it is the feminine form, idea, that, though itself able to
designate objects, is a 'view of something.'101 Thus, says Gadamer, in the case of the
Good as the idea tou agathou, Plato 'implies not so much the 'view of the good' as a
'looking to the good'- a case of apoblepein pros a gazing upon and looking away
from all other objects to view that one particular vision which is most important,
1 AA
which all other visions pale in comparison to.
However, Plato writes that the Forms are intelligible but not visible as the
'many beautiful things and many good things' are those which 'can be seen but not
thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen .'{Republic 507b) We see the
Forms with the eye of the soul and not with the eye of the sense. As Murdoch writes,
1
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the Forms are seen as 'objects of spiritual vision.' Through the vision of the soul
the philosopher is in relationship to the Form. Grace Jantzen comments that the
immanence of the divine is that which is not external, 'as an active mind grasping
and holding on to items of knowledge in an instrumentalist fashion.'104 For Plato,
says Jantzen,
knowledge occurred when a purified and unified mind was illumined, grasped
by the truth. There is a sense... in which the vision of the truth is not so
much a gaze upon something external, as a means by which the knower is
connected or united to the truth, which is the cosmic order.1 5
However, even with this understanding of seeing with the soul, Plato does not do
away with or negate the physical manifestation of the divine Form. It is certainly
true what Murdoch and Jantzen point out, but Plato is insistent upon the appearance
of the Form in the world. Jantzen does not give a full interpretation of Plato for she
overlooks the fact that Plato as much as insisting upon the internal transformation of
100
J.O.Urmson, A Greek Philosophical Dictionary (Gerald Duckworth & Company: London, 1990),
48, 79.
101 Gadamer, Idea ofthe Good, 27-28.
102 Ibid., 28.
103 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 395.
104 Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: 1995), 42.
105 Ibid. Jantzen cites Charles Taylor's Sources of the Selfas establishing this pattern as part of
post-Cartesian thought.
121
the divine, establishes the role of the divine in the 'external' world as well. For
Plato, the Forms are manifested in the world as objective truths, as well as known in
that 'internal' and subjective world of the soul. As is shown in the case of the Form
of the Good and the Beautiful, the Forms are present in the world through the act of
things' participation in them: as in the Good and the giving to things their reality,
and as in the Symposium and the Phaedrus show, the presence of beauty in the
beautiful object that leads beyond itself to the philosophical vision of the divine
Beauty.
For Plato, the depth of such an immanence of the divine is known in the
cosmic order itself. In the myth of the Timaeus,106 the Demiurge107 creates the
cosmos by bringing chaotic matter into an order and beauty able to be
comprehended. Looking at that which is unchangeable for a pattern (Timaeus 29a)
the Demiurge comprehended the beauty of the 'eternal', and imposed it upon
matter:108
Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an
irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he [the Demiurge] brought
order, considering that this (order) was in every way better than the other
[chaos]. (Timaeus 30a)
As Timaeus indicates, the one who comes to contemplate this ordered cosmos is
brought toward the divine as philosophy itself is born out of beholding, of seeing the
divine order:
God has given them [eyes] to us... the sight of day and night, and the months
and the revolutions of the years have created number and have given us a
conception of time, and the power of inquiring about the nature of the
universe. And from this source we have derived philosophy, than which no
106 Richard Rietzenstein writes that in the Timaeus, Plato blends 'Oriental ideas, which were imparted
to him by Eudoxos, with Greek philosophy, to produce a 'natural teaching on religion' (naturalis
theologia)...' Richard Rietzenstein, Hellenistics Mystery-Religions: Their Basic Ideas and
Significance, transl. by John E. Steely (The Pickwick Press: Pittsburgh, Pa., 1978), 5.
107 Friedrich Solmsen explains that, 'Demiurge' (Sripioupyoc;) is a word which Plato and the Greeks
generally apply to an artisan engaged in useful activity, as a rule of a manual type. The work of this
Demiurge corresponds in its nature to that of a human craftsman.' Friedrich Solmsen, Plato's
Theology (Cornell University Press, 1942, 110. For Iris Murdoch this whole understanding of the
cosmos as a work of art is made known in the Demiurge being an artist, which provides a very lucid
understanding of Plato's conception - more so than a craftsman may in our own vocabulary. With the
artist is a much more aesthetic understanding than the one given in the concept of a simple technical
workman.
108 Some assume that the 'eternal' are the Forms, but Plato does not say actually say this. It is not
necessarily a wrong understanding, but Plato is ambiguous about what he has in mind. Timaeus' point
is that he looked to that which is eternal, which like the Forms, is changeless, and it is this that the
philosopher contemplates in the cosmos, (cf. Iris Murdoch, Existentialists andMystics, 429)
122
greater good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal man. (Timaeus
47a-b)
A reading of the Timaeus which explores the religious ideas of Plato's
philosophy recognises the various theological ideas within the myth, particularly
that the cosmos is an image of the divine.109 Timaeus says that the Demiurge places
his mark upon the universe in that,
He (the Creator) was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of
anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be
as like himself as they could be.110
The 'creator' through this act imparts divine goodness onto the universe.111 In this
act, writes Constantin Ritter, the Demiurge stamps his being onto the universe and in
so doing becomes immanent in the cosmos:
The divine demiurge... forms the chaotic material in accordance with his
thoughts... [and so] the Idea of the world can be conceived only as God's
purpose and as being grounded in his spiritual nature. If the Timaeus informs
us that God in his goodness 'desired that everything be as much as possible
like himself,' he himself evidently was the prototype after which he patterned
the world, and looking at himself he took from the fullness of his own Being
that which he imparted to the world.112
All things show the presence of the divine as even time itself is an image of eternity
as Timaeus says,
And so he (the Demiurge) began to think ofmaking a moving image of
eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make
an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity.
This number, of course, is what we now call 'time.' (Timaeus 37d)
The significance of this passage, writes Peter Manchester is that,
the religious experience of eternity and time that is distinctive of
Mediterranean spirituality in our period [time of Plato] is an orientation to
temporal presence. With this we arrive at the notion of eternity proper, the
Greek aion.... it is an experience of the divine Presence in the human present,
a presence reflected both in the cosmos of nature and in the life of the mind.
109 For a contemporary example of seeking an ancient reading, see Eric Perl in his article 'The
Demiurge and the Forms: A Return to the Ancient Interpretation of Plato's Timaeus\ Ancient
Philosophy 18 (1998), 81-92, who argues that the currently accepted reading, or 'scholarly' renditions
of the Timaeus, sees the Demiurge as standing outside and contemplating the Forms, contemplating
them, is not a full nor true interpretation ofPlato and overlooks the more 'ancient' and the more
'philosophical' understanding of the Timaeus.
110 Timaeus 29e.
111 Which according to the Republic (379b) is the essence of the nature of God itself.
112 Ritter, Essence, 372.
123
Here the characteristic religious problem is the competence of speculative
mysticism to encounter divine creative power....113
In general, Friedrich Solmsen comments that Platonic philosophical theology as a
whole (and even after Plato) understood a 'celestial religion, the regular movements
of the stars and planets, their harmony and concentus are recognized as the
immediate expression and manifestation of the divine in nature.'114
As the cosmos is an image of the divine, there is a correspondence between
the two which involves an aspect of immanence that is deeper than a simple
acknowledgement of the presence of the divine in the cosmos, but one in which the
very fabric of the cosmos is an image ofGod. The depth of this interaction is seen in
the last paragraph of the dialogue as Timaeus says,
The world has received animals, mortal and immortal, and is fulfilled with
them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible - the sensible
God who is the image of the intellectual, the greatest, best, fairest, most
perfect - the one only-begotten heaven. (Timaeus 92c)
The universe, says Timaeus, is 'a likeness of the intelligible God perceived by the
senses' (eIkcov xov vor|TO"6 Geoq odaBriidg Timaeus 92b). Ritter's free translation
of this last paragraph of the Timaeus is even more to the point:
We have shown how this world came into Being. It is singular and came into
its Being of its own accord. It is perfect in its nature and in its appearance; it
is visible and embraces all fullness of the visible; it is a living organism in
which all other mortal and immortal organisms have their Being; it is the
visible image of God whom we can conceive in thought alone.115
Edith Hamilton comments that, as Plato indicates,
the visible world is a copy, an image, of what is eternal and true. It is a
changing reflection of that which is changeless and therefore, imperfect
though it is, in it can be found the truth, God the Creator, the all-good....116
The lesson given in the Timaeus from Plato personally, says Hamilton, is the 'vision
to see 'the beyond' and that the ultimate truth is God, our Creator and Father.'117
The point of the Timaeus, Hamilton continues, is a, 'statement of scientific truth
• • •• •• 118combined with mythical truth in which great spiritual truths can be found.' Plato,
says Hamilton,
113 Peter Manchester, Classical Mediterranean Sprituality, 393.
114 Solmsen, Plato's Theology, 178.
'15 Ritter's translation of Timaeus 92c in Essence, 281.
116 Edith Hamilton Plato, 1152.
117 Ibid.
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Would have pointed out that science cannot be accurately true since it deals
with the temporal, the finite, the forever changing, never with the eternal.
But yet the visible world is a copy, an image, ofwhat is eternal and true. It is
a changing reflection of that which is changeless and therefore, imperfect
though it is, in it can be found the truth, God the Creator, the all-good. That
is the matter of importance, not scientific accuracy, but to catch a glimpse of
the 'the beyond, which ever thereafter the soul will strive to reach.119
Through the cosmos being an image ofGod, the one who knows wisdom, for Plato,
is the one who sees oneself connected to the cosmos, one who not only sees the
cosmos as an image of the divine, but who also feels himself or herself in
relationship to that order.
Reflecting upon the religious ideas of the myth of the Timaeus allows an even
further perspective and an image to be gleaned which speaks directly to the
philosopher in his or her own relationship to the cosmos. As the cosmos is both that
which the philosopher contemplates and is an image of the divine, philosophical
contemplation brings the philosopher into correspondence with the divine order and a
relationship with the divine. In the life of philosophy, the philosopher is one who,
even like the Demiuge, is in true relation to the divine reality. The philosopher, like
the Demiurge contemplating the eternal Forms, is one who contemplates and is in
relationship to that divine which is above and beyond any traditional pantheon as the
true source and cause of all things. As the Demiurge brings order out of chaos, so
too is the philosopher one who realises the order and applies it to the metaphorical
'chaos' of the world. In short, what can certainly be said is that Plato intends the
Timaeus as a philosophical myth that attaches itself to the reader's soul, bringing the
individual to the experience of philosophy - an experience that celebrates the divine
known through the cosmos and follows that divine in one's life.
The image of the divine in the cosmos, and the philosopher's relationship to
that divine, is particularly seen and culminated in the theological idea of Soul
(\j/D%fl) which permeates the cosmos. To Plato the cosmos is made alive (C^d)
through and with this power which, as in the words of the Timaeus, the Demiurge
gives 'life' or 'soul' to the body of the world fashioning it as a living thing. (Timaeus




motion, involved with the entirety of the world's processes. In the Laws (896e), Soul
is the universal cause of all things, 'of good and evil, fair and foul, right and wrong'
and even, 'all contraries,' controlling 'all things universally that move anywhere',
even heaven itself.
In Plato's philosophical theology, through the concept of Soul the universe is
permeated with an animating force. Friedrich Solmsen has written that there is a
provocative concept given in the Timaeus, and even more specifically in the Laws in
the concept of the World Soul, that conveys the universe as alive, as in the words of
the Timaeus (30c) that the world is made to be 'a living creature truly endowed with
soul and intelligence'. In this, Solmsen writes, Plato forms a decisive point in this
question of life in Nature for,
Nature now becomes alive - truly alive as something more and better than a
shadow or copy. At the same time, it becomes divine, because its life flows
from a source which is eternal, rational, perfect, and good. In a sense Nature
had long, perhaps always, been alive and divine, to the Greeks; but its divine
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quality is now restored to it on higher and philosophical level.
In many philosophical perspectives, including the Pre-Socratics, the cosmos as being
'alive' is a recognised concept as Solmsen writes,
The modern historian of philosophy may wish to insist that even for the Pre-
Socratic thinkers Nature was by no means dead and that the divine quality of
the Cosmos is fully recognized in their systems... There is Life in Heraclitus'
Flux, and God is in the World, being 'day, night, winter, summer, war,
peace.121
Yet, says Solmsen, even though the Pre-Socratic philosophers held such a
perspective, Plato's conception of the cosmos as alive is 'much richer' through the
conception of'Soul' as it,
includes besides the elements of Life and Divinity also those of goodness and
rationality. In addition, an order of ontological precedence and cosmic
priority has now been established for the spiritual and the material in the
Universe, and the whole theory ofNature has accordingly been revised with
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great energy.
120 Solmsen, Plato's Theology, 90.
121 Ibid., 92.
122 Ibid. What cannot be established, however, is that Plato is the first to think of such an idea, for the
aspect of the universe as alive, is seen even in the Pre-Socratics. Perhaps Plato's thought is in the way
of the evolution of the idea, and perhaps even a betterment of the idea as Solmsen suggests, but yet it
is in not a unique and individual conception. For the whole thought ofNature as alive seems found in
Greek thought throughout in various individuals. Plato synthesises the provocative idea passed on
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As the universe is made 'alive' with the power of Soul, the relationship
between the divine and the cosmos becomes even more intimate, an intimacy which
the philosopher experiences. For Plato, matter is lifeless and chaotic but through the
action of the Demiurge is given life. (Timaeus 30c) In the Laws (892ff), the idea of
life and the intimacy between the cosmos and the divine is further accentuated
through the concept of the World Soul as running through all things. Ritter
comments that,
Matter or the physical in and by itself is never beautiful. In accordance with
its nature, matter is void of every definite characteristic. Only the ensouled
physical object which is illumined by thought is beautiful. Therefore, a spirit
(or soul) must dwell in all parts of the physical, sensible world, which we find
beautiful. The whole world appears to be formed and ruled by a spiritual
123
power.
This 'spiritual power' gives a means for the soul to be in intimate relationship with
the cosmos due, as A. E. Taylor writes, 'as a consequence and embodiment of an
orderliness which is more intimate and profound and has its seat in the cosmic
Psyche.'124
Yet, even further, scholars such as Ritter, Murdoch, and Weil, see in the idea
of the Anima Mundi, as in the Timaeus (34b) where the soul, diffused throughout the
body of the world makes it a 'blessed god', conveys a deep immanence of the divine
which the philosopher experiences. Ritter comments that, 'we may with certainty
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say that this soul is immanent.' Iris Murdoch in this same persuasion writes that
Soul is, 'stretched out through the whole of the world and wrapped round its
exterior.'126 As Murdoch notes, the creation of the World Soul in the Timaeus
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35-37, 'initiates a divine beginning of unending intelligent life forever.' Simone
Weil adds a further perspective in that the Anima Mundi penetrates the entirety of the
universe containing in itself 'the substance of God united to the principle of
matter.'128 However, cautions Weil, we are not to read this as pantheism in Plato for
the soul, 'is not in this body but contains it, penetrates it, envelops it upon all sides,
from his predecessors and through his own thoughts incorporates it into his own philosophical
theology.
123 Constantin Ritter, Essence, 259.
124 Solmsen, Plato's Theology, 115.
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being itself outside space and time; being not entirely distinct from these but
governing them.'129 What can be gathered from Plato's concept is that the World
Soul involves an ultimate nearness of the divine within the cosmic order and an
intimacy that is experienced in Plato's philosophy.
Transcendence
However, the intimacy of the divine immanence is counteracted, or better is
complemented, by an acute sense of distance between the divine and ourselves. The
divine for Plato is not only known in its immanence, it is known in its transcendence
as well. The oneness with, and the immanence of, the divine in the cosmic order is
complimented by the transcendence and distance of the divine, accompanied by a
sense of unrestfulness with the world. Within the contemplation and elation with the
cosmic order, Plato still makes us aware of the evil that is present in society and a
world in flux. For Plato, there is an acute sense of the transcendence and distance of
the divine: a source of being above the flux, a source of salvation for the soul, even
within it, but a divine that is different and distanced from the soul as well.
In the two examples of the Republic in the concept of the Good and in the
myth of the Timaeus Plato conveys humanity's distance from the divine. The Good,
as that which gives to all things truth and knowledge, is also that which exists in utter
transcendence. For Plato, though present in all things that are known, the Good is
never fully present for we only realise its presence through its effects and in what it
gives. As Gadamer notes, analogous to the sun, the Good is only present through the
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gifts of knowledge and truth {gnosis kai aletheia) that it bestows. Iris Murdoch
notes this as well when she comments that we cannot really grasp the Good directly
through the soul, or have a first-hand experience of it. Plato does not give, says
Murdoch, a 'picture of an ultimate erotic union as ultimate knowledge, as in union
with a god... but Plato spoke only of (perhaps) glimpsing the Form of the Good, not
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of presuming to touch it.' For Plato, the Good is beyond description, as well as
beyond being (epekeina tes ousias). {Republic 509a//)
The question of the transcendence of the divine is a question which concerns
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at the centre of human existence, wherein we are conscious of ourselves as both
'inward and outward, distanced and surrounded' by the Forms.132 However, we are
also aware, says Murdoch, that 'we are strained and stretched out (like the Anima
Mundi in the Timaeus), we live with intuitions ofwhat we also realise as very
distant.' Through the envisioning of the Forms we find ourselves as both
surrounded yet knowledgeable of the distance of the divine, knowing the divine
within our souls, but aware also of the distance of the divine away from human life.
In the same passage as declaring that the patterns of the universe manifest the divine,
Timaeus declares that the God who is 'the father and maker of all this universe is
past finding out, and even ifwe found him, to tell of him to all men would be
impossible.' (28c) For us to be able to give an account of that which is eternal and
unchanging is difficult because of our humanity (29d). To Plato, there is an implied
distance between human knowledge and the knowledge of the God who orders it.
Plato, for Murdoch, indicates through such concepts, a distance between ourselves
and the cosmos, which, for Murdoch, is a way of Plato facing the unrest within the
world. What emerges from such a perspective is not a positive reading of order and
harmony in the cosmos, but one in which Plato is grapples with the nature of
existence. A God who is unknown and 'past finding out' is revered, but it is a
reverence charged with human pathos.
Significant to the expression and the human pathos of divine distance is the
Timaeus' concept of 'Necessity' (anagke). The creation of the world is,
the combined work of necessity and mind. Mind, the ruling power,
persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection,
and thus and after this manner in the beginning, through necessity made
subject to reason, this universe was created. (Timaeus 48a)
Necessity, as the materialistic chaos and the ever present force in matter, at first,
rallied against the power of the ruling Mind and its reason and order, but in time was
persuaded and subjected to reason. From this, says Timaeus, we see the two forces
of the cosmos,
Wherefore we may distinguish two sorts of causes, the one divine and the
other necessary, and may seek for the divine in all things, as far as our nature
admits, with a view to the blessed life, but the necessary kind only for the





them, these higher things for which we look cannot be apprehended or
received or in any way shared by us. (Timaeus 68e-69a)
The idea ofNecessity for Murdoch and Weil provides a basis for
understanding human existence and the way of the philosophical life. Within the
myth, humanity is given the choice of a way of life, as Murdoch writes, 'Plato,
turning to us, says that we must distinguish these (the divine and the 'necessary') ,134
and so live. 'We are (potentially) spiritual beings', says Murdoch, 'but also finite,
seeking the divine in a contingent spatio-temporal world material scene.'135 Citing
the example of Simone Weil's obedience to suffering as significant to understanding
this aspect of the myth in a religious light, Murdoch writes that Weil 'connects
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necessity with a spiritual obedience prompting purification and love.' Weil, says
Murdoch, 'stays with the reality (the truthful experience) of suffering, affliction,
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malheur, seeing this as a kind of absolute condition capable of spiritual use.'
We can see the world, nature and its laws, in the light of the good, and
experience a purified suffering which is a unique form of rapture. In
obedience we can see the whole cosmos in this light and take an inspired joy
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in its obedience....
Necessity as a cosmic force is that which the philosopher, like the Demiurge, reacts
against. As Eric Voegelin describes it, the 'resistance' to the idea has now become
as eternal as the idea itself, and all that is able to counteract it is the power of the
139 • • t•Nous. As is indicated through Plato's myth, humanity is plagued by the necessity
of things, which is the fate of the world, but through the power of nous, through the
pursuing of philosophy, necessity is persuaded (peitho), subjected to reason and
subdued. The weightiness of the concept ofNecessity is taken at a personal level
within the philosopher's life.
Realised in the philosophical life itself, the Timaeus depicts, generally
speaking, the closeness of the divine in its immanence, but also the sense of distance
and the estrangement of humanity from the cosmos as well as a general feeling of
unrest which arises from the sense that the world must be explained. Murdoch writes






paradeigmai (the spiritual Forms, qua the Good), who creates out of contingent
given material an imperfect copy.'140 The Timaeus portrays the Demiurge as
'looking away' from the cosmos and looking to the eternal, to the Forms which are
the sources of that order.141 For Murdoch, Plato's picture is one in which, 'One
might perhaps pursue the thought about the Timaeus by saying that the Demiurge
looking at his creation is like the perfect spectator looking at the perfect tragedy.'142
Murdoch continues that,
The cosmic deity seems more to express the inaccessibility of the absolutely
real than its accessibility. In the early dialogues the spiritual world is so close
that we seem to be God's children. In the Timaeus we are his grandchildren.
In the Laws we are his toys. Our frailty is insisted upon. We are scarcely real
(like, 889c, the products of art), we are abject creatures, taTteivot, dangling
from strings of pleasure and pain (Laws 644, 716, 902-7). In the Phaedo and
the Theaetetus Plato uses images of escape to God. In the Laws the imagery
is often of almost total separation and slavery.143
For Murdoch, Plato makes us aware of our 'distance' from the divine, a distance
which is ingrained in the intuition of the soul and seen through the act of vision.
Although in a positive sense we see the cosmic order and know philosophy (Timaeus
47a), in the vision of the divine one perceives distance as 'the visual image is an
image of distance and non-possession.'144 To envision something is at the start to
recognise that there is something other, something outside of us. Critical ofPlotinus'
speaking of union with the One, Murdoch writes that Plato's divine is one of distance
and transcendence, not one that we have union with, or that we can hold as, 'Plato
spoke only of (perhaps) glimpsing the Form of the Good, not of presuming to touch
it.'145 However, the use of vision that Plato suggests brings the divine within human
experience; vision and sight are sources of deep imagery, symbols of the
philosophical way of life in Plato. Murdoch writes that indeed, 'Sight is the
dominant sense' and, 'our world, source of our deep imagery and thought-modes, is a
visual world, our idea of the world is of a visual world.'146 Although to envision we
may always stand at a distance, it is because of vision that we are led to realise the
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closeness of that which we are seeing. For Plato, the vision that brings the soul close
to the divine, is the same vision that realises an utter distance with the divine.
Immanence and Transcendence, and Union
To understand philosophy in its religious dimension in Plato at a deeper level,
we must speak of experiencing both the immanence and transcendence of the divine,
as the philosopher encounters the divine reality of the Forms as 'present' and at a
'distance' to his life and to the world. It is 'immanent transcendence', to borrow
George Steiner's description of Simone Weil's appeal to Iris Murdoch,147 that is
applicable to the human experience of the Forms in Plato. In the words of Steiner, it
is an 'otherwise contradictory ideal of immanent transcendence, of down-to-earth
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'rapture' or illumination' that draws Murdoch to her own admiration ofWeil, and
it is this ideal that describes the philosophical experience of the Forms.
Through the experience of the Forms there is an expression of both the
nearness and distance of the divine in the human experience. We envision, and know
this act to be one of distance, but we also 'see' the divine Form in the particular and
know the close proximity of the divine as well. In Plato, the way of the
philosophical vision is one that involves both the immanence and transcendence of
the divine. Yet, in Plato, we encounter the divine in the soul in the philosophical
vision and come to an intimate encounter with the eternal. In his study of Plato's
Ideas, David Ross concludes that Plato uses both notions in regard to the Forms. By
studying the words that Plato employs to describe the relationship between the Forms
and their particulars, Ross finds that both immanence and transcendence are
represented.149 Ross writes,
The only conclusion possible seems to be that, while he was not quite
satisfied with either expression, he saw no way of getting nearer to the truth
than by using both, the one stressing the intimacy of the link between a
universal and its particulars, the other stressing the failure of every particular
to be a perfect exemplification of any universal. He may even have had an
inkling of the fact that the relation is completely unique and indefinable.
146 Ibid.
147 From George Steiner's Foreword in Murdoch, Existentialists, xiv.
148 Ibid.
149 See Ross, 'Retrospect', in his Plato's Theory ofIdeas, 225 ff.
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Both 'sharing' and 'imitating' are metaphors for it, and the use of two
complementary metaphors is better than the sole use of either.150
In the accounts ofBeauty and the Good in the Phaedrus, Symposium, and Republic
respectively, it is both the immanence and transcendence of the Forms that enamours
the philosopher. The closeness and immanence of the divine and the divine's
distance and transcendence is balanced, as the immanence of the Forms leads to an
encounter with the divine wherein the soul is transformed, and the Forms, existing in
their transcendent and utter reality, give meaning to life as that which lies above the
flux and evil of the world. As Guthrie writes, in Plato, 'the language of
'transcendence' never superseded altogether the language of 'immanence.'151 In
Plato then we are confronted by the mystery of the Forms which does not end the
search for answers, but prompts us to regard the Forms as being both immanent and
transcendent.
The nature and experience of the divine in Plato cannot be contained in
logical propositions, but exceeds beyond a tight logical system to be comprehensive
and embracing of opposite aspects. Plato's divine is not illogical, but beyond logic,
embracing the tension of what appears to be contradictory concepts. As the Forms
are both immanent and transcendent, they convey an all-inclusive concept of the
divine. Cornford suggests that ifwe consider Platonism to be primarily a theory of
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the Forms, then the 'Ideas,' will turn out to belong to the mystic tradition.'
Comford explains that,
The Idea is to be, somehow, the supersensible ground (aixia) of the
existence of sensible things which become and perish in time. In order to be
so, it must impart its nature in some inexplicable way, which can only be
described figuratively. It is like an original (JiapdSeuyiia) which casts a
copy (!UTtfpa), or likeness (eiKcbv), of itself into a mirror, or some other
reflecting medium. The supersensible world is an immutable hierarchy of
Ideas, or Types, which throws its image upon the everflowing stream of time.
Or, it is a heaven of divine souls, which impart themselves to the groups of
transitory things that bear their names. The whole conception is manifest
mythical....153
If taken outside of the religious experience, the aspects are in conflict with one
another, but if taken within the context of the religious experience that Plato provides
150 Ibid., 231.
151 Guthrie, A History ofGreek Philosophy, Vol. IV, 116-117.
152 Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, 242.
133
in his philosophy, both aspects become part of the same philosophical experience.
The philosopher experiences the Forms as distant, in their glory, apart from the
world, but also experiences them in the soul, in the very nearness of his being,
through desiring them, loving them. As Ugo Bianchi writes, the term 'mystical' may
connote three ways of the experience of the divine: one as distanced and indirect,
secondly, seen in its interference at human level, or a third, the 'mysteriosophical',
which is the position of Plato, which is a blending the ideas of distance and nearness
together.154
It is through the philosophical experience that both aspects of immanence and
transcendence are known and the differences between these two concepts are
transgressed. The philosopher experiences the intertwining of these two ideas and
not their exclusion from each other into separate realms. Interpretively, we must
remember that the constructs of immanence and transcendence themselves are placed
upon Plato and not derived directly from his texts. Yet, it is in the experience of the
philosopher that the Forms are contemplated in their transcendence, glory, and utter
reality, but simultaneously known as active in the world as unto that which the
philosophical soul is drawn. Within such an experience, the Forms surround the
philosopher, but are utterly distant as well. As we have seen above, both immanence
and transcendence are not only represented in Plato, but are needful to human
existence. The philosopher builds his or her life upon an ascension toward the Forms
and away from a world which follows change and evil, but also builds it upon an
ongoing encounter with the divine that is experienced shining through the everyday
objects of the world. Cornford writes ofPlato's Forms, that the theory is 'another
attempt to succeed... in relating the one God, who is good, to a manifold and
imperfect world.'155 It may be that Plato's overall motive is to relate a divine to the
experience of the philosopher in two ways which amalgamate immanence and
transcendence, nearness and distance into one experience. As Bernard McGinn
writes, philosophical contemplation in Plato can be described, 'as the way in which
153 Ibid., 257.
154 Bernard McGinn, Foundations ofChristian Mysticism (SCM Press: London, 1992), 24.
155 Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, 242.
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nous, a divine exile in the world of appearances, opinions, and time, unites the two
realms through its intuitive contact with the presence of the Absolute.'156
The idea of the immanence and transcendence in describing the religious
philosophical experience in Plato culminates in a metaphysical view of the relation
between the phenomenal and noumenal. Nicolas Berdyaev writes that,
At a certain stage in human self-consciousness, philosophy emerges out of
dualistic thought, out of the distinction between the world of sense and the
world of ideas, ofphenomena and noumena, of appearances and
things-in-themselves. Such an emergence was achieved by Plato.. .The
philosopher discovered that the world of the sense, the phenomenal world, is
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not the true world, nor is it the only world.
Because the noumenal and the phenomenal join together in Plato, he is able to give
insight, for those like Murdoch, to contemporary metaphysical and theological
thought as she writes,
Plato (more than any other philosopher) 'saves' metaphysics by showing how
the noumenal and phenomenal exist inside each human life. There is
nowhere else, it is all here.158
Murdoch's understanding provides a perspective which sees the immanent and
transcendent, seen here in the terms of the phenomenal and noumenal, as interrelated.
Yet, different to other perspectives of this same sort, Murdoch sees the need for both
in humanity. The necessity of an elsewhere, as Murdoch elaborates, is not needed
for the world itself becomes a place where immanence and transcendence, the
intellectual and the passionate, become intertwined. Both the phenomenal and the
noumenal are present at the same time within the experience of the Forms. On this
front, Karl Jaspers also offers a view which incorporates a union of subject with
object, and one that is similar to that suggested by both Murdoch and Berdyaev.
156 McGinn, Foundations ofChristian Mysticism, 25-6.
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Jaspers writes that, 'Ours is not an ontological search for a world of objective
definitions, but a periechontological one for the source of subject and object, for their
relations and interrelations.'159 The philosophical search is for that which is both
subject and object, and one which incorporates both subject and object in itself.160
The experience of the immanence and transcendence of the Forms and the
experience of the phenomenal and noumenal elicits a further aspect which involves
the soul's desire for union with this divine that is both seen within the world and
known in its transcendence. Gerard Watson writes that this 'immortal union of the
soul with God' is what Plato is primarily concerned with and that it is 'fundamental
to his philosophy.'161 Such a desire for union with the divine is brought about
because the soul is related to the divine in its nature. Watson writes that throughout
Plato's writing, from the Apology through the Laws, one thing remains constant in
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Plato: that 'it is through the soul that we are related to the divine.' For Plato, the
soul is akin to that divine that it seeks and desires through the philosophical life. As
in the Phaedo, the soul is most like the divine, 'deathless, intelligible, uniform
indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like the 'human':
'mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the same.' (80b)163
At death (literally as well as metaphorically in the practice of the philosophical life)
the soul, the 'invisible part', goes to a 'place that is, like itself, glorious, pure, and
invisible... into the presence of the good and wise God...' (80d) As Tike is drawn
to like' (cf. Laws 837a) so the soul naturally possesses a passionate desire to be with
the divine to which it is most akin. Thus, the philosophical contemplation of the soul
upon the divine is not simply intellectual, but one which involves the emotions as
well, joining the intellectual with the passionate - the entirety of humanity, involved
159 John Macquarrie, Existentialism (London: Hutchinson, 1972), 192. Jaspers metaphysical notion of
that which is 'periechontological' comes close conceptually to an idea of a One and a unity behind all
things in which distinctions of distance and being such as subject and object are unified. Jaspers
understands that the 'ever-present' subject-object dichotomy between that which is perceived and that
which perceives is broken down in his notion of the all-encompassing term of the Comprehensive:
'What is the meaning of this ever-present subject-object dichotomy? It can only mean that being as a
whole is neither subject nor object but must be the Comprehensive, which is manifested in this
dichotomy.159 See Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, 30.
160 As John Macquarrie describes it, an encompassing of both subject and object.. Macquarrie,
Existentialism (London: Hutchinson, 1972), 192.
161
Watson, Greek Philosophy, 28.
162 Ibid.
163 Grube's translation in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works .
136
in the process. As McGinn notes, 'while beatitude for Plato is essentially a cognitive
state, because the Good that is grasped in the act of contemplation is identified with
the Beautiful that is the goal of eros, contemplation also produces loving joy in the
soul.'164 Employing Festugiere, McGinn continues that, 'the seeing involved in
Plato's contemplation is not a defining, but is based on 'an immediate union... of a
mystical order' in which both knowledge and love play complementary roles in
attaining an intuitive contact with the presence of true Being.'165 Rene Arnou
further explains,
Platonic contemplation appears as a sudden and immediate vision of true
Being, or, if one ascends as far as possible on the scale of values, a union
with the Supreme Good, a mysterious union which is not just the vision of an
object by a subject, but the taking possession of the subject by a superior
reality in such a way that the love that responds to the attraction of the
Beautiful and the Good enjoys a role just as necessary as the intelligence
which gazes.166
Such a union with the divine is, in the deepest sense, personally involving for
the soul. But still, even in light of such a consideration, although the soul seeks a
union with the divine that involves itself personally, the divine as a 'personal' being
is not particularly expressed in Plato. Plato indeed speaks of a personal God as in
the strong case in the Apology,167 but also of the relationship and union with the
Forms which are impersonal in their nature but spoken of in personal terms. Bernard
McGinn illumines this idea of that the 'Beautiful-Good' is not personal 'in the sense
in which later monotheistic mystics strive for union with the God of revelation, but
Plato's description of the unitive vision with the Beautiful-Good is not totally
impersonal either.'168 As McGinn goes on to say,
The fact that Plato describes the Form that takes possession of the lover as a
god, or at lest as divine, certainly left the door open for personalized readings
that may go beyond but that are not necessarily contrary to his descriptions of
that indescribable supreme moment.169
Gerard Watson writes that Plato is shaped by two traditions: one, the personal, and
sometimes 'all too human' Greek religion,170 and the tradition of the philosophical
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schools emphasising the conceptual and impersonal, but, says Watson, 'Plato
combines and blends both these traditions'171 Here we find again the 'both-and'
aspect of Plato's philosophical theology in which the philosophical experience is
both personal and impersonal: the divine which is beyond a personal being is
portrayed in images as being personally known, and humanity, always personal, is
united with that which is beyond any description of personality. Thus, such a union
is described in terms which include both personal and impersonal ideas, but a union
with that which is part of the very fabric of the soul.
The union for which Plato's philosophy strives is not only deeply personal, it
is also one that is cosmic in its nature as well. As the soul desires that which is
above the world and transcendent, it is also a union with a divine which is known in
the cosmos itself. As Andre-Jean Festugiere writes, in one aspect of his quest for
unity, Plato desires a union with 'the God of the world' a God who is 'cosmic'.17
For Plato, the union with this immanent divine, this 'cosmic God', is one which is
facilitated and secured in a certain way of life and existence for the philosopher
which involves the imitation of the divine in an ethical life. One is not only to
understand the cosmic as a manifestation of the divine, but to contemplate that order
and bring it to bear upon one's way of life. In the Republic (500c) Socrates says to
Adeimantus that,
the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities has no leisure to turn
his eyes downward upon the petty affairs ofmen, and so engaging in strife
with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the
things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong
nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he
will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their
likeness and assimilate himself to them...Then the lover ofwisdom
associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in
the measure permitted to man.
In contrast to the man of the world, the philosopher has no time for living within
strife, envy, or hate, but is witness to a universe that exhibits harmony and order
which he or she imitates. As Timaeus declares, 'If a man has become absorbed in
his appetites or his ambitions and takes great pains to further them, all his thoughts
171 Ibid., 25.




are bound to become merely mortal,' (Timaeus 90b) however, if he contemplates
the cosmic order, 'then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be
immortal and divine.' (Timaeus 90b-c) According to Timaeus, to seek to live one's
life according to the order of the cosmos is to bring oneself into harmony with the
cosmos, and to bring oneself in line with the true inclination of one's own soul, but
to live one's life simply for mortal gain ends up within the same chaos of the world's
system, out of union with the cosmos and the essence of harmony and justice and out
of union with himself. (Timaeus 90c-d) The cosmic order manifested outside of the
soul, and the order which is within the soul, are of the same 'substance'; the soul is a
microcosm of the cosmic order. As in the Timaeus, the union of the soul with the
cosmic order is a familial relationship for,
there is a kinship between them (the orbits of intelligence in the universe),
even though our revolutions are disturbed, whereas the universal orbits are
undisturbed. So once we have come to know them and to share in the ability
to make correct calculations according to nature, we should stabilize the
straying revolutions within ourselves by imitating the completely unstraying
revolutions of the god. (47c)
The divine which is manifest in the cosmic order is what the philosopher
imitates, and through that imitation is brought into relationship, even union, with the
divine. Simone Weil writes that, there is a lesson we can learn from the Timaeus in
that,
this world, at the same time as it is the mirror of this Love which is God
himself, is also the model we must imitate. For we also have originally been,
and must again become, images of God.174
Such an imitation is a way of union with the divine that gives to human existence the
sense of wholeness that it desires. As George Thomas notes, 'unlike many modern
existentialist, however, Plato is convinced that man can attain authentic existence
only by conforming his character and conduct to the structure and purpose of the
cosmos ofwhich he is a part.'175 The cosmos is then a source for worshipping the
divine, a point where the divine is known, but it is also a point where the soul joins to
the divine knowing the wholeness and peace for which it searches. From the
Timaeus as well as the Laws, Andre-Jean Festugiere writes that the relationship
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achieved with the divine is one characterised as assimilation to God through the
action of becoming like God:
Since these movements are regular, and since all autonomous motion implies
the presence of a soul... Since the human soul... comes from the heavenly
bodies, it is related to them, and its function in the human body is to impose
upon the body an order similar to that of the heavens... since this World-Soul
is God, since the World is a god, and since the heavenly bodies are gods, to
establish within oneself an order like that of the heavens is to assimilate
oneself to God. Thus Plato, ever faithful to the principle ofbjiotocic
0ecp - becoming, or being made, like God, - simply enriched this precept
here with a new meaning and with moral and spiritual possibilities hitherto
1 lf\
unsuspected.
But yet, such a union is one which is humbly received and understood. Iris Murdoch
writes that there is still distance and difference between ourselves and the divine and
it is in that humility that we live. She writes that,
We were never told to 'copy' the Forms by producing something else, but
only to become able to see them and thus in a sense to become like them. In
the Timaeus myth they are more remote from us, seen by God and by him
creatively transformed into another medium. Our humbler task, as part of
creation, is to understand the Forms through the cosmic intelligence which is
akin to our own.177
Even with such a provocative theology, some wish to dispense altogether
with any relevance of such an ethic that is based upon a perceived cosmic order.
Don Cupitt rejects all correspondence between the soul and the cosmos, as a
continuation of'Bronze Age thought', as he comments:
They (Plato and other Greek philosophers) want things to run like clockwork,
law-abiding, benign and harmonious at all levels: so that Plato will readily
argue that just as in a well-governed state everything would be done in
obedience to wise and benevolent laws, so at the cosmic level that is surely
how everything actually does happen - and therefore, of course, ought to
happen in the state and, uh, in our own souls too. He argues from a
conditional ought here below, to an actual is above; and thence back down to
substantive oughts here below again. Because we want law and order on
earth, we know it must already exist in the heavens and therefore must also
• 178be brought into effect down here on earth.
The point that Cupitt ridicules in Plato is a point based upon a misreading of Plato in
two ideas: one is that Plato has a bottom-up ethic in the philosophical life, and
secondly, which is indirectly suggested, is that Plato is out of touch with reality as we
176




know it. Technically, against Cupitt, Plato does not attempt to establish a way of the
philosophical life and the way humanity 'ought' to be and then place that upon what
actually 'is' in the divine. Plato's is a directly opposite understanding in that that
which 'is' and manifest in the cosmos is that which we 'ought' to be. For Plato, as
stated in the Timaeus, it is because of the order beheld in the cosmos, that humanity
has the model it is to follow in life. Plato's is not a means of transposing human
order on the cosmos, but the cosmic order on humanity. But the valid point is that
humanity is brought into harmony with the cosmic, with all things, and is not
rebellious in its evil. Plato and the other Greek philosophers understand the depth of
human existence as a whole, its aspirations and its dilemmas, and are not simply and
naively wishing for some weak ordered society but are grappling with the quest for
wisdom within the human dilemma. As Murdoch points out, Plato's position is not
naive, as Cupitt seems to indicate, but is a struggle with the longing for harmony in
his soul in contrast to what he faces in existence. For Murdoch, Plato is not given
over to seeing a 'fundamental natural rhythm (as in the strife of opposites) which
unites the aspirations of the human soul to a harmonious background in the flux of
nature..' but he rejects this perceived harmony, relating 'these spiritual aspirations
to our evident existence as accidental beings in an accidental world....'179 The
striving of bring oneself into line with the divine manifest in the cosmos is an attempt
to bring the soul into union with the divine wherein is found the remedy for the evil
that the soul faces. Reflectively, it is Cupitt's understanding that draws us away
from the world and not toward it. In Cupitt's perspective we do not face reality in
Plato, for we must reject any sense of the eternal altogether. In this Cupitt throws
away human intuition toward the eternal which Plato realised. Plato realises that the
unity with the divinely ordered cosmos was an acknowledgement of reality and not
its disparagement. Plato's philosophical theology is provocative in that it recognises
our tendency to see humanity as not simply a coalescing of accidents, but that there
is an intuition of the soul toward an ordered cosmos, and taking that appreciation one
178
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and Strife, and even in Heraclitus when he speaks of a God comprised of cosmic opposites.
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step further, seeing that the contemplation of this order is needful to human
existence.
What is recognised through the ideas of immanence and transcendence, and
the union with the divine, is the notion of the human experience of the divine in
existence. For Plato, the divine is ever close but ever distant and it is through
philosophy that the soul secures this understanding. But it is an understanding that is
crucial in conceiving human existence and what is, for Plato, a fulfilment of the need
for meaning in humanity. In Plato's philosophical theology, philosophy is the means
of returning to the divine, and living life in light of that which is truly reality. As
much as it is an outward turning of the soul toward a divine known in its immanence
and transcendence, it is also a turning inward of the soul to itself. For Plato, the
divine reality to which philosophy strives is that which not only lies external to the
philosophical life, it is also that reality which is known acutely within the soul.
The Religious Experience ofAnamnesis and the Way of Return
The doctrine of anamnesis, the recollection of the soul, plays a significant
role in the religious dimension ofPlato's philosophy, and in particular, in
understanding the soul's relationship and union with the divine. The doctrine of
anamnesis centres upon the a return to the divine through the memory of the Forms
that is latent within the soul. In the words of Simone Weil, anamnesis is 'an
orientation of the soul toward something which one does not know, but whose reality
1RO • • •
one does know.' In its religious dimension, anamnesis represents an aspect of the
soul's relationship to the divine in that it is a knowledge of the divine which the soul
already knows through looking inward upon itself, and is an aspiration of the soul
returning back to a relationship with the divine which it once enjoyed.
For Plato, philosophical knowledge is within the soul, and is rediscovered
when the soul looks inward upon itself. To understand anamnesis one must consider
the Meno which, according to Murdoch, offers the best commentary on anamnesis
when the slave boy's answering of mathematical questions is used by Socrates to
prove that the boy had the answer within him. So profoundly regarded is anamnesis
within the Meno, that 'there is indeed no limit to the power of remembering since
180 Ibid., 505.
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'all nature is akin and the soul has learnt everything,' (Meno 81d) and 'nothing
prevents a man, after recalling one thing only - a process men call learning -
discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search,
for searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection.' {Meno 8Id) To Plato,
learning is not an importation of knowledge but a matter of recollecting knowledge
and drawing out the eternal truths that are already within the soul. (Phaedo 72e; 91e)
As Socrates says in the Phaedo,
we acquired this knowledge before birth, then lost it at birth, and then later by
the use of our senses in connection with those objects we mentioned, we
recovered the knowledge we had before, would not what we call learning be
the recovery of our own knowledge, and we are right to call this recollection
[&va|H|i.vf]GK£G0ai]? (Phaedo 75e)
As Socrates observes, relying on an idea of the pre-existence of the soul, an infant
seems to forget about the knowledge it had before it was born, and must be reminded
of that which it knew. As Murdoch writes, the soul, existing before being born in a
body, becomes 'confused by ordinary sense perception, but can gain some
refreshment from the contemplation of eternal objects to which it is akin and which it
• 1R1 •
feels prompted to rediscover.' For Plato, the knowledge needed in the soul is not
one that is imported into it, as from the outside, but is latent in the soul waiting to be
reawakened. As Kierkegaard describes it,
One who is ignorant needs only a reminder to help him come to himself in the
consciousness ofwhat he knows. Thus the Truth is not introduced into the
i M
individual from without, but was within him.
181 Ibid., 406.
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Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1974), 11-12.
Kierkegaard argues between the Teacher (Christ) and Socrates. The doctrine of Plato's anamnesis has
no place for Kierkegaard in Christian thought because, Niels Thustrup writes, the 'highest truth,
saving truth, comes to human being from the outside.' (xcii) Though it is far from my purpose here to
compare Platonic theology with Christian theology, it must be said that Kierkegaard's basis of his
whole argument is faulty in that he strikes too much of a dichotomy between having or not having
truth instead of seeing that anamnesis in Plato is about recollecting that memory which is latent in the
soul, and does not warrant that no more understanding is ever to be had. In effect, Kierkegaard adopts
Meno's position in that how does one know truth or search for it, if one does not know what it is, or if
one knows it, why does one search.{Meno 80ff) The answer to the dilemma is that truth is a quality
and a quantity in that one can have a greater degree of truth or lesser. To Plato anamnesis is the
process whereby one recollects, or gets in touch with the latent ideas and truths in the soul that were
there before the soul was born. Anamnesis is not constituted by an either-or for Plato as it is for
Kierkegaard, but is a state of beginning to learn the fullness of the divine. In the end, Kierkegaard is
too protective ofChristian thought to be helpful for in his defense of Christianity he misses the true
point of Plato's anamnesis.
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As Kierkegaard goes on to point out, recollection, receiving further development by
Socrates, 'ultimately becomes the point of concentration for the pathos of the Greek
consciousness, since it serves as a proof for the immortality of the soul; but with a
backward reference, it is important to note, and hence as proof for the soul's
preexistence.'183
If the Meno speaks of the more rational side of anamnesis in what learning
and knowledge are, the myth of the Phaedrus depicts the more passionate side of
anamnesis in that it is the return of the soul back to a relationship with the divine. In
the myth, the human soul had its pre-existence in a world beholding the 'blessed and
spectacular vision' of the divine as it was initiated into the 'most blessed' mystery,'
gazing upon the 'perfect, and simple, and unshakeable and blissful. (Phaedrus
184 • •
250c) But yet the soul turned away from this contemplation of 'true being
(id 6vxa)' {Phaedrus 250a) and fell to earth entering into the human body. Because
of this origin of the soul, the soul longs to return to that divine vision that it once
beheld. When the philosopher beholds an image of the divine Beauty he is filled
with longing for that which his soul once beheld. {Phaedrus 250dff.) Such a desire
moves us in an 'anamnestic reversion of thought from the sensible to its intelligible
1 Of
ground.' Bernard McGinn comments that in Plato's myth, although all souls
receive their wings back eventually, the philosopher has a shortcut to this goal
• • • 186 •because he can remember when his soul 'rose up into real being.' McGinn
continues that in humanity's fallen (and forgetful) condition, 'it is beauty entering in
• ' l 07
by means of sight.. ..that begins the philosopher's return.
The evocative theological issue found in the experience of anamnesis is that
it is, for Plato, a universal experience of humanity, a 'collective consciousness',
wherein the divine is remembered within the soul. Murdoch describes anamnesis as
an idea based upon the 'unconscious knowledge' latent within the soul that goes
'very far back in Plato', adopted from the Pythagoreans who considered the soul as
™
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religions sought first and foremost a communion with the god.
185 Werner Beierwaltes, 'The Love of Beauty and the Love of God', Classical Mediterranean
Spirituality, 298.
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imprisoned in the body (Phaedo 62b). As Murdoch notes even the Muses are the
i on
daughters ofMemory. What is represented in anamnesis is a knowledge that is at
times more than we can understand or fathom for 'the human mind is potentially
connected with an obscure elsewhere.'190
In one aspect anamnesis involves the soul turning within itself and realising
the memory that lies deep within. Karl Barth, though of course standing at a totally
different theological juncture to Plato, gives a perspective on anamnesis when he
writes that, 'Recollection means inwardness, Verinnerlichung - 'man's return from
the distractions of the outside world and reentry into himself to find God there.'1 1
To recollect in Plato is to come back into the soul and remember, as in the doctrine
of 'knowing thyself becomes a matter of turning inward, in order to find wisdom.
The idea of recollection is an inward turning of the soul back upon itself in order to
find the latent truth which is already present within it. Through this 'inward
turning', one finds the eternal truth already inside the soul.
The religious nature of anamnesis is considered by Murdoch who calls it, a
'spiritual memory', as it belongs to the individual who remembers and recollects the
vision of the Forms when the soul beheld them 'face to face' before its coming into
1Q? . .
the body. As a 'spiritual memory', the example of the Meno is as much a
religious understanding as is the Phaedo or the Phaedrus as it is based upon an
understanding of the soul's previous encounter with the divine. Gadamer however
writes that here is no proof here of any religious attachment,193 no reference to the
soul's pre-existence as it is seen in other myths. (Phaedrus, Phaedo) Yet, Gadamer
misses a valid point in his quickness to remove the attachment of religious nature to
anamnesis as it is depicted even in the Meno. To posit the point that this is not at all
part of religious thought on Plato's part is to overlook a vital understanding of
anamnesis. For Plato, the recollection is part of the soul, a link with the divine, and
because of Plato's philosophy is a return to the divine, involves a deeply religious
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implication as well. Anamnesis is never divorced from the deep pondering of the
soul, the link of the soul with its pre-existent state. Ifwe see anamnesis in light of
being part of the depth of the psyche, then the deep spiritual nuance becomes clearly
visible. As can be seen above, anamnesis is tied completely in Plato's mind with a
returning toward the divine and plays a significant role in the soul's encounter with
the divine. Erik Davis gives the insightful remark that in Plato is the 'simultaneous
embrace of rational thought and mysticism' which 'underscores... that the works of
reason cannot be so easily riven from more otherworldly pursuits.'194 The religious
nature ofphilosophy is always present in Plato simply for the fact that the two cannot
be extracted one from the other. As that philosophy and a religious way of life is
linked, so also is knowledge to the soul, and the way of the Meno is to bring about
that which will lead the slave boy to philosophy, or better, the transformation of his
soul.
Exhibited in the doctrine of anamnesis is a deep and indelible relationship
between the soul and the divine which the soul remembers and to which the soul
longs to return. Anamnesis suggests that the Forms are part of the psyche itself,
existing in their fullness beyond, but are within the soul in its memory. Anamnesis is
an illumination of the soul which perceives the Forms as permeating all facets of
existence. The one who realises the memory of the Forms within the soul sees the
Forms as being present within the soul as well as being that reality which is manifest
in the world. As Iris Murdoch puts it, in anamnesis the world of the Forms is
'rediscovered.'195 (Phaedo 75e) In Plato's doctrine the memory of the Forms is
emblazoned upon the soul due to the soul's pre-existence with the divine, which is a
relationship and passion stronger than any ties with the passions of the body which
are part of the ever changing, undependable reality.
As part of the soul's memory, anamnesis occupies a place of knowing and
not knowing, of possessing a deep knowledge of the divine but not recalling that
knowledge right off, but having to be reminded of it and to recollect it. Christopher
193
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Smith, notes that Gadamer sees this position of humanity in Plato, which for him
illumines the 'both-and' nature ofPlato's idea:
human beings never have insights that are fully clear and distinct, but only
partial insights within persistent obscurity. Thus any aletheia, or truth, that
they know is embedded in lethe, or forgetfulness. This concomitance of
knowing and not-knowing (which Heidegger would call,
Gleichurspriinglichkeit) has far-reaching consequences. For one thing, it
renders the project of Cartesian methodology incapable of execution: since
there is no certain starting point, no certain conclusions can be drawn. For
another, it makes systematic unity and conclusiveness unachievable: we
always find ourselves in media res - under way in the middle of things whose
beginning and end are beyond the horizons of our knowing.. .Consequently,
our inquiry will remain inconclusive (unabschliessbar).196
Although Gadamer's words show the human predicament that is implicit within
Plato's doctrine, his conclusion that because anamnesis is a 'not-knowing' means
that nothing conclusive can ever be reached is taking Plato's thought too far.
Contrary to Gadamer, Plato sees anamnesis as the remembrance of a certainty of
knowledge, and it is only the unphilosophical life which is 'embedded in
forgetfulness' and not all of human life as Gadamer indicates. For Plato, the
certainty of the Beautiful and the Good establishes that something is known, but is
known in a process of realising deeper and deeper truths about that divine that we
are drawn to, as Socrates says, we move from one thing to another 'recalling' - what
men call 'learning' - recollecting various things gradually. (Meno 8Id) Recollection
makes the philosopher 'energetic and keen on the search,' (Meno 81e) not removing
it to uncertainty and ignorance.
Even though it is the inward realisation of that which is certain, the
recollection is not one of face-to-face encounter but a memory, a drawing, a desire to
see the divine once again. Humanity is thus in a place ofmovement, remembering
but wishing to see face to face, recollecting but not fully realising. Thus philosophy
itself for Plato is a way for a middle existence, between a divine existence that was
our possession but which was lost (Phaedrus 250a) which we now remember, and to
which we are attempting to return. Through its recollection, then, the soul is
returning to the divine whence it came. Thus, it is a re-collection, a recapturing of
that which, though not lost, is latent. Jackson Hershbell suggests that it is possible
196 Gadamer, Idea ofthe Good, 55.
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that Plato's dialogues themselves, 'were designed to 'remind' a reader ofwhat was
• 107
already known, to actualize latent knowledge... Anamnesis is then, as a way of
returning to the divine, is salvific for the soul.
Through anamnesis and the soul's return to the divine, we do not stand
outside of the Forms as objects, but, in an existentialistic sense, are inextricably
involved in the divine which we perceive. Through anamnesis the subject and object
barriers are taken away, and the divine which is known in the soul is also that which
has eternal reality. Hubert Dreyfus in an interview with Bryan Magee describing the
work ofMartin Heidegger gives a comment which is applicable in this context of
Plato's anamnesis:
We are not detached from some external reality which is 'out there', trying to
gain knowledge of it as something categorically different from ourselves, and
trying to relate to it. On the contrary, we are part and parcel of it all, and
from the very beginning we are in amongst it all, being in it, coping with it.
In consequence we are not in any primary sense 'observing subjects' or
'knowing beings' in the way traditional philosophers have regarded us... We
are beings in amongst and inseparable from a world of being, existences in an
existing world....1
In relation to the Forms, we are directly involved with them, and in fact, find our
reality and our happiness in the knowledge of them. The barriers of subject to object,
and even Form to perceiver are broken down through anamnesis to the point that the
philosopher is involved directly with the divine. In the doctrine of anamnesis it may
be said that we become aware of our own being as well, acutely aware of our
participation in the divine. Some suggest, however, that such a close relation with
the divine involves the loss of personality,199 that we are swallowed into the divine,
into the divinity of the Forms. However, as Paul Elmer More writes,
Instead of looking forward to a future life of empty contemplation divested of
memory, Plato regards memory as one of the chief proofs of immortality;
instead of idealizing a state of being without self-consciousness, the highest
aim of his philosophy is that a man should come to know himself. To say
that 'Plato's philosophy in no way involves the duration of the individual' is
to turn page after page of his writings into mere trifling.200
197 Jackson Hershbell, 'Orality and Literacy of Plato's Dialogues', The Third Way. New Directions in
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Through the centrality of anamnesis in Plato, we see that philosophy itself is
a way of return for Plato - a return to the divine and, for Plato, to what it is to be
truly human. The entirety of Plato's thought can be considered as a philosophy of
return and as anamnesis as a way of recollection a path toward that return. Even the
memory, the vision, and the philosophical life, is an idea of Plato that is the notion of
returning. In the genre of the Phaedo, Socrates is returning to his true home, which
is not a part of the changing world. The world of the philosopher lies not in that
which is sensually known, but in a memory of the soul, and thus, the life lived is
simply, a passing through, a going back to one's origin. We may add that
existentially, the soul wanders looking for its home, and through anamnesis is
constantly reminded ofwhere it came from and that eternal reality to which it longs
to return. In Plato then one remembers to live - the memory of the soul for Plato is a
means ofparticipating in the eternal. The theme of return is played out in an
interesting correlation by Macquarrie who links Plato to existential thought through
Heidegger's concept of 'thrownness' (Geworfenheit). For Macquarrie we are never
fully in control of our situation, for even though we can choose between various
possibilities in our lives, we are still bound by the 'facticity' of our existence - that
• 901
which we are not in control of and it is Plato who reminds him of this idea. As
Macquarrie writes, the Republic (618 ff.) shows that,
Plato was aware of this problem, and in the myth which he tells of
pre-existent souls choosing their lots before they enter the world, sought to
reconcile the elements of freedom and facticity in human existence. The
point is that I never begin from scratch, so to speak, I am always already
• • 909 *
thrown into a situation, given over to my being.
It is thus the idea of returning to the divine from which humanity has fallen,
to which the philosopher longs to go back, which causes the unrest within the soul
that philosophy satisfies. Plato's philosophy is a return to the Forms, and the
philosopher one who comes back to that from which he or she has fallen, 'a fall from
being' as Eric Voegelin puts it,203 that causes anxiety of being cast away and the
way of philosophy is a journey back the divine - a returning to the divine that is a
way of salvation.
201 John Macquarrie, An Existential Theology: A Comparison ofHeidegger and Bultmann (Greenwood




The conclusion to be drawn is that in Plato, the philosopher's experience of
the divine is one of religious encounter that involves the depth of human experience.
The Forms in Plato are seen to be both immanent and transcendent, and the
philosopher's experience of the Forms to be both near and distant. Plato's is a
philosophical theology best characterised as 'both-and' rather than either-or where
the Forms, though occupying the divine realm outside of the force of the flux of the
world, are known deeply within the human soul. What is established in Plato is that
the encounter with the divine in the Forms is one that is a religious experience, one in
which the philosopher encounters that which is ultimate reality, but that which is
known deeply within the soul. The religious encounter of the Forms is one which is
not only a perception of place, as ofwhere they are, but is also a question of
meaning, as the perception of the Forms transform human existence. Plato's is an
inward turning of the soul to contemplate, literally, to remember the Forms, and an
outward turning to perceive the Forms within the world which affects life and
existence as a whole.
203
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DIVINE:
THE FORMS AND A GOD OF MANY NAMES
The point to which philosophy as a religious experience moves in Plato is toward
a personal relationship with the divine in the experience of the Forms and in the concept
of God. As we have seen, Plato's philosophy is a religious encounter with the divine,
yet the philosophical experience for Plato is one which is a personal relationship with
the divine that is contemplated. In this chapter I wish to argue that the divine possesses
in Plato a personal appeal in humanity's relationship to the Forms, and in that Plato
conceives of a personal God who is linked to the life of philosophy. This experience
leads to an understanding of the relationship between God and the Forms, exemplified in
the question of the Good, and one that culminates in an experience of a God ofmany
names and in the experience of an impersonal Divine that is beyond the traditional
concept of a personal God. All of these views express an interpretation of Plato's
philosophical theology that is insightful for contemporary thought.
The Philosopher's Relationship to the Forms
The vision of the divine in Plato is a religious experience that involves the
philosopher's entire being. In the case of the Forms, the relationship the philosopher
feels to the Form is one of personal involvement and devotion, where his or her life is
given to that which is eternal: contemplating it, speaking or writing about it, living in its
light, or dying for it if need be. It is in this interaction and personal relationship with the
divine wherein, for Plato, is found wisdom. Such an interaction and relationship is one
in which, as Gerard Watson writes, the Forms become 'personalised' as, 'Plato
represents them as exercising an attraction and taking on a quasi-personal appeal' for the
philosopher.1 As Murdoch comments, the Forms in Plato are 'essentially objects of
love.'2 However, for Murdoch, the Forms exist in their eternity without reference to
1
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humanity and are portrayed in Plato as 'separate and unresponsive.' The personal
devotion of the seeker of wisdom is one-sided, for Murdoch, as the Forms only have
appeal but do not act. Yet, it can be shown that Plato conveys the Forms to be more than
'objects' which take on, in the words ofWatson, a 'quasi-personal' nature in themselves,
as visions of the divine with which the philosopher seeks to be in relationship.
In Plato, the philosopher's devotion to the Forms is one based upon a vision of
the Ideas that are described in deeply religious, even 'personal' terms. In the Symposium
(211b) Diotima describes the vision of Beauty as an,
everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes, which neither flowers nor
fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as now, here as
there, this way as that way, the same to every worshipper as it is to every other...
Subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness, while every lovely thing
partakes of it in such sort that, however much the parts may wax and wane, it
will be neither more nor less, but still the same inviolable whole. (Symposium
21 la-b)4
Such language conveys that which is very intimate, a vision of an entity and not simply
an 'object'. Likewise the vision of the Good in the Republic (509a) is one which Plato
intends for the reader to envision and be captured thereby. The Good is said to 'furnish'
the ability of things to be seen and is that which is fairer to look upon than even
knowledge or truth as it is an inconceivable beauty that 'gives' (7tapfe%ov) to the world,
by its 'presence' (ttapetvat), knowledge, truth, and existence. (509b) As can be seen by
such wording, the Forms are much more than simple objects, but are that with which the
philosopher becomes personally involved with in the philosophical vision.
Plato's philosophy as the experience of, and love for the Forms, and the Forms'
interaction with the world, leads one to see that adopting a perspective of the Forms as
lacking a personal aspect is too simplistic, for it is one that fails to see the personal
nature that is involved in the way that the Forms are conceived in their interaction with
life. However, to describe the Forms as 'personal' is to go beyond Plato's conception
completely and add things on to the text. In Plato, the divine is portrayed as both
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characteristics, or apersonal impersonality. The divine possesses, for Plato, a subjective
and personal appeal for the philosopher, but also an objective and impersonal nature in
and of itself. Yet, such distinctions of 'personal' and 'impersonal' are too easy to apply
to Plato for it is the philosophical experience that is the point of focus in his
philosophical theology. As the individual is seen to be personally involved in the divine
in seeking the philosophical life, one cannot really make such a distinction between a
subjective or objective nature in the divine or simply a personal or impersonal nature in
the philosophical relationship that Plato describes. In Plato, the divine cannot be seen to
possess a personal nature in the same way that humanity does, as the divine is eternal,
unchanging, and uncapricious, but at the same time it is involved with the world, not
lying in an impersonal, stagnant reality away from existence. The relationship and
experience that Plato conveys is one which involves both concepts of the 'personal' and
'impersonal', incorporating an idea which actually lies beyond such a distinction. What
certainly can be said beyond the terminology is that it is the nature of the philosophical
experience, and the interrelationship of the one who seeks philosophy with the divine,
that is Plato's concern and it is this philosophical experience which defines the divine
for Plato.
How the philosophical experience defines the divine in Plato is an idea
approached in contemporary thought. One aspect of this subject is that capitalised upon
by Martha Nussbaum in that the relationship that Plato calls for the philosopher to have
with the Forms diminishes the individual. Interestingly, Nussbaum's is not a denial that
the philosopher is personally involved with the Forms, but is a question as to what that
personal relationship means to the role of the individual or in other words, what does the
philosopher's relationship to this divine mean in terms of human relationship and status?
To Nussbaum, the Platonic Form, as in the case of Beauty, is an 'objective' Idea and this
is dangerous to the sanctity of the individual. Fergus Kerr, writing on Nussbaum's
perspective, writes that the vision ofBeauty to Nussbaum is,
a way of transcending one's dependence on the pleasures and pains of
involvement with others, though by losing all that characterizes human life, to
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end in self-abandonment to a totally non-human other - a recipe for losing one's
real humanity....
For Nussbaum, life is diminished in such a vision for the individual is cast aside for the
Idea which is the impersonal 'other'. The lover, says Nussbaum, 'must consider that the
beauty in souls is more honourable than that in the body.'6 By 'looking towards the vast
amount of the beautiful, he will no longer, like some servant, loving the beauty of
particular boy or a particular man or of one set of customs', be a slave captivated by
'particularity' and by those numerous occasions of beauty.7 The experience of seeing
Beauty itself, will, says Nussbaum, be a contemplation 'unalloyed, pure, unmixed, not
8 •
stuffed full of human flesh and colours and lots of other mortal rubbish.' Such a way is
a losing of one's humanity into a non-human other, and that is what Nussbaum would
avoid.9
In a similar idea to that ofNussbaum, Gregory Vlastos comments that regarding
the Phaedrus (250e), as well as the Symposium, we 'are to love the persons so far, and
only insofar, as they are good and beautiful.'10 Vlastos continues that,
since all too few human beings are masterworks of excellence, and not even the
best of those we have the chance to love are wholly free of streaks of the ugly,
the mean, the commonplace, the ridiculous, if our love for them is to be only for
their virtue and beauty, the individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of his or
her individuality, will never be the object of our love. This seems to me the
cardinal flaw in Plato's theory.11
It is not the person at all that we are concerned about in Plato and the concept of love,
we love only 'that abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of their best
qualities.'12 Even in the Republic, for Vlastos, Plato fails to see the love that fellowship
requires in his Utopia, a society which is built upon tolerance, respect, forgiveness,
tenderness, validity, etc.. Plato's view, according to Vlastos, would stand against
making 'flesh-and-blood men and women terminal objects of our affection' as that,
5
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'would be folly or worse, idolatry, diversion to images of what is due only to their divine
IT
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original.' Such an error would be 'because of our carnal condition burdened with
incompleteness... were we free ofmortal deficiency we would have no reason to love
anyone or anything except the Idea: seen face to face, it would absorb all our love.'14
The Forms are at one end of an extreme, while the temporal individual is at the other,
and, as Vlastos explains, 'in between, the individuals' immanent characters, projections
of eternity on the flickering screen of becoming.'15 As the Forms are the objects of
knowledge in Plato's epistemology, the order ofPlato's cosmology, and the highest
grade of reality in Plato's ontology, so also in the relational aspects of love, Vlastos
writes, 'the individual cannot be as lovable as the Idea; the Idea, and it alone, is to be
loved for its own sake; the individual only so far as in him and by him ideal perfection is
copied fugitively in the flux.'16 Within this, for Vlastos, a great contrast is represented
between Plato and the Hebrew and Christian traditions which forms a 'polar opposite'
ideal. The Hebrew and Christian ideal is one of a 'Being whose perfection empowers it
to love the imperfect; of a Father who cares for each of his children as they are, does not
proportion affection to merit, gives it no more to the righteous than to the perverse and
17 •
deformed.' For Vlastos, Plato does not have such a notion, though Plato's God 'is
impelled by love for Beauty to create and thereby to share his own goodness with his
| o # t #
creatures.' To Vlastos, what is not present in Plato is the overtly personal aspect of
God which is an essential part of Christian theology.
The points which both Nussbaum and Vlastos make in their consideration that
the Idea means the negation of the personal for the impersonal does not do Plato justice
as it misinterprets the nature of the Forms in Plato's philosophical theology. For Plato,
the knowledge of the Idea does not lessen or diminish the value of existence but, as Plato
clearly indicates, augments and enhances life in general. In the case of the Symposium,












understanding of love itself is accentuated by the Form, not lessened. In the vision of
the Beautiful, as according to the Phaedrus, the love that is shared between two
individuals is enhanced not depersonalised. The Form of Beauty is the catalyst through
which, and in which, true love is realised as it leads the lovers
to follow the assigned regimen of philosophy, their life here below is one of bliss
and shared understanding.... There is no greater good than this that either human
self-control or divine madness can offer a man. (256bff)
As Stephen L. Clark puts it, the Forms' objective 'is to perfect love, not to despise it.'19
Along with this understanding, in contrast especially to Nussbaum and also to Vlastos, is
the perspective of Iris Murdoch who, as Fergus Kerr comments,
Far from fearing Diotima's ascent of love on the grounds that ir requires gradual
abandonment of our human particularity (Nussbaum's fear), Murdoch regards it
as a paradigm or anyway a parable, of the only way ofmoral growth that will
bring us to full humanity.20
However, going further than that love is augmented and enhanced, Murdoch insists that
it is the loss of the supremacy of the individual in light of that which is transcendent that
is the valuable point in Plato's words. She writes that the vision of beauty brings on an
'unselfish attachment' which brings about 'spiritual change.'
'Falling in love', a violent process which Plato more than once vividly describes
(love is abnegation, abjection, slavery) is for many people the most extraordinary
and revealing experience of their lives, whereby the centre of significance is
suddenly ripped out of the self, and the dreamy ego is shocked into awareness of
• 21
an entirely separate reality.
It is this accentuation of love which Plato describes in the Phaedrus (256b$).
Plato's philosophical vision of the transcendent is a striving for the
'enhancement' of life, and not its diminishing. The philosophical vision does not negate
existence into an impersonal ideal, but leads to the transformation of the self and the self
in relationship to others. Though Plato never speaks of distinguishing between the
concepts of the 'personal' or 'impersonal' as in more modern thought, he certainly has a
concept of the individual being involved with the divine. In Plato, it is this individual
life when involved with the divine that is enhanced, as even in Murdoch's commentary,
19
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the self remains intact, but follows a practice of not being self-centred. The self, or the
personal individual, is not lost in the philosophical vision as Nussbaum fears and which
Vlastos echoes, but follows a path of true existence where one's soul is caught up into
the philosophical vision and learns what true existence entails - an envisioning of the
Forms, the divine, as a way of salvation that draws one away, even above the 'fray' of
life, to behold that which is transcendent so that in turn one returns to live out a greater
existence.
The Philosopher's Relationship to 'God'
As the question of the philosopher's life is enhanced through the personal aspect
of his or her relationship to the divine Forms, there is a further and related aspect
addressed by Plato in his philosophical theology in the question of the philosopher's
devotion and relationship to a personal God. When considering the perspective of
philosophy in its religious dimension in Plato, the question of a 'personal' divine
becomes important in that it addresses the nature of that divine to which the philosopher
ascribes. Regarding Plato, this is important in two ways: first is that it is important for a
practical understanding of the nature of philosophy and the philosophical experience
itself, and secondly, in terms of a metaphysical understanding of the conception of
divine as related to human existence.
In Plato's understanding of philosophy, the philosopher is one who is in relation
with a personal 'God.' As a lover ofwisdom, the philosopher is blessed by this God
because, for Plato, living the life of philosophy and living one's life in devotion and
obedience to God are equated. For Plato, God is involved in the cause of philosophy,
not only as a model (Theaetetus 176b; Republic 319aff, Republic 500c-d) but also, as
Echecrates confesses his belief that Socrates would be under the 'providence of God'
(Getaq poipaq) and go safely to the 'other world' (Phaedo 69d), provides for those who
follow the philosophical life (.Phaedo 58e). In the Republic as well, it is through
providence that the philosopher is saved from the influences of society (492e) and only
21
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providence saves anything good in the 'present condition of society and
99
government.'(493a) In the vivid case of the Apology, the link between God and
philosophy is based upon a concept of a God who provides the blessing of philosophy to
humanity. In his defence, Socrates says that his calling to philosophy is a command of
God and an example of this divine providence:
This duty I have accepted, as I said, in obedience to God's commands given in
oracles and dreams and in every other way that any other divine dispensation
(Osta potpa) has ever impressed a duty upon man. {Apology 33c)
Later, declaring his philosophy to be a blessing he says, 'This, I do assure you, is what
my God commands, and it is my belief that no greater good has ever befallen you in this
city than my service to my God.' (30a) Socrates goes on to says that such a gift is
legitimised by his life: 'If you doubt whether I am really the sort of person who would
have been sent to this city as a gift from God, you can convince yourselves by looking at
it in this way... my poverty.' (31b) For Socrates, his philosophy is a matter of being
obedient to God and recognising the blessing and providence of God in philosophy as he
says in his classic statement:
Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and devoted servant, but I owe a greater
obedience to God than to you, and so long as I draw breath and have my
faculties, I shall never stop practicing philosophy and exhorting you and
elucidating the truth for everyone that I meet. (29d)
Socrates establishes that philosophy is a providential blessing of God, one that involves
a way of existence that is blessed of God and that shows the way ofGod to humanity.
Through these words we derive a basic understanding of Plato's perception of
the philosophical experience and life is one of serving the Divine. Mark McPherran in
his work, The Religion ofSocrates23 bases his case upon the idea that Socrates is a
philosopher who is deeply affected by his religious conviction to do philosophy. As in
regarding the Apology, McPherran argues that, 'we have many good reasons for holding
that Socrates sincerely believed himself to have a unique, divinely ordained mission to
22 The vision of the Form of Beauty itself comes by 'grace' (9eia goipa: Symposium).
23 Mark McPherran, The Religion ofSocrates (The Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park,
Pennsylvania, 1996).
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do philosophy.'24 We have in Plato's account a deep contrast between an ancient
definition of philosophy and more modern conception, in that for Plato philosophy is a
way of life and devotion to this God as Paul Gooch writes,
What Socrates must carry on isn't the sort ofphilosphizing done by teachers and
scholars these days, part of a large academic enterprise in which students are
graded and articles published... It's the search for an excellence of life and mind
that cannot be taken for granted, that is lost as soon as one stops being mindful of
the manner of one's living... not to live this way would be disobedience to the
god.25
Philosophy for Plato is a personal endeavour of a life of devotion to a God and divine
which gives philosophy, forming the focus of the philosophical life as well.
In this personal relationship with the divine, it is philosophy that is Plato's
religion, and the philosophical life the pattern of a life devoted to the divine. In this
way, Plato is a religious reformer who seeks to transform the perception of the divine
and the life lived in the light of that divine. In the Apology, and even throughout the
Dialogues, Socrates is to be seen not as a simple rationalist removed from religious
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devotion, but is one who, in McPherran's words, is a 'profoundly religious figure.'
His is a life which is 'a moral idealism based on religious fervour', a model for the life
which proves to be the 'hallmark' of Plato's own thought.27 As Watson points out, 'one
can hardly read Plato's Apology, Socrates' defence when on trial for his life, and not
come away with the impression of Socrates as a deeply religious man, however difficult
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it may be to give the right meaning to what he refers to as 'the god' or 'God'.
In Plato, we witness a depth of religious understanding coupled with the
conception of, and a devotion to a divine which, for the most part, remains beyond a
simple definition or set of terms. As Watson's words raise, in Plato we are hard pressed
to define fully what, or whom, this 'God' is that Socrates devotes his life to. The simple
answer is that Socrates refers to the god Apollo, through whose oracle he received his
calling to philosophy. But such an answer is an all too hasty answer to the problem of
24
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Plato's 'God' as Apollo himself is 'in a special way the spokesman of Zeus', god of the
great oracle at Delphi, the god 'who declares the divine order in the world', and who
with his associates, the Muses, inspires mousikU which covers the whole of human
• • on
culture including philosophy. Thus, Socrates through the oracle, hears the voice of the
divine itself, literally of the 'God'. J. B. Skemp expresses that he purposely translates
toi theoi as 'God' rather than 'the god Apollo,'30 explaining,
Socrates was not alive to the issue ofmonotheism, but his way of believing in the
gods rose above that of his fellow Athenians. He had achieved (or had by natural
gift) a faith in a divine reality outside good persons but giving them support and
underpinning their moral existence. To such a divine reality one can commit
oneself and one's deeds.31
What must be gathered from this are two important ideas in that Plato's philosophy
builds itself upon a communication with the divine, as in the case of Socrates, but a
divine which in Plato allows for some speculation as to what is meant.
The understanding that can be gleaned from a consideration of Plato is that his is
a perspective which is both monotheistic and polytheistic, centring itself upon a
conception of a unified divine reality, mysterious in its essence which underlies all
things, while employing a way of knowing and experiencing this divine by using varied
myths and symbols, integrating and interrelating monotheism and polytheism together.
Yet, what is given through Plato's perspective is that which provides a deeper
philosophical and theological understanding as it is an interrelationship of these two
ideas rather than a holding of these two concepts in parallel. Grube describes Plato as
holding together two aspects of the divine, which, to Grube, feed into our own concept
ofGod: one is the static aspect of the divine seen as ultimate reality, the highest form of
being, the eternal absolute, seen in Plato in the Forms, and the dynamic aspect which is a
29 A. H. Armstrong, 'The Ancient and Continuing Pieties of the Greek World', Classical Mediterranean
Spirituality, 84. As Armstrong notes, poets and philosophers feel themselves to be inspired by Apollo.
Even Pythagoras was, it is thought, very closely associated with Apollo. (84-85) Also, J. M. Dillon notes
that Plutarch, the second-century Platonist, saw Apollo as the supreme 'God of Platonism, the Good of the
Republic', the one who is to be etymologized as 'Not-Many', the Unitary and Simple. (See Dillon,
'Plutarch and Second Century Platonism', Classical Mediterranean Spirituality, 215.)
30 As evidence of this same translation problem compare Hugh Tredennick's translation of the Apology in
Hamilton and Cairns, The Collected Dialogues ofPlato with G. M. A. Grube's translation in Cooper,
Plato: Complete Works.
31
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concept of an active force causing movement and life. In Plato the divine reality of the
Forms, and of this God who gives and calls philosophy, is one which is above all things,
the source of all wisdom. However, the other aspect of the divine present in Plato as
well is the relational, the mythical, the interactive divine known through the myths, a
divine known in the world as alive and moving within it.
Plato's is a philosophical theology devoted to a 'God' which is an all-inclusive
divine reality and unity that underlies, as James Mackey has put it, the 'bewildering
multiplicity of the reality we experience.'33 For certain, Plato employs the word 'god'
within his philosophy - the word o Oeog is used over 130 times throughout the
Dialogues,34 and established even in crucial places in which philosophical issues are
addressed (e.g. in the Apology and the calling to philosophy, the Republic (book II);
Theaetetus (176b); Laws (book 10); etc.) which shows the significance of the concept.
Yet, admittedly, it is unclear what Plato means by the term, 'God.' Werner Jaeger
describes Plato's 'utterances' about God as 'solemn and mysterious', ' and Gerard
Watson writes simply that it is 'notoriously difficult to ascertain what Plato's conception
of theos is.' As James Mackey writes,
Not that Plato pretended to know who/what God is. He not only inherited a
reverent agnosticism on the subject, a humble sense of the severe limitations of
human powers of knowing, but many of the passages he wrote became source
texts for the great apophatic theology which is common to pagan Greek and
Christian theology in succeeding centuries.
What can be said is that offered by Grube, as he writes that 0ebg and its plural indicates
whatever there is beyond and above humanity; the existence of this higher force, or
forces, and the belief of its working for good is never doubted, and is Plato's belief
throughout his dialogues.
However, even though the concept of a one God is an important aspect of the
philosophical experience in Plato, some dismiss the notion ofGod altogether in Plato by
32
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seeing it as unneedful in a true conception of his philosophy. Paul Shorey attempts to
arrest any theological thought being attributed to Plato at all by understanding Plato's
use of the word 'God' as being an over-embellished concept of a minor term. Shorey
writes that Plato's conception is simply one taken from the popular national religion
• -JQ
only 'purified and elevated' by Plato's own rejection of anthropomorphism. However,
says Shorey,
Plato does not attempt to work the idea of God into a complete metaphysical
system or adjust it to one, and the endeavors of the later Platonists to do this for
him and to foist such a system upon him are among the chief causes of the
misinterpretation of his writings. For Plato, God is a supreme category of the
moral ideal and a word of edification, and that is all there is to it. He does not
identify God with the Idea of Good, the idea of unity, the idea of pure being, the
mythical Demiourgos of the Timaeus, or any other abstraction, principle, or
symbol of his philosophy.40
In short, for Shorey, Plato's conception ofGod, if any at all, is not vital to any
understanding of his philosophy.
Even with all of Shorey's dismissal, however, we cannot simply cast aside the
references to God in Plato as embellishments. As pointed out above, the points at which
'God' is mentioned are too crucial to be waved away. Gerard Watson notes the opinions
of those like Shorey by responding to history, writing that no one,
reading the literature on Plato might be justified in thinking that theology was a
relatively unimportant part of his (Plato's) thought. This was not the way in
which his followers in Middle and Neoplatonism read him for many centuries
after his death....41
In another place, Watson points out, 'that later Platonism drew up a kind of anthology of
favourite texts to illustrate Plato's theology.'42 Watson's points raises the issue that it is
not so easy to cast aside the opinions of early thinkers much closer to Plato
chronologically and in fact, as for some, breathing the same philosophical 'air', to be
labelled as mistaken.
38 Grube, Plato's Thought, 156.








Still, even as a concept of a God as a unified being is important to Plato's
philosophical theology, so also is the concept of the divine multiplicitly conveyed
through the myths. As Michael Morgan writes, the 'mention of gods, festivals, beliefs,
and rites' pervades Plato's dialogues.43 Like the theology which makes up Greek
religious understanding,44 Plato is a thinker in whom religion, 'as rite, conception, motif,
and vocabulary' integrates.45 Yet, Plato's use of the myth is governed by philosophy
which, for him, comprises the true devotion to the divine. Thus, even though the myths
describe different facets of what that divine means, there is one true divine reality which
is illumined only by philosophy. As in the Apology, Socrates is one who stands true to
his calling of philosophy and at the same time speaks from the place of one who is
seeking to reform that which takes place. As Socrates declares in the Apology, because
of his practice of philosophy, he has a truer belief, one that is 'more sincere' than those
around him. (Apology 35d) The charge that is levelled against Socrates in his trial that
he believes in gods of his own invention (Apology 24bff) becomes true insofar as he
practices a true conception of the divine which is different from the type of life practised
around him by his fellow citizens. It is a case of 'not believing in the gods in whom the
city believes.'46
Plato's view of any myth is that it must convey a right conception of the divine.
As did his philosophical predecessors before him, such as Xenophanes, Plato's
philosophy aims at removing the anthropomorphic understanding of the divine: a point
against which Greek philosophy had directed its attacks from the beginning.47 In Plato,
this rejection of any anthropomorphic references is done through specifically casting
aside any reference to the divine that portrays God or the gods as unvirtuous as Plato
rejects any conception ofGod which sees God as deceptive or evil. As Socrates says in
the classic passage of the Republic: 'the true quality of God we must always surely
43 Michael L. Morgan, 'Plato and Greek Religion', in the Cambridge Companion to Plato, Richard Kraut,
ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 227.
44 A comprehensive analysis of Greek religion is offered by Walter Burkert in his Greek Religion,
translated by John Raffin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).
45 Michael L. Morgan, Cambridge Companion to Plato, 227.
46
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attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse... and is not God of
course good in reality and always to be spoken of as such?' (379a-b) Instead of being
cast aside, the myths in Plato are cleansed and brought into use by philosophy as
conveying within them the deeper truths of philosophical ideas. As Grube points out
Plato did not believe in the Olympians as persons, but,
once the more objectionable myths were removed, he probably thought it an
unprofitable task to destroy the old god (even if such a task had been possible)
when these old moulds might still be used as effectively as any other to express
new ideas, new conceptions of divinity....4
Part of the cleansing and transformation of the myths in Plato is to use the myths
allegorically. As John Macquarrie points out, 'the attempts to treat myth allegorically,
as the bearer ofmetaphysical truths for which no precise literal language would be
adequate', is a method that Plato employs.49 Though, such a perspective is a great tool
in Plato's overall mission in his philosophy, some myths cannot be redeemed at all and
must be cast aside. As Socrates says, such myths as
Hera's fetterings by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his
father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of
the gods in Homer's verse are things that we must not admit... either wrought in
allegory or without allegory. (.Republic 378d)
Though Plato did not believe in the Olympian myth, he did, as Grube attempts to point
out, believe in something divine. As Grube writes,
Eros and Aphrodite do represent for him the love of truth and beauty which
makes a man a lover ofwisdom, a philosopher. They are real forces, real deities
if you will, and Plato believed in them in that sense. If he refrained from any
criticism of the Olympians themselves (as distinct from the stories told about
them), it was probably because to him they stood for something very real, and
because he thought them still capable of meaning the same to others.50
The meaning is that which goes beyond the surface levels of thought to that which is
more allegorical and even more philosophical. Grube continues, 'Ifwe insist on finding
a connexion between them [the Ideas and the gods] we have to say that the gods appear
to be the mythical representation of that eternal world which the Ideas describe in a
48
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different manner.'51 Plato's is a philosophical faith as one which is the filter through
which the conception of the divine as a whole is understood. G. Lowes Dickson sees in
Plato a looking away from traditional religion as a religious reformer, one who as the
'deepest thinker of the Greeks' is the farthest removed from the popular faith52 but one
• ST
who 'traced the root of the evil to the decay of religious belief.' His reconstruction of
religion drove him 'back upon metaphysics.'54
What can be seen is that Plato displays a certain ambiguity in his final
understanding of the divine. The interrelationship between a unified reality and the
mythological means that he incorporates two different theological nuances into one.
Yet, such an ambiguity, for Gerard Watson, is actually part of Plato's plan. As Watson
writes,
Plato deliberately avoided the construction of a neat closed system so that he
might stimulate people to think for themselves. We have to impose some system
on his thought in order to discuss it at all, but it is important to remember that
Plato is deliberately flexible.55
As Watson makes clear, it is not that Plato does not employ a conception of 'god' as
much as that Plato may have chosen to avoid the issue of a tightly conceived theology
altogether as Watson explains that,
It is not that Plato does not use the word; but there is much else to be considered
besides the passages where the word, singular or plural, occurs. And there are
certainly differences of emphasis between the early and late works. It is almost
as if Plato did not want to tell us what he really thought. And while there is in
such a statement the danger of seeming merely to want to avoid the issue, I think
the possibility of such an intention should be kept in mind. The remark in
Timaeus 28c cannot be simply dismissed... ,56
Such an ambiguity, writes Constantin Ritter, is part of the philosophical process in Plato:
Just as it is impossible for our calculating understanding to grasp the totality of
reality, the universe, it is also impossible for us to apprehend the spiritual power
(God) which pervades the universe. .. .Therefore, we must not look for a
non-contradictory description of God's nature and his relation to the world and
51
Ibid, 158.






Watson, Greek Philosophy, 9.
56
Watson, Unwritten Teaching, 73.
165
the things in it, to man and his interests. We must not reproach him if, upon
examining all his statements, we find that they cannot be brought into full and
clear agreement.57
Yet, such ambiguity plays a part in the role of philosophy within the soul by being an
integral part of the philosophical endeavour altogether. For Plato, philosophy is the
search and love for the divine, and it is the vagueness of what the divine, even God, is
that initiates the philosophical search. As Watson writes,
Is it wrong to ask: 'What is Plato's final answer to the God-problem?' There are
more questions than answers in Plato on the matter. But the questions always
imply that an answer is to be found.. .58
Watson writes, that when we talk of attempting to understand the conception of 'God' in
Plato, 'we pay perhaps more lip service than attention to this difficulty.' The fault may
lie with us, for, as Watson writes, most philosophical and theological endeavour to
understand the conception ofGod in Plato is clouded by the fact that, 'we tend to shy
away from this aspect (the question of God) of Plato... partly because of the difficulty of
giving any satisfactory meaning to the word 'God' for us.'59 What can certainly be said
is that the meaning of 'God' for Plato, as well as the mythological ideas he describes are
indelibly tied to a theology of the experience of a relationship with the divine through
philosophy which is his greatest concern.
The Experience of God and the Forms: A God ofMany Names
As Plato's philosophical theology is built upon the philosophical experience of
the relationship with the divine, it conceives of the relationship of God to the Forms. It
is an experience which conceives the concept of God and the Forms as ontologically
occupying the same reality, but through further interpretation, is one which in which the
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60 Such a perspective was taken by the ancient thinkers in their interpretation of Plato as Aristotle's
comment shows when he writes that Plato sought a unity, a One which is, 'the cause of the essence in the
Forms. '{Metaphysics 1.6.9) An existentialist meaning of such a quest for unity is given by Iris Murdoch
who comments that there is a general longing in humanity to unify all things into singular ideas, or into
one idea and it is only such a unified reality that provides a meaning to existence: 'The idea of a
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John Kenney suggests that as the Forms are multiple, there are also several ways in
which they evince a higher unity.61 Seen in the descriptions ofBeauty and the Good,
both are spoken of in identical terms: as ultimate reality, inexpressible in their essence,
envisioned by the philosopher.(cf. Symposium 21 la ff. and Republic 508e ff.) In the
particular example of the Good, the Good is described as an inconceivable 'beauty'
(Republic 509b), and Plato conceives beauty and goodness to be of the same reality.
{Republic 507b) As Plato indicates, the philosopher is to attach himself or herself to the
divine, to the reality of the Beautiful, or the Good, or the One, etc. and does not envision
the Beautiful over the Good, not as separate realities vying for position, but
contemplates each of these Forms as part of one vision of the Divine. An example of
such thinking is in Werner Beierwaltes who in his treatment ofwhat he terms as the
'spiritual' nature of Plato's philosophy, unites the love of beauty, the love of the Good,
and the love for God all within one idea. Beierwaltes writes that the, 'Love of the
beautiful is a manifestation of the Good and the divine itself; or again, love ofGod is the
essence of beauty, is the absolute cause of the beautiful as idea or as individual beautiful
• 69
object. 'In the beautiful' writes Beierwaltes, 'the divinity of the Good imparts itself to
• ... 6T
the thinking and striving directed by eros.' Fie continues that, 'Beauty of the beautiful
is the truth of the Good, that is, the Good unconcealed and open; thus beauty is also the
first manifestation of the divine.'64 The tie between all of these is that the philosopher
beholds one reality through a multiplicit array ofForms - one eternal and experiential
reality. As Kenney writes, although each Form has a distinct, definitional nature, each
Form calls into play several others, 'so that there is a rich nexus of connectivity within
being {Sophist 248-51A, 259E).'65 The richness of this thought is found in the idea that
the philosopher beholds one reality seen in an array of forms. The Forms through their
divine unity elicit a conception of a unified divine transcendence and ontological
self-contained unity or limited whole is a fundamental instinctive concept.' - the plurality and
fragmentation presents only chaos, only unity and oneness provides meaning. (Murdoch, Metaphysics, 1)
61 John Kenney, 'Hellenic Monotheism', Classical Mediterranean Spirituality, 281.








Moving from this recognition of one divine reality multiplicitly conveyed,
Gerard Watson writes that many have perceived, as in ancient times, Plato's Forms to be
(\1 •
expressions of God, an interpretation that is still evocative today. Watson even
suggests that Plato himself,
would always have welcomed Heraclitus' conception of a Logos which was at
once the unseen plan of things and a God ofmany names who ruled the universe
and harmonised all the apparent discordancies in it.68
As they possess a 'quasi-personal appeal' 9 the Forms, as Watson reminds, could easily
be adopted by Augustine in his Confessions for his vision of God, or terms which the
Pseudo-Dionysius can use in his Divine Names.70 Even today, such a conception can
warrant a philosophical experience that elicits a theology which gives rise to a God of
many names as the vision of the Forms may be seen as various names and aspects of one
God. Critically, however, one may say that such an interpretation arises not from a
straight reading of Plato but from, admittedly, drawing a theological perspective from
him. However, contemporary thinkers, religious and non-religious alike, regard Plato as
certainly expressing through the vision of the Forms a picture of the divine, but disagree
on how that divine may be expressed. For some, Plato speaks of one reality in various
ways through the Forms, while others, though seeing Plato as establishing a concept of
God, disagree as to whether the Forms are expressions of God or not, and yet still others
see Plato as one who speaks of the divine, but a divine that is impersonal, multi-faceted,
and above the traditional conception of God altogether.
The ancient question of God in relation to the Forms is one which is still
illuminating in Plato's philosophical theology, giving insight today, and one which is
especially illumined by the question of the relation between the Good and God.71 The
65 John Kenney, 'Hellenic Monotheim', Classical Mediterranean Spirituality, 281.
66 Ibid.
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a helpful overview of this whole debate in which, though the article is now dated, the arguments that he
explains are still in vogue.
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classic statement of the Good in the Republic shows that the Good is more than a simple
philosophical construct, but is the supreme Idea, surpassing all in reality, conveying a
philosophically religious vision.
This reality, then, that gives their truth to the object of knowledge and the power
of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must
conceive it as being the cause [octxtav] of knowledge, and of truth in so far as
known. Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be
something fairer still than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge
and truth... to think that either of them is the good is not right. Still higher honor
belongs to the possession and habit of the good... the objects of knowledge not
only receive from the presence [7tape%et] of the good their being known, but
their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself
is not essence but still transcends essence (87teK£iva xt)<; obcaaq) in dignity and
surpassing power. (Republic 509a b)
These words and concepts convey a religious vision - the Good is that which is the
source of all knowledge and truth, fairer than all things, even an 'inconceivable beauty'
(&pfl%ocvov KakkoQ), which by its 'presence' is even the source of all existence and
essence, transcending all things in its glory.72 As Stephen R. L. Clark comments, no one
can really turn away from the reality of the Good: 'The divine oneness, the Good,
irradiates the world: the world, in all its manifold types, is the expression of that Good,
not some other real thing from which we turn away.'73 As Jaeger adequately puts it,
we cannot appraise his central doctrine of the Idea of Good except against a religious
background.'74
For Plato, the Good is such a religious philosophical vision that it describes the
essence of the divine. The Good permeates the divine reality to the point that God and
the ideal of goodness coincide in that the 'true quality' ofGod (Republic 379a) is one
who is good in reality: 'And is not God of course good in reality (xcp 6vxi) and always to
be spoken of as such?' (.Republic 379a) Such goodness is part of the divine essence for
Plato, an understanding that is even within Homer, as Friedrich Solmsen comments,
'God is good' is the basic proposition laid down at the beginning of the discourse
72 For a treatment of the Good as a philosophical vision see Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: The
Consummation ofPhilosophy (Blackwell: 1998), 1 \ff.
73
Stephen R. L. Clark, 'Platonism and the Gods of Place', 30.
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(Plato's). No attempt is made to prove it. The two concepts simply belong
together. It is unlikely that anyone in Greece would have questioned this. The
conviction that God is good had been expressed before Plato and had been
essential in Greek thought about the gods ever since the poet of the Odyessy... .75
With such a statement of equation between God and goodness, Werner Beierwaltes goes
so far as to say that such an idea suggests that, 'the expressions are interchangeable.'76
To see this idea of Good is to see the divine in Plato in one of its highest expressions. In
the Republic, the Good is set above all being in its mystical, and spiritual prominence, as
the experience and ideal of the philosopher. Until this point, writes Jaeger, it has been
simply called 'the greatest subject'77 but it is in this part of the dialogue that the Good
achieves the status for which it is remembered. Goodness is seen in various examples,
but it is Plato's objective to describe what is that universal goodness that links all of
these examples of good together, for all of these examples, 'have some share in the Idea
70 #
of Good'. With this understanding, the idea of the Good becomes then, as Jaeger puts
it, a 'universal goodness (as the word Idea signifies), the unity of all goodness in contrast
to the various objects which we call 'good',79 for all good things participate in this one
eternal idea. The Good is elevated to the highest idea in which all goodness participates,
OA
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and reduced to be a summum bonum, a one true Good. With this one idea in place,
Plato directs the philosophical soul to behold and comprehend this eternal Good.
For some, the religious meaning of the Good is so profound that it implicates a
conception of God. Reflecting upon the ancient tradition and interpretation, Gerard
o 1
Watson writes that in ancient times many see the Good as God, and L. P. Gerson
echoing this statement writes that, 'It is commonplace in antiquity that when Plato
07
speaks of the Form of the Good he is speaking of God.' In a contemporary
interpretation, Ritter, Beierwaltes, and Jaeger see in the Good a concept of God. For
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Ritter the Good is the comprehensive source of all things and is ultimate Being. As it is
occupies this ultimate status, there is no more fitting way of regarding the Good, for
Ritter, than to establish its divine status and its equation with God, as he writes,'.. .the
highest Idea, the Idea of the good, is nothing else but God.' 3 Ritter reasons that,
We say that all powers, and with these everything in the universe, are ultimately
grounded in God or in the highest Idea. For all practical purposes this means the
same thing; only for our point of view it is not altogether indifferent.84
To Ritter, it does not matter what term may be given to this ultimate reality, the concept
is still to be perceived as God:
if it can be shown that the good (as something actually existing, as Idea) consists
in complete agreement of all segments or characteristics of reality; that there can
be no reality apart from the totality of active powers, which in their activity are
conditioning and in turn are conditioned by every individual being; that
therefore the world, which embraces every real being, is in its nature a living and
animated organism; in addition that a uniform co-operation and interaction can
be produced only by a spiritual power which rules the world, and can be assured
only by the rule of his power; then the conceptual explanations of the variously
sounding words such as Being, world, God, and good can be reduced to one and
the same formula, and the concepts which they designate are identical in
content.85
For Ritter, whatever the ultimate reality is named, 'Being', 'Good', or 'God', the reality
is identical. The Good and even God, represents the collective whole of all reality, the
place in which all that is finds being. All reality, for Ritter is interrelated and is part of
the whole and all encompassing God. Thus, as the Good encompasses all of reality, and
is the source of that reality, it is to be understood as none other than God. Beierwaltes
agrees with Ritter when he writes,
Ifwe wished... to ask explicitly who the Platonic God is or what simply the
(absolute) divine in Plato's sense is, then the idea of the Good or the Good itself
as Plato develops it, particularly in the three analogies of the Republic, might
seem to be a fairly adequate response. Plato, to be sure, never directly equates
the 'idea of the Good' with 'God'... Let it merely be said that essential
predicates, which Plato also attributes to the 'gods' or the 'divine', appertain to







- on the basis of its priority to all things - must also be good in the highest or
8f\
absolute degree and consequently 'most divine.'
Beierwaltes continues his argument that in Plato the degrees of reality show that which
is most divine. Hence, as the Good occupies ultimate reality, it is ultimate divinity, and
thus the conceptions of the Good and God converge:
what exists to the highest and most intense degree would also be what is most
divine, and vice versa. Because god is perfect being, he is self-sufficient
(Philebus 20a; 60c). The Good, however, is the self-sufficient, because it is the
foundation of all hypotheses yet requires no hypothesis or condition itself (=
anhypotheton; Republic 510b; 51 lb). In this respect, the definitions of God and
the Good converge in absolute unconditionality. They also converge in
blessedness; the divine is the most blessed (Theaetetus 176e; Phaedrus 247a).
Similarly, the agathon (good) is the 'most blessed of being' (.Republic 526e)....
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the idea of the Good, as it is developed
in the context of the Platonic concept ofpaeideia, is considered just as much a
measure of individual and public (political) activity as God is assumed to be in
the Laws (716c), which specify, in contrast to a subjective relativism in the
manner of Protagoras.... 7
Following a similar line of interpretation, Jaeger remarks that Greek philosophers before
Plato, 'usually described the highest principle in the universe - whether it was the
material substratum which bestows life, or the spirit which controls everything - simply
88
as God, or 'the divine'. It follows then, for Jaeger, that we do not need to read the
word 'God' to understand Plato's true meaning:
According to Greek ideas, Plato, by making the Idea ofGood monarch of the
intelligible world, like the sun in the world of sight, gives it the same divinity as
the God of other thinkers, even though he does not actually call it God. It looks
as if he had purposely avoided doing that, because it was so obvious that the
reader could fill it in without help, and also because it was important to
distinguish his supreme being from the gods of everyday religion... nothing
deserves the name ofGod better that the Idea of the Good.... 9
As H. D. F. Kitto simply concludes, 'although Plato does not formally identify the Good
with God, he speaks of its divine nature in such a way that formal identification would
make but little difference.'90
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Yet, for some, there is a deep problem that exists with the concept of the Good
being equated to God. The Good cannot be considered as a 'god' because it is not
'personal' in its nature. Etienne Gilson writes that the Good can never be considered as a
god at all, personal or otherwise, as it is the lack of personality which discredits such an
equation of God and the Good altogether, as Gilson comments:
And why, after all, should an Idea be considered as a god? An Idea is no person;
it is not even a soul; at best it is an intelligible cause, much less a person than a
thing.91
For Ritter, a negation of the Idea on this charge misunderstands the nature of Plato's
theology:
From certain quarters objections have been raised against this identification. We
are told that, according to Plato, God as personal spirit is a soul, the highest soul,
but not an Idea; for the Idea is impersonal. I regard this position as erroneous.92
For Ritter, as being is included within the Good, so also is personality, as he writes,
'.. .there is nothing in the general concept of the Idea (of the Good) which would exclude
QT •
personality.' Ritter argues that all reality depends upon the Idea, including the reality
of personality and as it is,
the Idea is nothing more than the designation of the objective basis of a
conception; this objective basis assures validity to the conception and gives
certitude to it. Everything then depends on whether that which gives security to
the good in this world - so that consequently the conception of the good is no
idle dream - is a personal Being or not.94
However, a further argument is offered by A. E. Taylor and others that although
it can be admitted that the Good is a supreme metaphysical reality and deeply significant
to Plato's philosophical theology, it is not the Good but only the conception of the Soul,
as seen in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and especially the Laws, that can be rightly
understood as Plato's God. Taylor writes that Platonic theology is explicit in that 'God
is a soul, not a form.'95 Taylor writes:
The language used in the Republic of the 'Form of Good,' .. .at once raises the
question whether or not this form can be identified with God .. .is the Form of
91 Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1941), 26.






Good another name for the God recognized in the Platonic philosophy?' the
answer must be definitely No, for the reason given by Burnet, that the good is a
form, whereas God is not a form but a 'soul,' the supremely good soul. .. .It is
just because his God is not a form that God can play the part the Platonic
philosophy assigns to him.96
For a true understanding of Plato's theology, Taylor argues, we must centre our thoughts
upon the tenth book of the Laws as the prime dialogue ofPlato's theology. Friedrich
Solmsen, echoing this position, even calls the dialogue a forgotten treatise in the issue of
• Q7
Platonic theology. This appeal of the Laws for Taylor and Solmsen centres itself upon
the origin and design of the universe. Written late in Plato's life, the Laws is an
apologetic dialogue in its nature as it philosophises upon a teleological proof of the
existence of the gods against the sceptics. According to the dialogue the design and
cause of the world originates from 'the supremely good soul' (psukhe), 'that takes
forethought for the universe and guides it along its path.' {Laws 897c) The nature of this
• • • 98 • •World Soul is that 'which can move itself , and is 'the cause of good and evil, fair and
foul, right and wrong - in fact all contraries', it is the universal cause of all subsequent
movement of the universe, and the controller of heaven itself (896d-e)." Considering
such statements, Taylor offers the comment that, 'God (or the gods) is quite definitely
declared to be a vj/u%f], and we are told that this means that the universe is a result of
tsxvt), design.. .The movement which can move itself is the highest type of agent
known to Plato..."100 As John Burnet writes as well, preceding Taylor, the highest
theological statement for Plato is found in this concept of the self-moved Soul.101
96 Ibid., 288.
97 In the Preface to Plato's Theology Solmsen describes the Laws as having, 'long been unduly neglected.'
98 Laws 894d.
99 Laws 896 d-e.
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101 One may question the strong alignment with the being of God to the concept of soul due to the
Athenian's statement in the Laws of the possibility ofmore than one soul present within the world. Such a
thought, of course, jeopardises the monotheism that Plato indicates as his persuasion, and more strikingly,
if soul is equated with God, such a multiplicity introduces a conflicting nature within God, or dualism
between varying natures of gods. The more convincing view may then be to see soul as not only God, but
also that which governs the universe, as a force, and as that which all being participates in. Such a thought
would not erase the convincing argument that both Taylor and even Ritter give, but would introduce a new
factor in determining the full meaning of soul for Plato. Perhaps again, the conception of soul implies both
a divine being and a force infused throughout creation, as is the concept of The Good. Soul may be
considered as a philosophical concept or entity which lies at the centre of the universe and governs, as do
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Alongside such considerations, the debate is carried further by Friedrich Solmsen
who cautions that there must be a difference maintained between the Forms and God.
The difficulty that arises is one of identification in Being, which Ritter and others would
champion, but as Solmsen writes,
To think ofGod as the apex of this realm has become so customary that even
modern interpreters of Plato tend to treat his God as identical with his highest
idea, and to overlook or misunderstand the peculiar situation out ofwhich Plato's
theology developed. Plato conceived of the Deity as mediating between two
worlds and as imparting to the visible world the qualities which connect it with
the intelligible world....102
Solmsen raises a valid point that the understanding ofGod in Plato is one which is
connected to the infinite worth of philosophy. However, for Solmsen, the concept of
God is a mediating concept and not able to stand equal to the Forms, nor can ever be
seen as ontologically tied to the Forms' realm of being. This mediating role, as in
Taylor's and Burnet's argument is one known through the World Soul:
Plato by identifying true being with the 'Forms' had made it difficult, if not
impossible, for himself to determine God's plan in the realm of Being. He would
not of course deny, nay, as we have seen, he would emphatically assert, the
reality of the imperishable Cosmos permeated by the divine World-Soul. But for
him God is an essence different from the Forms, and his function is to impart to
1 OT
the physical world essential characteristics of the Forms.
In criticism of these arguments, the bias to protect a traditional God or to impose
this concept on Plato wears the argument thin in terms of its applicability to a valid and
creative interpretation of Plato's philosophical theology. The merit of the argument is
that it sees the Soul as an expression of a God who saturates the cosmos with his
presence. However, the fault in such an argument as Taylor's is that it begins with a
traditional Judeo-Christian concept of God and imposes that upon the Platonic text.
Solmsen, though keeping within this line of thought, does go a bit farther in seeing
beyond this idea to understanding the relationship of God to the Forms in a mediating
role, but also fails to see a more creative side to the theology which Plato presents. One
cannot deny that the picture of the World Soul is one of the divine, as Ritter even writes
the philosophical concepts of Empedocles' Love and Strife, or Heraclitus' flux, which is both the
governing philosophical factor of the universe and is equated with God.
102 Solmsen, Plato's Theology, 192.
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that, 'the more we consider this world soul, whose thought processes regulate the details
of the creations, the less we can differentiate it from the soul of the creative god or from
God himself.'104 Yet, the arguments of the kind offered by Taylor and Solmsen is that
they limit the concept of the divine to be that which only fits with an already conceived
notion.105 In the question of the Good in relation to God, we are presented with a
conception that does not in any way present anything contradictory to a traditional
understanding ofGod, but one that does present a more creative theology of the concept
of the Divine.
What must be considered in the Good and its place in Plato's philosophy as a
religious experience is that it is an experience of the soul. As Socrates describes it, the
Good is an object of the philosophical vision, a religious experience for the philosopher
of divine reality. A. E. Taylor who, although disagreeing with the equation of the Good
with God, writes in consideration of Christian theology and the experience of this
ultimate reality in the Good:
is the Good spoken of in the Republic identical with what Christian divines and
philosophers have meant by God?... In one most important respect it is. The
distinguishing characteristic of the 'Form ofGood' is that it is the transcendent
source of all the reality and intelligibility of every thing other than itself. Thus it
is exactly what is meant in Christian philosophy by the ens realissimum, and is
rightly regarded as distinct from and transcendent of the whole system of its
effects or manifestations... It is the supreme value and the source of all other
value, and at the same time it is, though 'beyond being,' the source of all
existence. This explains why, when a man at last comes in sight of it at the
culmination of his studies in 'dialectic', it is supposed to be grasped by direct
vision, and for that reason is strictly 'ineffable.' Neither Plato nor anyone else
could tell another man what the good is, because it can only be apprehended by
the most incommunicable and intimate personal insight. Thus, as it seems to me,
103 lb id., 181.
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105 One of the deepest questions surrounding this question of the Good and God is the question of the
personal and impersonal aspects of the divine. Throughout the arguments against the Good as an
expression ofGod, and the arguments for the concept of the World Soul is the aspect of personality. Yet,
the interpretation to see beyond a common argument of whether or not the Good is personal or impersonal
presents the most evocative theological perspective as it suggests that the Idea as ultimate being includes
all reality includes personality within it. The crux of the issue is that the Idea of the Good as Plato presents
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metaphysically the Form of Good is what Christian philosophy has meant by
God, and nothing else.106
As the Good is a central and philosophical idea, it is an ideal to which all humanity is
called to understand and subscribe. It is thus not only the greatest object of
contemplation, but also the greatest subject as model and ideal. In the Republic, the
dialogue centres upon the idea of goodness as given within a just society, and it is in this
context here that the Good is described as the highest philosophical reality.
Ifwe see, then, the Good in its rightful place, it is part of the religious experience of
philosophy, and in that, part of the question of human existence. The question of the
Good in this context, lies beyond the technical argumentation to be that which Plato
intends as to transform humanity.
In the work of Martin Buber the personal aspect of the Divine is not only
important for a true conception of God and in human existence, it is for Buber one that is
found in Plato through the concept of the Good. For Buber, the predicament of human
existence is the 'relativizing of all values' and it is through Plato's doctrine of the Ideas
1 07
that such a relativisation is abated. Plato's Ideas represent the attempt to connect and
unify the ethical with the Absolute, the metaphysical with the moral, and thus, the
human with the divine. The philosophical theology of the Forms achieves a unity within
the discordant reality of the ancient world, a world split from a 'harmonious cosmos'
into a 'discordant bios', a world which 'could no longer serve man as a model and
108 • •
pattern.' Such a world is an 'It', confronted by 'an inviolable, archetypal world of
pure Forms,'109 - a world with which mankind even today must deal. This higher world
of Plato, according to Buber, has its own construction in the idea of the Good, equated
with the idea ofGod, forming the highest summit of the eternal. For Buber, as we
engage with the Good we become that which we should be, for in the Good, 'The eternal
106
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see a difference between Neoplatonism and Platonic thought which was not recognised by the
Neoplatonists themselves.





Ethos itself, the ground of being of that universal human function that sets the yes
against the no and pushes to a decision, becomes the highest 'form' of the Absolute.'110
For Buber, we interact with this highest Idea, personalising it, engaging and becoming
involved with it. For Buber, the rich philosophical and ethical engagement that is
possible between humanity and the Good, establishes a 'clarity of thought never before
attained' as,
man is given here the task of realizing the unconditionality of Right through his
person. The objective 'imitation' of Ideas by things becomes transformed in and
through the subjectivity into the spiritual act of becoming just.111
Thus, the objectivity of the divine seen in the notion of'imitation' is made subjective
and personal as the individual imitates the Forms in his or her existence. In this
imitation, humanity finds its fulfilment for which it searches.
The glory of Plato's Good for Buber is the experience of its remarkability in
towering above 'being in dignity and power' as the 'primal cause of all that is just and
•112 • ... ... .beautiful.' The Good not only brings each individual thing into existence and being,
but is the cause so that each individual thing may 'perfectly become that which it is
meant to be.'113 The Good is the cause and the destiny of all that exists, the point at
which all things find their existence, their reason for being, even their fulfilment. To
Buber, such an idea is possible because in the Good's 'innermost depths, one nears the
mystery of God, for not Being, but only perfect Being, may be called God.'114 'If one
does not cease', as Buber continues, quoting Plato, 'until one has reached the Good itself
through knowledge itself, then one reaches the end of the knowable.'115 But, as to how
to know this Good, Buber writes, is not specifically answered by Plato, however,
we remain close to him (Plato) ifwe say that the Good is recognized there where
it reveals itself to the individual who decides with his whole being to become
that which he is meant to be. And in fact, whether it takes place in the soul or in
the world, nothing is so mysterious as the appearance of the Good. In its light all







human person to that which 'towers above being' cannot be learned, it can only
be awakened.116
To experience the philosophical vision of the Good is to be illumined in one's
perception of ultimate reality. But it is a reality with which one is in relationship
through one's life imitating the glory of the Forms in one's own existence. As Buber
writes, to catch a vision of the Good is to understand ultimate Being, but also to connect
that to one's own life as well, and for Buber, to see the Good is to understand its
relationship to God, and one in relationship to it. Yet, further, the interpretation of the
religious philosophical experience of the relationship between the Forms and God, and
the soul's own relationship to the Forms and God, gives rise to a philosophical theology
which interprets the concept ofGod as known through doctrine of the Forms.
When the philosophical experience in Plato is considered, two understandings of
God in relation to the Forms are elicited: one, exemplified by Karl Jaspers, is that the
Forms express a Divine, even a God, ofmany names, and the other, that of Iris
Murdoch, is that what Plato expresses is a theology of the Forms, especially that of the
Good which goes beyond traditional concepts of a personal God. Both positions, though
occupying different emphases, represent a unified approach that goes beyond the
positions listed above as they attempt to interpret an aspect of the philosophical theology
of the Forms within a contemporary context. We must be cautious, however, as both of
these perspectives would warn us, of implying too little as Jaspers warns, or too much as
Murdoch warns, upon an interpretation of Plato in regard to the relationship of God to
the Forms.
On one hand, Jaspers sees Plato as expressing through the Forms a God ofmany
names in that all facets and expressions are of this one divine reality. What Plato
conveys through his Ideas, for Jaspers, is one God, one divine reality, known by the
various names and in varying ways. Jaspers writes,
Plato speaks of God. The good, which in the Republic is compared to the sun,
the life-giving Idea that transcends being, what in Parmenides is touched upon in
the dialectic of the One, what in Timaeus is represented as the Demiurge, who,




matter - all these, one may say, refer to the same thing. But ifwe combine these
statements into a Platonic theology, the thought is lost. For in each case his
thinking approaches the limit in a different way, in metaphoric intuition, in a
rising dialectic of concepts, in the myth of creation. In each case the thought is
meaningful only in connection with the conditions of its thinking. If the thoughts
are combined into an objective knowledge of God, their meaning, which lies in
thinking as inner action, is engulfed in a supposed knowing of something.
Plato's dynamic theology is turned into a dogmatic theology.117
However, though there is a multiple array of names for this one God, all of these
expressions are bound by the limit of never fully expressing the completeness of that
divine reality which they name. The ideas of Beauty, One, or Good are different
manifestations of the one ideal reality of God. Thus, Plato represents a 'dynamic
theology' which makes possible various expressions of the same reality, but a theology
which is never 'objective', or that which is never fully expressed.
Through this understanding, Plato's philosophical theology is one that is
dynamic. In fact, Jaspers cautions, in making Plato's theology into a dogmatic system
we cast away Plato's true theology, or one that is a dynamic, or a philosophical
theology which attempts to express one divine reality. An objective theology, or one
that limits and objectifies is against Plato's dynamic and philosophical God ofmany
names. In fact, Jaspers writes, the transformation of Plato's dynamic theology into a
dogmatic one is historically what happened:
The word 'theology' occurs in Plato. He created the discipline and was founder
ofWestern theology. Aristotle made the world into a technical term. This
creation of philosophy was adopted by the Christian churches and by Islam. But
often the Platonic thought is scarcely recognizable in these definite, dogmatic
systems.118
Plato's multi-expressible theology stems from the recognition of that which is,
'enduringly true, which fundamentally and essentially evades object knowledge, direct
statement, or adequate formulation. 119 All the Ideas are divine, various names and
representations of this divine (the One, the Beautiful, the Good, the Just, etc.) but not
117





exhaustive of it, nor housing it completely. Every Form is true and divine in itself, but
never fully descriptive of the whole of the divine of which it is an expression
Turning from Jaspers to Murdoch, we are given another option in Plato's
thought. If Jasper's view of Plato's theology is one that is known by a multi-expressed
God, then the question is not whether this God is personal or not, but is a God known by
both expressions, and even those names that are still not yet developed. However, for
Iris Murdoch we must look beyond a notion of a personal God altogether in order to gain
a true understanding of Plato, and to understand where the religious life that Plato
teaches can be applied to a contemporary setting. She writes that, 'Plato, who treated
the Olympians with such a careful detachment, was of course well aware of the
ambiguous nature of a busy personified 'God' or gods except as either necessary cult or
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explanatory myth in a philosophical context.' 'Any seriously envisaged "God",
Murdoch continues, 'once liberated from Zeus, has to recede, since anything said about
•••• 121 •him is likely to mislead us....' For Murdoch, the way of true understanding for Plato
and existence as a whole is to move beyond a conception of a personal God to one that is
espoused by Plato himself. For Murdoch, the philosophical religious ideal represented
in Plato is one which moves beyond a personal God in favour of the spiritual reality of
the Good.
For Murdoch, it is the Good that provides the loftiest vision of the divine, but it
is a vision with no association to God. In fact, for Murdoch, no relation exists at all in
Plato's mind between the Good and the conception of God, personal or otherwise as the
Good exceeds the conception ofGod altogether. She writes,
Plato does not set up the Form of the Good as God, this would be absolutely
un-Platonic, nor does he anywhere give a sign of missing or needing a real God








Murdoch writes of the Good that it is a 'a transcendent magnetic centre' providing the
most realistic and least corruptible use for the moral and religious life which is for her in
19T
no way identified with God. She writes,
Plato's image (metaphor) for the Fonn of Good is another separate spherical
object, the sun: an ideal unity, a transcendent source of light. Good is above
being non-personal, non-contingent, not a particular thing among other things.
Plato illumines it with stories which are deliberately cast as explanatory myths
and must not be mistaken for anything else. Plato's 'sun' is separate and perfect,
yet also immanent in the world as the life-giving magnetic genesis of all our
struggles for truth and virtue. Plato never identified his Form of the Good with
God (the use of theos at Republic 597B is a faqon de parler), and this separation
is for him an essential one. Religion is above the level of the 'gods'. There are
no gods and no God either.124
For Murdoch the vision of the Good is not the vision of a god, but is an 'impersonal
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object of love, a transcendent idea, pictured as a magnetic centre of vitality...,' it is a
'mythical religious vision, which in Plato's mind has nothing to do with a personal God
or gods.'126 Yet, for Murdoch, though the Good is abstract and impersonal, it still
maintains an active and mystical role within the world. In fact, it is because the Good is
abstract and impersonal that humanity enjoys a relationship to the Good which is 'distant
and apart', yet is 'a source of energy', 'an active principle of truthful cognition and
127
moral understanding in the soul' as 'the inspiration and love-object of Eros.' The
Good, writes Murdoch,
is not a logical universal, or a Person, it is sui generis. It is a 'reality principle'
whereby we find our way about the world. Plato's philosophy offers a
metaphysical picture of that essential presence, together with (throughout the
dialogues) many and various instances and examples of our relations to it. So
198
there is, we may say, a rainbow bridge - but no covenant.
When seen as a whole as new interpretations of Plato's philosophical theology,
the ideas of Jaspers and Murdoch are not contrasting options but complementary.
Jaspers speaks of a 'dynamic' theology which sees in Plato a multi-faceted divine
123 Existentialists and Mystics, 361.








exhibiting itself in the differing visions of the various Forms all representative of one
God. For Murdoch this same idea is taken from a different perspective in that the Forms
offer a far more compelling theology than a personal God of traditional theology.
Where these two perspectives come together is that they perceive Plato as presenting a
theology which is not bound by the expression of a personal God. The point at which
these two perspectives draw apart is that Jaspers sees a God ofmany names, whereas in
Murdoch, it is Plato's Good that is the central object of his philosophical theology in
which all things display a Good ofmany names, images which the world 'is full of.'129
Both see a divine Unity which lies beyond full expression in Plato (for Jaspers, a God
pictured in the differing Forms and for Murdoch, a Good which is the central focus of
Plato's theology) but Murdoch conceives also of a multi-faceted divine in the Forms, the
Demiurge, and the World Soul whereas Jaspers strives to see the one overall God. For
Jaspers and Murdoch collectively, we see in Plato a much more fluid theology. The
interpretation of Plato's philosophical theology is enriched by the tension of both views
which sees Plato as speaking of a God known in the Forms as well as the Form of Good
being placed even to a prominence beyond a traditional expression of God. Both Jaspers
and Murdoch wish to move beyond dogmatism in Plato, Jaspers beyond the ideas of
expression and Murdoch beyond a conception that the Good cannot stand on its own
without a conception ofGod to compare it to. However, both preserve religious
viewpoints within Plato. Held in tension, they point to a multi-faceted but unified
experience of the divine, but a divine which lies beyond traditional conceptions of God
and that make the debates of the relationship of God to the Ideas more profound. Still,
and in the end, Jaspers and Murdoch point us on by this tension to the culminating





In conclusion, we may say that Plato speaks of a divine with which the
philosopher is personally involved. As we have seen, Plato speaks of the Forms and the
divine, even God, as 'personally' appealing to the philosopher and as that with which the
philosopher is in relationship. Yet, further, Plato's philosophical theology offers a
perspective in which the Forms and God are seen in relationship to one another which
provides a perspective for the soul's own relationship to, and the experience of the
Divine. The debates as to whether the Forms are or are not expressions of God is
inapplicable for contemporary thought as long as applied to preserving a traditional
concept of God, but when seen imaginatively as in a philosophical theology of the Good,
or in the Forms being expressions of one divine reality, even a God ofmany names, such
considerations become a source of a profound philosophical theology. The depth of this
philosophical theology is especially seen when it is applied in the light of the religious
philosophical experience, upon which Plato's philosophical theology is based, and to
which it ultimately strives.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
INEXPRESSIBILITY AND THE INEXPRESSIBLE EXPERIENCE
Philosophy as a religious experience in Plato ultimately expresses itself in an
inexpressible experience. It is this experience that characterises both the vision of the
divine and the philosophical experience itself. Such an experience is shown in Plato's
treatment ofwriting in the Phaedrus, the vision of the Forms in the Symposium and the
Republic, the concept of God in the Timaeus, and culminates in the philosophical
experience itselfof the Seventh Letter. What these show is that this inexpressible
experience is the goal of Plato's philosophy and is one of the most poignant aspects of
Plato's philosophy as a religious endeavour.
Plato is a writer,1 yet, as Socrates makes clear in the Phaedrus, it is the
philosophical experience of the divine that one should strive for, the encounter of the
divine in the soul. When considered in light of the usefulness of the experience of
philosophy, words and writing only serve as reminders of other words, paling in
comparison to the actual experience of philosophy in the living discourse. In the
Phaedrus, Socrates says that one must be wary of any ultimate power of the written
word for it is only a simple reminder, only marks on a page, and is only an imitation of
that first-hand knowledge of the divine that gives wisdom. Socrates recounts the
Egyptian myth of the god Theuth coming to the lord of the gods, Thamus/Ammon, to
show him the gift ofwriting which Ammon refuses. (.Phaedrus 274dff) Ammon says,
Ifmen learn this (writing), it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will
cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling
things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of
external marks. What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for
reminder. And it is not true wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its
semblance, for by telling them many things without teaching them you will make
them seem to know much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men
filled, not with wisdom, but with the conceit ofwisdom, they will be a burden to
their fellows. (275a-b)
1 Erik Davis, Techgnosis: myth, magic, and mysticism in the age ofinformation (Harmony Books: New
York, 1998), 24. Eric Havelock argues that the realm of the Forms may have revealed itself to Plato
through the alphabet, as the Forms are analogies to visible forms, they are also forms of the alphabet.
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For Socrates, the problem ofwriting is that it does not teach the wisdom that is known in
the soul, but is simply an exercise of dealing with words. To rely upon writing is to
forego the internal realisation of wisdom and truth spawned within the soul, for one that
simply conjures memory by an external mark. Writing does not promote a knowing of
oneself, nor anything eternal, and,
anyone who leaves behind him a written manual, and likewise anyone who takes
it over from him on the supposition that such writing will provide something
reliable and permanent, must be exceedingly simple-minded; he must really be
ignorant ofAmmon's utterance, if he imagines that written words can do
anything more than remind one who knows that which the writing is concerned
with. (275d)
However, beyond the written word is a word and discourse that is eternal, written
in the soul, not on paper as lifeless marks on a page, but living:
But now tell me, is there another sort of discourse, that is brother to the written
speech, but of unquestioned legitimacy? Can we see how it originates, and how
much better and more effective it is than the other? .. .the sort that goes together
with knowledge, and is written in the soul of the learner, that can defend itself,
and knows to whom it should speak and to whom it should say nothing. (276a)
Phaedrus describes the answer to Socrates' question: 'You mean the living and breathing
word (kdyov Xtyeiq ^dovxa kou fep,t|/d%ov) of him who knows, of which the written
word may justly be called an image [et8co7.ov, a 'ghost'].2 The word of wisdom is one
that is alive and not simply an image or a spectre that only appears. For Plato wisdom is
that which is embodied and made alive in the philosophical experience.
Iris Murdoch gives a poignant commentary in her, The Fire and the Sun:
Since truth (relation to the timeless) exists for incarnate being only in immediate
consciousness, in live dialectic, writing is precisely a way of absenting oneself
from truth and reality... What is really important in philosophy cannot be put
into written words and scarcely indeed into words. (Language itselfmay be a
barrier.)3
This is a composite of Plato's notion. As Murdoch writes, the important part of
philosophy cannot be described for the nature of the Dialogues is that they lead to the
experience of philosophy. Murdoch comments,
2 Harold North Fowler's translation in Loeh edition, volume 1 (1982), 567.
3 Murdoch, Existentialists, 405.
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Writing can easily become a kind of lying, something frivolously pursued for its
own sake, in fact an art form. True understanding comes suddenly to trained
thinkers after sustained and persistent discussion; and there is little danger of a
man forgetting the truth once he has grasped it since it lies within a small
compass.4
The 'truer heir' of Plato's argument is found within philosophy that is an,
attack upon system, jargon, grandeur, and the development of wordy theories
which prevents a simple lively relationship with truth. (The dialogue form itself
is of course a slight precaution against monolithic system.)5
The importance of this non-reliance upon writing and words for Plato is that true
wisdom is found in the personal philosophical experience of the dialogue. As Murdoch
comments, there is in Plato, 'a deeper concern about the independent creative thinking
remembering person.'6 Plato's objections to writing set forth in the Phaedrus can be
summarised in that, 'written works can only be inert reminders of real communications
7
which take place orally in particular contexts between one person and another.'
Murdoch continues that, 'the problem about writing is a problem about 'live
remembrance': not the dead written text prompting second-hand reactions, but the deep
8
called-up truth of the individual mind.' We find echoes of Plato, writes Murdoch, in
modern thoughts as in Wittgenstein,9 who by his direct method, 'scared' off disciples,
writing with reluctance 'because he feared that his books would fall into the hands of
fools.'10 Wittgenstein, Murdoch writes,
thought that there was little danger of forgetting what had once been properly
understood. Criticising some of his own work he is reported as saying in
conversation: 'No. If this were philosophy you could learn it by heart.' What
has been clearly seen is appropriated and cannot be lost.11
The natural apprehension of philosophy is necessary to the would-be philosopher for









9 See also Frederick Sontag's, Wittgenstein and the Mystical: philosophy as an ascetic practice (The





written, or even described. To Plato, philosophy is not about texts but about the
individual soul. Philosophy is not textual analysis to Plato, it is found beyond the words,
in the personal experience of the divine in the philosophical soul.
As with the striving in Plato to go beyond writing to the philosophical experience
which those words convey, the nature of Plato's Forms is that they are founded upon an
inexpressible experience as much as they are a point of doctrine. In Plato the Forms are
more than a doctrinal statement but are involved in the philosopher's own existence.
They represent a coinciding of philosophical doctrine and experience as they are that
upon which the philosopher bases his or her perception of wisdom, but are depicted in
Plato to be also that which the philosopher experiences. Exemplified in the vision of
Beauty, the Good, the One, the Forms are described as being an experience of the
inexpressible and the ineffable inexpressible vision and experience. In the Symposium,
Socrates recalls Diotima's words on love (eros) for Beauty that as the lover progresses
in the 'mysteries of Love', viewing all the aspects of the beautiful in succession, when
'suddenly' (e4oci(|)vr|c;) there comes to him the 'final revelation' of,
that wondrous vision which is the very soul of the beauty he has toiled so long
for. It is an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes, which neither
flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as
now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to every worshiper as it is to
every other. (211a)
The soul progresses to the eternal Beauty, where the vision of the Beautiful is seen not
to, 'take the form of a face, or of hands, or of anything that is of the flesh', and,
will be neither words, nor knowledge, nor a something that exists in something
else, such as a living creature, or the earth, or the heavens, or anything that is -
but subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness, while every lovely
thing partakes of it in such sort that, however much the parts may wax and wane,
it will be neither more nor less, but still the same inviolable whole. (211b)
The Beauty that is longed for in the soul is one which is beyond expression, beyond the
tangible, neither touched nor handled in other beings, but one ofwhich all beautiful
things partake. Like the true reality that it is, it is changeless, independent, and is an utter
unity. For Plato, to express such a vision in its essence is an impossibility as words
falter.
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Diotima's words about the vision of the Beautiful in the Symposium express an
experience of the divine that is the goal of the philosophical life. It is not only a concept
of the divine but one which is to be experienced as Diotima says,
Whoever has been initiated so far in the mysteries of Love has viewed all these
aspects of beautiful in due succession, is at last drawing near the final revelation.
And now, Socrates, there bursts upon him that wondrous vision which is the very
soul of the beauty he has toiled so long for. (211a)
The vision of the beautiful appears to the philosopher-lover suddenly (fe£od<J)vr|q) as one
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who has been initiated into the mysteries of Love. Festugiere writes that such a vision,
according to Diotima's words, is the experience of that which is beyond expression. In
his commentary, Festugiere asks, 'how do we apprehend this primary object (the
13
Form)?' It comes by a purification of the subject: a detachment with the world, the
'contemplative mood, the turning of the soul upon itself, ' and a purification of the
object: the contemplation of a beautiful boy to the Form itself. 14 As Festugiere writes,
once such a stage is arrived at, 'it is no longer a question of an abstraction, but of a leap
into the unknown' - an initiation into the great mysteries, 'the perfect initiation.'15
Festugiere writes,
Up to this point the object was noeton in the true sense of the word; it was an
object which could be understood, the essence of which could be entirely
mastered. Now, one must advance to the Beautiful in itself, an object admitting
neither of definition nor of name. The Symposium is positive on this point, and
the text, in my opinion, leaves no room for doubt.16
Festugiere argues that essence (ousia), definition (logos), and denomination (onoma) as
in Laws (895d) are interchangeable. But it is here in the Symposium that we come to the
i n
'Ocean of the Beautiful' which is above onoma and above logos. 'Thence', says
12
Though the mystery religions of the Greeks involved silence and secrecy as to the rites of initiation and
ritual, according to Grace Jantzen, scholars such as Louis Boyer clarity that 'it was not an esoteric
doctrine that was secret, nor was there at this stage any question of a specialised means to religious
knowledge not available to normal human perception....' Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Christian
Mysticism, 27.
13
Festugiere, Personal Religion, 43.
14 Ibid.
15
Ibid., 43, citing Symposium 211a.
16 Ibid.
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Festugiere, 'it is no more an ousia, it is above ousia.' Such is the 'mystical' contact
says Festugiere with the Form for there is, writes Festugiere, 'merely a touching
(fe(f>ot7n;o|i£vcp Symposium 212a), the touching of which the mystics speak to designate
the ineffable contact by which they attain the supreme object.'19
Similarly, the same experiential inexpressibility is given by Socrates in the
description of the Good in the Republic (509ff). The Good is the cause of knowledge
and truth, 'yet fair as they both are', says Socrates, it surpasses them both. (508e) They
are indeed like the Good, but, says Socrates, 'still higher honor belongs to the possession
and habit of the good.' (509a) In Glaucon's words, Socrates speaks of an 'inconceivable
beauty' (&p,f]%ovov - 509a) for even as it is the cause of knowledge and truth,
even the object of knowledge itself (Republic 508e), the Good is beyond being,
£7c6keivcx tf)<; obalag, existing by itself beyond that which it gives and causes:
In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only
receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence
and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but
still transcends essence (epekeina tes ousias), in dignity and surpassing power.
(.Republic 509b)
The experience of the vision of the Forms, especially the Good is one that
transforms the soul. Eric Voegelin enquires in his commentary on the Good,
What is the Idea of the Agathon? The briefest answer to the question will best
bring out the decisive point: Concerning the content of the Agathon nothing can
be said at all. That is the fundamental insight of Platonic ethics. The
transcendence of the Agathon makes immanent propositions concerning its
content possible. The vision of the Agathon does not render a material rule of
conduct, but forms the soul through an experience of transcendence.
It is the experience that is key to understanding the description of the Good - it is a
vision where the philosopher sees the ineffable source of all things. A. E. Taylor writes
lucidly of the philosophical experience of the Good that:
The last question whether the philosophy of the Republic and the dialogues
generally is 'rationalism' or not is briefly this. Ifwe could fully comprehend 'the




Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, 112.
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only object which is wholly and perfectly intelligible; as we never can
comprehend it completely, there is, in fact, always something mysterious, not yet
understood, about it. It is free from all self-contradiction, but it always contains
'surprises' for us. We can 'see into it' to some extent, and it is the philosopher's
duty to see further and further into it; but you will never 'see through it.21
It is indescribability that is also a characteristic of Parmenides' exposition of the
22 • • • •One. The One, says Parmenides, 'is not named or spoken of, not an object of opinion
or of knowledge, not perceived by any creature.' (.Parmenides 142a) The One is known
through what it is not; it is beyond descriptions of wholeness, beginning and ending,
shape, place, motion, likeness and relationship, age and time, and even that which is.
(\31ff) The dialogue even ends in the philosophical and mystical conclusion:
To this we may add the conclusion. It seems that, whether there is or is not a
one, both that one and the others alike are and are not, and appear and do not
appear to be, all manner of things in all manner ofways, with respect to
themselves and to one another. (166b)
The point of the Parmenides is that the One is not simply an exposition, but is
one which, as with every dialogue, the seeker experiences transformation. John Cooper
writes that the effect of the entire scene of the dialogue is twofold: 'to emphasize the
extraordinary philosophical value of this conversation and to put us hearers at a great
intellectual distance from it...' In reflection ofCooper's commentary, we are drawn
near to the One in our experience but we are part of the philosophical experience of the
dialogue and of attempting to conceptualise the One, however we are also aware of the
extreme distance of our never fully realising what the One is. Throughout the dialogue
Plato emphasises the philosophical experience of the One - an experience beyond
description.
Like the Forms, God is one who is inexpressible. The famous statement by
Timaeus is that, 'the father and maker of this universe is past finding out, and even ifwe
found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible.' (Timaeus 28e) The cosmic
order is experienced, the philosopher experiences the divine and eternal pattern, but for
Plato we are at a loss when it comes to describing this God who ordered it. For Gerard
21 A. E. Taylor, Plato, 288.
22 Parmenides' own writing proves the point as well. See Katherine Freeman's Ancilla.
23 Plato: Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed., 360.
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Watson, it is the notion ofmystery that is essential to Plato as for Plato there is a,
'mystery in being', a mystery in 'knowing, in using language and in acting morally,'24
To miss this point in Plato, writes Watson, is to misinterpret him altogether.
Plato believes that there is some sort of ideal reality which is a mystery. Man,
his knowledge and actions are set against this ideal and measured by it: to this
extent at least Plato is a theologian. 5
Festugiere comments that ultimately Plato's words are a description of the 'cognition of
. 0f\ . .
the supreme object' ofwhich the encounter with the inexpressibility of the
philosophical experience is in,
the final degree of our metaphysical investigations, the term on which all the rest
depends, is an object which defies definition, and hence cannot be named. It is
the Unknown God.27
To experience this inexpressible God in Plato is to face the power ofmystery as a
theological idea. Applicable to Plato's position and the philosophical experience as a
whole is Gabriel Marcel's comment that, 'Reflection shows, however, that in a genuine
mystery the distinction between subject and object, between what is in me and what is
98
before me, breaks down.' Marcel's point is one that is exhibited in Plato in that the
encounter with the divine, as that which is inexpressible, is an experience of the soul in
which the separation between subject and object breaks down as the person becomes
involved within the divine itself. As Marcel continues, 'A mystery is something in
which I am myself involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as a sphere where
the distinction between what is in me and what is before me loses its meaning and its
9Q •
initial validity.' If such mystery takes the form of a question, say in the meaning of
life, or ofGod, then, Keen comments, there is no objective standpoint which I can adopt
to answer such questions as I am involved in, and inseparable from, that about which I
. TO ....






Festugiere, Personal Religion among the Greeks, 44.
27 Ibid.
28 Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 20.
29 Ibid.
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that lie beyond us; they are truths that comprehend us.'31 Keen continues that within
Marcel's opinion, 'In contrast to the world of the problematic where truth may be
determined by objective means, wherever one is involved in mystery, one is involved as
a total person in an intimate set of relations which can ever be grasped as something
apart from one's self and held up as an object of knowledge.'32 Plato agrees with Marcel
that mystery is not to be equated with that which it totally unknowable or the unknown.
Thought penetrates all aspects of human experience and it is a search for the 'ideal
reality' that is of the essential nature of Plato. Yet, it is a search that culminates in an
experience of the divine through philosophy that is ultimately mysterious that words
cannot describe. For Plato, philosophy is a search for a reality that is eternal - a reality
which provides the impetus to philosophy and which is found in the philosophical
concepts, the Forms, and the Divine, immanently witnessed by the philosophical soul -
but as written by Plato himself, one that remains mysterious, and ultimately
inexpressible.
As it is an inexpressible experience that involves humanity within it, the divine
reality is also capable of being known by many names. As Guthrie writes upon the
philosophical experience itself,
Since it cannot be described literally, no single account can do it justice. The
effect is cumulative. The dialogue form, and Plato's own imaginative powers,
made it possible for him to present it from different angles, using different
it
metaphors and parallels.
The connection of this with the concept of the divine is made by Iris Murdoch who
writes, 'We still live in the old familiar mysterious world and explain and clarify and
celebrate it in the old endlessly fertile and inventive modes of speech.'34 'We enjoy the
• • • TS
freedom of imagination.' Further, as there are many modes of speech, one
experiences the divine entering all part of existence. As Murdoch continues in her own









The idea of 'the world as full of images of God and hierarchies pointing to God'
is... fundamental in religion and (mutatis mutandis) in morality. I think this is
what (ifwe put Good for God) the world is full of! The affirmative way, which
can find the divine everywhere in al the desire-driven burrowings of cognition,
relates spirituality to the whole of our being.36
Murdoch's positive view about the world enlightens our thinking on a conception of
God that is much more fluid than static, dynamic rather than staid, seeing the divine in
various ways.
The ineffability of the divine as an experience of the soul is that which provides
theological insight, as it is the highest expression of the Divine and the ultimate
experience of the philosophical life. The one who experiences such a vision is that one
who is truly a philosopher for Plato, one who truly knows the Divine. Iris Murdoch
T 7
quoting Weil, 'that admirable Platonist', writes that a poem, 'is beautiful in so far as
TO
the poet's thought is fixed upon the ineffable.' The same is true for Plato in the
inexpressible experience of the Forms and God - only after this vision does one attempt
theology, or at least does so with such a vision in mind. But, it is the experience of
transcendence for Plato that is important, the description will always fall short of the
actual reality but it is the experience that is the beginning of philosophy itself as the
Seventh Letter proves.
• • • 39
Lastly, it is within the Seventh Letter that one of the greatest expression of the
religious experience of philosophy as an inexpressible experience is given as it is one in
which the inexpressibility of the philosophical vision and philosophy as an experience





39 On the authenticity of the Seventh Letter. Gerard Watson's discussion on this in the Appendix of his,
Plato's Unwritten Teaching, is helpful as well as A. E. Taylor's, Philosophical Studies (Macmillan and
Co.: London, 1934). The full discussion ofwhether this is or not the actual letter of Plato is one which I
have not chosen to pursue here due to the importance of other issues related to the discussion. The point of
philosophy as an experience is sufficiently grounded in other dialogues, though, admittedly, without the
unique symbolism of the Letter. For some, the legitimacy is unquestioned, though there is no truly
conclusive answer to the question. My own thoughts are that the letter is legitimate on the fact that
nothing in the letter directly opposes anything else within the undisputed corpus of Plato. It is either by
Plato himself, or one completely familiar with Plato's own thought to provide valuable thought for the
Platonic perspective.
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I certainly have composed no work in regard to it (philosophy), nor shall I ever
do so in future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies.
Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on
instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when suddenly, like
a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once
becomes self-sustaining. {Letter VII, 34Id)
In this classic statement of the inexpressibility of the philosophical experience, Plato
describes philosophy as an experience of the soul as a 'spark', a fire, that is ignited in the
soul, passing from philosopher to philosopher. Unlike other studies, philosophy is one
that is an experience beyond description, (341b) even to the place that even Plato
himself would not attempt to describe it. It is an experience which comes from an
'acquaintance' the subject after a 'long period,' in the communion (cru^f|) with
philosophy itself, and in close companionship (gdvodgIocc;) with it and with those who
are lovers ofwisdom themselves. In that company, as in the vision of Beauty
(,Symposium 210e), philosophy is 'suddenly' (e£,ocichvr|c;)40 born in the soul, as a blaze of
fire, and a 'leaping' spark as it passes from one to the other. As in the Symposium
(210e) where the vision of Beauty is beheld in a 'suddenness of the mystic vision of the
Idea,41 so too philosophy is born in the soul through a sudden insight given to the soul.
As Guthrie comments, quoting A. E. Taylor, philosophy's 'mode of apprehension,
though attainable only after a long and arduous process, is by 'direct acquaintance', a
sudden revelation, and not through a discursive 'knowledge about' it.42 Once generated,
it becomes a self-sustaining burning. Philosophy is an indescribable, even mystical
experience that is ignited in the soul from the communion with the divine and
companionship with those who have the same philosophical love. Humanity in such an
experience moves beyond the description and word, even beyond the concept to
encounter that which is indescribable. The description of philosophy as an indescribable
40 Amihud Gilead, in his 'Plato's Eros, Camus' Sisyphus, and the Impossibility of Philosophical
Satisfaction,' Clio 17 (Summer 1988), 323-44, writes that the philosophical experience of a sudden vision
ties directly with an impossibility of philosophical satisfaction in that the philosopher is on a constant
search for that which fulfils the soul.
41 See the Loeb edition of the Rev. R. G. Bury's translation of Plato's Epistles (1929), 530 note 2.
42 Guthrie, A History ofGreek Philosophy, 507; A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man andHis Work, 231.
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experience that comes from a communion with it and suddenly sparks in the soul betrays
the religious nature of philosophy an experience that cannot be placed in words.
The attempt to formulate such an intimacy in the form ofwords or doctrine with
motives other than the love ofwisdom and the knowledge of the divine, writes Eric
Voegelin, 'is worse than futile' for it becomes the, 'desecration of a mystery.'43
Historically, the attempts to do so are in the case ofDionysius as Plato describes it,
(340b//) who brings reproach to the very nature ofphilosophy itself as a love ofwisdom,
and brings it to serve the ends ofpolitical ambition. For Plato, philosophy is an
experience that is directly implicated in a rule of life and behaviour. The philosophical
life cannot be taken lightly but one which should cause each individual to count the cost
of knowing it. (340b//) The true lover ofwisdom possesses a 'divine quality' that makes
him or her 'worthy' to accept such a life. (340c) For Plato, philosophy is a 'marvellous
quest' one to be entered with all earnestness, or it is not even worth the living. (340c)
The value of such a life is so great to the philosopher that there is a hatred for the
opposite way of the unphilosophical. (340c) The true lover of wisdom is one who is a
'genuine convert to philosophy' (340d), one on fire with philosophy (340b), and not
simply as one with a coat of tan that people get in the sun (340d), but one who is
penetrated to the soul by this love for wisdom. Festugiere comments that in order for
one to apprehend the eternal, there must be a 'purification of the subject', a 'detachment
from the world, and a turning of the soul upon itself.'44 The coming to philosophy is for
Plato part of a long process that cannot be taken lightly. As Karl Jaspers writes, when we
finally reach the end of philosophical endeavour we lose the sense ofwords to describe
it. The presence of God, writes Jaspers, 'at the end of philosophical endeavour' ceases
speech (inexpressibility), has no other gods but finds its fulfilment in the 'unfathomable
idea', and bows down before it.45 'Trust in this basic attitude makes possible an
all-encompassing sense of thankfulness, a wordless, impersonal love.'46 This is Plato's
piety: found within inexpressibility.
43
Voegelin, Order and History, 19.
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Festugiere, Personal Religion, 42.
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The inexpressible experience represents the culmination for Plato of philosophy
as it joins the most profound expression of the divine with the deepest of experience. It
represents the union of the most important aspects ofphilosophy for Plato in that it is a
vision of the divine which the philosopher experiences. As the Seventh Letter indicates,
this experience of the inexpressibility of the divine is the hallmark of the philosophical
life to which all philosophy strives, and the benchmark by which the true philosopher is
measured. It may even be said that the experience of that which is inexpressible is that
to which Plato's philosophical theology strives and upon which it builds. All in all, it is
the experience of the divine through philosophy to which Plato's philosophical theology
is given and upon which Plato bases all of his philosophical and theological teaching.
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CONCLUSION
The idea ofPlato's philosophy as a religious experience forms a basis for a
vibrant and insightful philosophical theology for today. What Plato offers through his
philosophy is a religious way of life, an interrelationship of philosophical and religious
thought, which sees the pursuit and practice of philosophy as a means through which
humanity experiences and encounters the divine. Yet, one of the most theologically
evocative ideas that is raised from such a perspective is that the religious experience of
philosophy in Plato presents itself as a religious way of life today. From such a
perspective, an issue is raised which involves a theological understanding of the human
experience ofphilosophy itself in Plato. In particular, two theological ideas come to the
forefront when such an experience is considered in regard to Plato's philosophy as a
religious way of life: namely, a theological perspective which sees the quest of
philosophy as a religious way of life as establishing a theology ofphilosophy, especially
in terms of seeing the religious experience of philosophy as one that is perennial, even
atemporal, making the way for the experience of Plato's philosophy as a religious way
of life to be recognised today. Secondly, because it is based upon the human experience
of the divine, the practice of Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life leads to the
experience of a concept of the divine which is open and dynamic, going beyond
traditional theological constructs. What is seen is that the religious experience of
philosophy in Plato is based upon a synonymous interrelationship between philosophical
and religious thought in which the idea of philosophy is so theologically charged, and
the quest for a theology in Plato so intertwined with philosophy, that the two are
inseparable and lead to the same religious way of life.
Yet, what can also be stated is that even with the idea of the synonymous nature
of philosophical and religious thought in Plato leading to a religious way of life, the
theological ideas that surround this way of life being lived today are neglected.
Contemporary theology suffers from not only a lack in what such an understanding
holds for theological thought, but is detained within a particular attitude that the
religious way of life that is presented by Plato is inapplicable to today's understanding.
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Although there is a plethora of reasons offered why this is so, two particular ideas come
to the forefront through a view of Christian theology which attempt to establish that
there is no commonality between the religious experience which Plato conveys and that
which may be known today, and secondly, that thinkers can do no better than take the
perspective of traditional Christian thought in constructing philosophical theology in
establishing a relevant and engaging theological perspective for the world today. As in
one particular perspective known as 'radical orthodoxy', the implications ofwhat such a
position means within philosophical theology is given in a definition, in a collection of
essays, ofwhat 'radical orthodoxy' hopes to accomplish:
Radical Orthodoxy reclaims the world by situating its concerns and activities
within a theological framework. Not simply returning in nostalgia to the
premodern world these essays visit sites in which secularism has invested heavily
- aesthetics, politics, sex, the body, personhood, visibility, space - and resituates
them from a Christian standpoint; that is, in terms of the Trinity, Christology, the
Church and the Eucharist. What emerges is a contemporary theological project
made possible by the superficiality of today's secularism.1
The bottom line approach of such a position is that it simply and solely looks to a
doctrine of God as revealed in the Christian 'story', capitalising upon Christian theology
as the central point and best conception of the divine. Yet, to take such a position is not
a way forward, as the definition hopes to indicate, but a call back to a holding within
tradition away from any theological creativity and speculation because it is found within
an established truth, away from a building of theological thought from the human
experience. Through such eyes, the world is imposed upon by the Christian revelation
implicating that the world is neither engaged nor dialogued with, and the human
experience, as the point from which theology creatively arises, disregarded in favour of a
concept and knowledge of the divine which is imported as revelation to humanity. Such
a position, of course, limits severely the creative expression of philosophical theology by
limiting and not recognising the role of human experience in forming theological
concepts, and in limiting the idea of the divine to a Christian theology.
However, such a position is challenged through the idea of Plato's philosophy as
1 Radical Othodoxy, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward, eds. (Routledge: London, 1999), 1.
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a religious way of life in that what is given in Plato is built upon a much wider
theological basis, a philosophical spirituality which, by blending the practice of
philosophy with religious thought, engages in a much more dynamic philosophical
theology which arises from, and counts as central, the human experience of the divine
which comes through the endeavour of philosophy as a religious experience, and not an
imposed doctrine. Beyond simply an acknowledgement of the religious dimension of
Plato's philosophy, as one begins to understand Plato's philosophy as a religious way of
life today, what is elicited is an understanding of the human experience itself as well as a
conception of the divine giving insights for theological thought today.
One of the most poignant theological perspectives offered in Plato is a theology
of philosophy. As has been established throughout this thesis, the important aspect of
Plato's philosophical theology begins with the fact that the practice ofphilosophy for
Plato is characterised as a way of transformation within humanity. This experience of
transformation informs one of the central ideas, if not the central idea upon which
Plato's entire philosophical theology is built, even how the divine is both conceived and
experienced in Plato. However, for Plato, even though philosophy arises from its source
in the divine, the transformational aspect of philosophy does not involve the divine
being conceived as an outside source importing philosophy, or any form of revelation, to
humanity from outside the soul, but involves a transformation which is realised through
that already present within the soul: namely, the knowledge and memory of the divine
that is awakened through philosophy. Because philosophy involves this memory of the
divine, as Iris Murdoch points out, philosophy, for Plato, is more than simply a mental
• • • 9
exercise but is a spiritual discipline,' and throughout the whole of his work, 'Plato
T
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understands intellectual activity as something spiritual.' As Pierre Hadot further points
out, to see philosophy in this way is to see that,
we are not just dealing with a code of good moral conduct, but with a way of
being, in the strongest sense of the term. In the last analysis, then, the term
2 Murdoch, Existentialists andMystics, 404.
3 Ibid., 437.
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'spiritual exercises' is the best one, because it leaves no doubt that we are dealing
with exercises which engage the totality of spirit.4
In fact, we are given in Plato a vision of the world which, in Hadot's understanding,
involves a metamorphosis of one's entire being.5
What can be understood is that philosophy as a divine way of life is already
present within the human experience and is given within the understanding that there is a
correspondence between the human experience and the divine - an interaction which
Plato's philosophy realises and makes known. For Plato's philosophical theology,
philosophy is a way of salvation that fulfils a need on the part of humanity to know the
divine above the flux of the world, to be, in the words of Karl Jaspers, 'in contact with
what is most essential.'6 The transformation that Plato's philosophical theology presents
is not a turning away from existence, but represents an enhanced way of existence in that
one's entire way of life as a philosopher is given to constantly encountering the divine.
Interestingly enough, this particular aspect is emphasised further by Jaspers when he
writes that through philosophy we are 'reborn', and when reborn see that the 'value of
all finite things, though always limited' is 'enhanced.. ..'7 When seen in the context of
Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life today, philosophy is a way of
transformation through which humanity encounters the divine, but even further, it is this
experience that is the governing factor in the way that humanity conceptualises the
divine as well.
The theological perspective that philosophy is a means of transformation, and
even salvation, in Plato betrays a philosophical theology that conceptualises the divine
as directly involved within, and arising out of, human existence and experience. The
insight of Plato's philosophical theology is that it is a philosophical theology of
humanity and the divine in interaction which is, particularly for our concern, seen in a
philosophical theology that is based upon the human experience of philosophy as a
religious experience. For Plato, the philosophical contemplation of the divine is
4 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 127.
5 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way ofLife, 127.
6 Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, 122.
7
Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, 38.
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intertwined with, and never removed from, human experience, and the ramifications of
Plato's philosophical theology are such that they always correspond back to a type of
life and existence lived out in society and the world, establishing a philosophical
theology in which the contemplation of the divine affects the way that life is lived.
Offered through Plato is a philosophical theology ofwhat the human experience entails:
not only a doctrine of the soul reflecting the divine, but also the ways that philosophy as
a religious way of life involves itselfwithin existence. In one way, the theological ideas
surrounding Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life are constructed from, and
involved within the forces which affect humanity at its deepest level. In other words, the
various ideas which make up the human experience as a whole become the bases for the
various theological motifs that Plato employs within the religious implications of his
philosophy. Considering the aspect of the theological implications of Plato's philosophy
as a religious way of life today, and due to the interrelationship between philosophical
and religious in his thought, the ideas that govern human existence such as life, love,
death, etc. are seen in Plato as theological ideas, concepts through which the divine is
known and encountered via philosophy. Proven by the particular case of philosophy as a
way of death, that which is very much part of the human experience becomes in Plato
that which conveys the divine life of philosophy and builds through this common idea of
human existence a religious way of life. Eric Voegelin raises this important aspect when
he writes that what we encounter in Plato, at least in the early work, is that the soul is
ordered by the forces of Thanatos (death), Eros (desirous love), and Dike (justice), or
philosophy as the practise of dying, the erotic reaching out of the soul in love toward
the Agathon, the Good, and the right ordering of the soul through participation in the
Idea.8
In Plato, therefore, theology can never be separated from human experience, and
in fact, it is the religious experience of philosophy that determines and defines the
divine. A modern commentary upon this idea is offered by Karl Jaspers who writes,
8 Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, 272.
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for us the Deity, if it exists, is only as it appears to us in the world, as it speaks to
us in the language ofman and the world... Only in ways that man can grasp does
the Deity appear.9
In Plato, the intermixing of the two ideas of the human experience with the divine
promotes a theological perspective where the two become inseparable. In fact, the ideas
of the divine and human experience are reflective of each other in that as one draws in
toward an understanding of the divine, humanity is immediate within the purview, and
likewise as the idea of human experience is considered, a conception of the divine is
automatically drawn. As Jaspers goes on to say,
Thus it is seen that it is wrong to play off against each other the question about
man and the question about the Deity. Although in the world only man is reality
for us that does not preclude that precisely the quest for man leads to
Transcendence. That the Deity alone is truly reality does not preclude that this
reality is accessible to us only in the world; as it were, as an image in the mirror
ofman, because something of the Deity must be in him for him to be able to
respond to the Deity. Thus the theme of philosophy is oriented, in polar
alternation, in two directions: deum et animam scire supio [I desire knowledge
of God and the soul].10
Thus, Plato's theology is one of the religious experience of philosophy: that which is an
analysis ofwhat takes place in the human soul, in the human experience of the
philosophical life, and a divine formed from such an interaction.
In seeing Plato's philosophical theology as deeply human in its application, one
then begins to open to the possibility that Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life is
applicable today. For certain, to seek Plato as a source of religious thought or devotion
is to adopt a position which recognises a sense of atemporality of the philosophical and
theological enterprise that Plato undertakes because it is so involved within the human
experience - an experience which is common to all because of their humanity. What is
raised through such an idea is that Plato's philosophical theology is able to be lived out
and understood even in a contemporary context in that it participates within and
addresses a common approach to the human question which is beyond the limits of the
accidents of time, place or culture. As in the Seventh Letter, it is emphasised that
9
Jaspers in Existentialismfrom Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (Meridian, 1989), 169.
10 Ibid.
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philosophy is an experience of the human soul, that for which the philosopher strives in
the pursuit of wisdom. What Plato describes is that which is, as he indicates, a general
experience that all who seek philosophy will undertake and experience for themselves,
no matter the time and place which they occupy. This experience of which Plato speaks
is one that is based upon an ancient definition of philosophy, a seeking ofWisdom, and
as one adopts this same position seeking the same philosophical ideal, she or he
experiences the one idea of philosophy and encounter with the divine. Taken from this,
such an experience bears upon contemporary understanding in that what is given in the
Seventh Letter, and indeed the Dialogues as a whole, is a philosophical religious
experience that is, at the very least, similar to that which is known by Plato himself
which he encourages in his readers. Further, such an understanding and experience is
possible through Plato because of the theological position that is taken in regard to
philosophy - an atemporal quest, need, and experience that is able to transform every
individual through an encounter with the divine in the soul, which all possess and which
is fulfilled equally by an encounter with the divine, which remains changeless in its
essence throughout time.
In our own time, such a thought is challenged by a perspective that influences
both theological and philosophical thought in that all are bound by the hermeneutics of
one's own age, to the point that no one has the same experience and that all of our
experiences are conditioned by our own particular situation. Even as Protagoras said
which Plato quotes himself, 'man is the measure of all things,\Cratylus 386a) no one
can claim an experience which unites them to a group or individual beyond their own
first-hand experience. Of course, no one will safely deny that there is some
hermeneutical distance between our own historical and cultural situation and others of
other time periods, and cannot deny that we all possess our own unique, individual
experiences which are ours alone, unable to be linked to anyone else. However, what is
experienced through a reading of Plato by those who seek Plato as a religious thinker is
that there is a commonality of human experience, based upon a common understanding
of humanity itself, which is addressed by Plato through his philosophy and through
which humanity is transformed. In our own time, Karl Jaspers illumines such an
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understanding in his work, The Perennial Scope ofPhilosophy, by alluding to the
consideration that there is a universal religious experience of philosophy in which all
those who desire wisdom desire the same thing. Jaspers writes that, 'Philosophical truth
is the philosphia perennis to which no one can lay claim, but with which everyone
engaged in philosophical thought is concerned, and which is present wherever there are
true philosophers.'11 Jaspers sees philosophy as a great tradition which would 'beckon
us' in that,
Despite the wide variety of philosophical thought, despite all the contradictions
and mutually exclusive claims to truth, there is in all philosophy a One, which no
man possesses but about which all serious efforts have at all times gravitated:
the one eternal philosophy, the philosophia perennis. We must seek this
historical foundation of our thinking ifwe would think clearly and
meaningfully.12
The 'true philosophers' in this case are those who engage in an atemporal quest through
philosophy for a one eternal reality, and it is those philosophers, like Plato, who are able
through their work to cast our minds, even our souls, toward this eternal reality. As
Jaspers writes, it is only by contemplating the eternal that we are able to 'become
1 "3 # #
ourselves,' and the great philosophers, though people in the world, 'help us to by
contemplating that which is eternal.'14 Through Plato's philosophical theology,
contemporary theological and philosophical thought is given an idea of a common
human experience which is above time and place.
Yet, where the consideration of Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life
today leads us, is to an encounter with the divine. The subjects which have been
covered in this thesis involve a concept of the divine as occupying a place very much
involved with humanity, manifest in the world and the memory of the soul, but also a
transcendent realm that the philosophical soul strives to encounter and become united
with in order to live the best possible life. The idea of the divine in Plato constantly
occupies a both-and position, in the human experience both in the soul and in the world,
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doctrine of the Forms, Plato presents a philosophical theology that expresses this
transcendent but very immanent idea of the divine, but one which, through Plato,
establishes a way of philosophical spirituality for today.
Through the view of Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life, the concept of
the Forms is one that prompts devotion in the philosopher, but it is a divine that is
dynamic as the Ideas (e.g. the Good, Beauty, the One, etc.) are each, in and of
themselves, divine realities but known in the religious philosophical experience as the
centres of the philosophical quest - in dramatic terminology, as the divinities, the true
gods, ofPlato's philosophy. What is emphasised through this high regard of the
philosophical Ideas is that in Plato the concept of the Ideas is the compelling notion in
philosopher's religious devotion, and not so much a simple devotion to a personal God.
One particular expression of this notion in a contemporary context is seen in the work of
Iris Murdoch who manifests a theological perspective that is not only based in Plato, but
one that seeks to show that the conception of the divine that is offered by Plato through
the experience of his philosophy in the encounter with the Ideas is one that is much more
religious, as well as insightful, for contemporary thought than the traditional concepts of
the divine altogether.
It is an indisputable fact for Murdoch that one who reads Plato experiences that
which is of both a philosophical and religious nature that is applicable for today, for as
Fergus Kerr writes, to Murdoch, Plato is indeed a deeply religious thinker15 to whom
'we must turn'.16 Yet, the experience that is given through Plato is one that defines, for
Murdoch, what a true religious experience is to be, as Kerr continues that for Murdoch,
'Religion is inescapable... and Platonist metaphysics is the only viable form it can now
take.'17 The crucial aspect ofMurdoch's position is that we are presented through Plato
with the reality of the divine, a divine that is experienced beyond a traditional
understanding: one that is beyond a simple description of one or many, or even in terms
of being 'personal' or 'impersonal', but one that is religiously moving at the same time.
14 Ibid
15




For Murdoch, Plato presents a philosophical spirituality that finds its religious devotion
in the philosophical quest, a quest that takes one beyond a simple understanding of
'God' or 'gods' to a quest for a divine that is above traditional conceptions, as Murdoch
writes, 'Plato of course did not believe in a personal God or gods. ..,'18 but is one who
sees religion or 'concern with "the ultimate", above the picturesque or figurative level of
"the gods,'" altogether. 19 As Kerr notes, for Murdoch, this unbelief in a personal god or
• 90
gods is precisely why Plato 'speaks to our age.' However, as Murdoch indicates, it is
not an unbelief in the divine, nor the lack of a religious experience in his philosophy
which makes Plato applicable to the contemporary age, but a negating of a belief in a
personal God. The type of experience that Plato portrays through his philosophy makes
him relevant to our time, an experience which does not simply rely upon traditional
understandings of the divine, but is one made up within the spiritual reality, power, and
human experience of the Forms.
In considering the human experience of Plato's philosophy as a religious way of
life, we are presented through Murdoch's commentary with a perspective for a religious
way of life that is built upon the Forms as a basis for a philosophical spirituality. For
Murdoch, Plato presents a much more vibrant spirituality through his conception of the
Forms than what is offered in a traditional picture of God as she writes:
The eternal separate inviolate Forms seem to me a more profound image of
moral and spiritual reality than the picture of a personal Father, however good.
The Forms represent the absolute and gratuitous nature of the moral demand.. ..21
Counteracting against the traditional Christian concept, Murdoch's words indicate that
which is part of the human experience. Echoing the thoughts of Simone Weil in her
22 • •
Intimations ofChristianity, Murdoch even writes that Plato establishes a 'trinity' of his
own in the concept of the Forms, Demiurge, and World Soul, which, 'may be seen
reflected (surely not by accident) in the Christian Trinity as God the Father (Form of the




Kerr, Immortal Longings, 86.
21 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mysics, 431.
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Weil, Intimations, chapter 8: 'Divine Love in Creation', 89-105. In a significant quote, Weil writes that
the Soul of the World in Plato's Timaeus is the 'unique Son of God' (92) and that the 'essential idea of the
Timaeus is that the foundation, the substance of the universe wherein we live, is love.' (102)
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Good), Holy Spirit (Demiurge) and Christ (Anima Mundi).'23 However, Plato's trinity is
that which is, for Murdoch, more spiritually enlivening than any traditional concept: 'If
one may here respond simply and naively to something so complex, I confess that I find
Plato's Trinity more morally radiant than that of the Church.'24
The actual question of'why' the Forms are able to be such compelling religious
ideas for Murdoch may be answered in the fact that through the philosophical theology
of Plato's Forms we are given a religious philosophical concept which is present within
human experience. Through the Forms being involved within and affecting human
existence (i.e. in the memory of the soul the philosophical life that is lived), they become
far more applicable to human existence as a whole, more intertwined with humanity,
than even a concept of a personal God or gods will allow. The Forms are an
interrelation of philosophy and spirituality presenting a philosophical theology that is
based upon the philosophical concepts which are involved within and experienced by
humanity. Setting aside the plethora of arguments that may be offered for or against
Murdoch's idea of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Murdoch sees that by looking
beyond the traditional view of God to Plato's approach, one finds not an absence of the
divine but a full and rich presence of the divine in the world, known especially in the
idea of Plato's Good. She writes,
The idea of 'the world as full of images ofGod and hierarchies pointing to God'
is, as I see it, fundamental in religion and (mutatis mutandis) in morality. I think
this is what (ifwe put Good for God) the world is full of! The affirmative way,
which can find the divine everywhere in all the desire-driven burrowings of
cognition, relates spirituality to the whole of our being.
Through Murdoch's commentary we are able to see, through Plato's philosophy as a
religious experience, a concept of the divine that goes beyond the Christian tradition,
and secondly, one that is known within the philosophical experience.
Murdoch's perspective gives a fresh conception of the divine, one that attempts
to understand the spirituality of Plato's philosophical theology on its own terms (which
23
Murdoch, Metaphysics, 145. A correction, however, must be made of Murdoch's associations, as
historically Chrisitan theologians have seen the Holy Spirit as the Anima Mundi, and Christ as the
Demiurge.
24 Murdoch, Existentialists andMysics, 431.
25 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 455.
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is where a contemporary understanding of Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life
must be considered). A value ofMurdoch's perspective is that it offers, for lack of
better terms, a philosophical polytheism: meaning that the Ideas form a multiple array of
divine concepts which interact with human experience and are witnessed within the
world forming through this a much more dynamic theology as well as a theology very
much involved within the human experience itself. In this manner, it is the
contemplation of the Forms, that provides a spiritually and philosophically enlightening
way of life. Such an example as Murdoch's is characterised by its attempt to reconstruct
an aspect of Plato's philosophical theology for contemporary thought while not overtly
drawing upon established conceptions ofGod and the divine and making Plato's
philosophical theology conform to them. For Plato, the divine is described in a
multiplicity of expressions but remains ultimately inexpressible, one that is always being
known acutely through the religious experience of philosophy. Though being variously
expressed and indefinable, the divine is not absent in Plato, but is one that is known and
defined through the philosophical experience itself. The definition that Plato offers of
the divine is one which is varied and ultimately indefinable, expressed best in terms of
concepts, or better, the Ideas rather than a person, yet at the same time is one that is just
as real and personally involving for humanity as any traditional concept of a personal
God alone. It can also be said, however, along with this, that Murdoch is too quick to
rid Plato's philosophical theology of a personal God altogether. Given the evidence in
the Dialogues of the use of the word, 'God' alone, there is indeed some conception of
'God' in Plato, even though the question of what is meant by the term may be an open
one. What is interesting, however, beyond this, is the insight that Murdoch attempts,
though dealing primarily with Plato's philosophical theology from an ethical question as
9 f\ • •
her work on the Good manifests, to understand Plato's theological perspective as
outside of traditional theological mandates but still aware of the divine as well. It is here
that we are given a contemporary direction that springs from philosophy as a religious
experience and in the process illumines the face of the conception of the divine through
26 See On 'God' and the 'Good and The Sovereignty Good Over Other Concepts, in Existentialists and
Mystics, pages 337 and 363 respectively.
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that experience of the divine itself. Even Stephen R. L. Clark's words convey the
reluctance to lump Plato's philosophical theology with a traditional Judeo-Christian
conception but to still capture the presence of the divine within Platonic philosophical
theology. As he seems to indicate, for Clark, to fit Plato's words into a traditional
conception actually promotes a misunderstanding altogether of the 'God' that the
Platonists seek,
But as a general rule... nothing I say is peculiar to the forms of theism
identifiable as Abrahamic. More often than not (as often in my books before) I
am speaking of "God" as pagan Platonists did, and often in ways that I could
fairly easily translate into less theological modes.27
What is offered through Plato's philosophical theology in the consideration of
philosophy as a religious way of life is that the concept of the divine is not termed in less
theological modes, but simply in terms less traditional and more fluid. What can be said
is Plato emphasises the experience of philosophy as a religious way of life, and when
seen in a contemporary context, this experience is the basis for a divine multiplicitly
expressed, but unitedly experienced by the philosophical soul.
We may say that the human experience of philosophy as a religious way of life
through Plato exhibits a playfulness toward the conception of the divine, a speculative
nature that does not strive for a hard, doctrinal approach, but incorporates through that
play and speculation, a deeper devotion than any hard doctrinal position. In the idea of
Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life is an idea of the divine that is experienced,
and this experience can never be placed in a tight category which states conclusively one
idea of the divine. Just as the experience is multiplicit, so are the expressions of the
divine that come to be known through this experience. Yet, such a playfulness does not
negotiate the meaning of the divine within the life of the one who seeks the
philosophical experience. As J. B. Skemp adequately puts it, '[in Plato] is a playfulness
which can be mistaken for disbelief but which expresses a deeper faith than
98 • • •
"orthodoxy."' What is sought for and known in this experience is that which is more
profound than religious ritual, even a purer and more meaningful concept as it is born
27
Stephen R. L. Clark, How To Think About the Earth (Mowbray: London, 1993), 4.
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within human experience itself. It is in its playfulness that the life followed through
Plato's philosophy become truly religious - or to use Murdoch's definition, truly
concerned with 'the ultimate' - because it is that which begins within human
experience.
A main conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that theological thought, if it
is to be effective to the world, must move beyond the strictures of traditional theological
concepts to that which is more speculative and creative as it arises out of the human
experience. The way that this can be done is to analyse that which is meaningful to
human experience itself, even a conception of the divine from that which is known
already in the soul and from the encounter with the divine through the quest for Wisdom
in the ancient conception of philosophy. It is just such a reason why Plato's
philosophical theology applies today, forming a model of a religious way of life.
The main aspect of the overall value ofPlato's philosophical theology for today
is found in that it recaptures a sense of philosophy as a religious endeavour and upon
this idea forms a philosophical theology that is insightful to contemporary thought.
Plato's is a way that celebrates the philosophical endeavour as that through which
humanity experiences the divine, all along being a philosophical theology that is deeply
intertwined with the human experience. It is these two ideas that not only govern the
overall characteristic of Plato's philosophical theology as a whole, but are the points at
which Plato's philosophical informs theological thought today. If any sort of call can be
given as to what may be further investigated, it is that what must be undertaken is a
theological understanding of the human experience and endeavour of ancient philosophy
as a religious exercise and allow for the ancient philosophical vision to inform our own.
This is not to say that all philosophical movements are essentially intertwined with
religious thought, or even capable of being seen in this way, but to see that the ancient
endeavour of philosophy benefits theological thought remarkably by examining the
enterprise of philosophy itself in light of being a way of human transformation and a
vision of the divine which is mystical and dynamic and present within the world. To
28 J. B. Skemp, 'The Spirituality of Socrates and Plato', Classical Mediterranean Spirituality, A. H.
Armstrong, ed. (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1986), 109.
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examine (even re-examine) the religious nature of the ancient philosophical visions in a
contemporary light yields a much needed mixture between philosophy and spirituality,
intellect and soul, and a way of life that sees the practice of philosophy as a religious
way of life. As Peter Kingsley has conveyed in his book In the Dark Places of
9Q • •
Wisdom, there is a even a need to bring the depth of the religious vision of the ancient
philosophical tradition to today, in his own particular argument, through the work of
Parmenides, to a contemporary world that is thirsty for a blending that embraces
philosophical depth with religious ideas that go beyond the traditional, and sometimes
worn, doctrines of theological establishment. Yet, as has been suggested in this thesis, it
is through Plato that such an endeavour can be most profitably done within
contemporary thought as Plato presents a theology that arises from human experience.
Through Plato's philosophy an array of theological ideas are given which are insightful
to theological thought today - even pressing the mark toward a theological
understanding that is at once open but also directly experienced and relevant for human
existence. Such a way, of course, is found in Plato who, though even having been
exhaustively treated for centuries regarding textual considerations and commentaries,
nonetheless is given a reviewing through this thesis that his philosophy poses a religious
experience which is relevant and insightful for today. As a religious thinker, even in
some ways a reformer, his philosophical theology seeks to transform humanity through
its theological ideas, and within this one idea of philosophy as a religious experience,
provides a basis for a contemporarily relevant philosophical theology to be built.
What is seen in the consideration of the theological ideas that are implicit in
Plato's philosophy as a religious way of life today is that Plato's philosophy represents a
call back to seeing philosophy as a way of spirituality. In this calling back to philosophy
as a religious way of life, Plato's philosophical represents a looking forward to once
again no longer joining philosophical and religious thought seeking a place wherein both
of these become interrelated. Indeed, that Plato leads us to a 'new' theological
perspective is a far-reaching thought. To establish a contemporary rendering ofPlato's
philosophical theology is to begin to see the act of pursuing philosophy in the Platonic
29 Peter Kingsley, In the Dark Places ofWisdom (Element Books Limited: Dorset, 1999).
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sense of the term as uniting the divine and humanity through a perspective which
interrelates and unites philosophical and religious thought. Yet, Plato teaches how to
philosophise and theologise rather than necessarily what to think. All of Plato's
philosophical-theological ideas are beginnings within which, and through which, we
may delve into a more profound theology and a deeper understanding of humanity, as
even the very nature ofPlato's dialogues proves by leaving us with as many questions as
it does answers. It is through Plato's philosophy as a religious experience that we come
to encounter and experience the divine and understand Plato's philosophical theology as
a true philosophical theology - a place where philosophy and religious thought
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